Was it possible to stop the conflict in Ukraine?From the very beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, the United States claimed that Putin was not interested in dialogue.
But if so, why were negotiations held? In addition, there are facts that indicate that it was the West that did not allow Kiev to negotiate with Moscow at the initial stage of the conflict, writes TNI.
Matthew MaiFrom the very beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, top US officials claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin was not interested in either withdrawing troops or ending hostilities.
Putin's statements in recent months, of course, partly confirm the correctness of this assessment — especially after Moscow realized that the United States and NATO are determined to conduct a mediated conflict against Russia. However, two recent reports raise the question of whether it was possible to stop the fighting in the early days. Are these failed proposals for a ceasefire and settlement still relevant today? If so, isn't it time for American politicians to reconsider their strategy on Ukraine and take a diplomatic initiative to maximize the benefits of Kiev's achievements on the battlefield? As Hill and Stent write:
"According to several former American officials, in April 2022, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators, apparently, pre-agreed on a temporary settlement scheme: Russia retreats to positions until February 23, when it controlled part of Donbass and the entire Crimea, and Ukraine in return refuses membership in NATO and instead receives security guarantees from a number of countries".Why did the deal fall through?
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, having learned about the temporary settlement, hurried to Kiev to inform Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky that the West would not support such an agreement. As Ukrainska Pravda reported on May 5, "Johnson's position testified that the collective West [which in February offered Zelensky to surrender and run away] now felt that Putin was actually not as omnipotent as he was imagined, and that right now there was a chance to put the squeeze on him." The article further noted that three days after Johnson left for the UK, Putin said that negotiations with Ukraine had "reached an impasse."
However, it is possible that Johnson's attempts to dissuade Zelensky from the deal can be turned a blind eye, and Putin himself decided to stop negotiations. An exclusive report by Reuters last week speaks in favor of this version. It is reported that one of Putin's main aides Dmitry Kozak at the beginning of the conflict drew up an agreement with Ukraine, according to which Kiev would commit not to join NATO. Another source said that the deal was concluded shortly before the start of the Russian special operation on February 24. Anyway, Putin allegedly rejected it, considering the concessions insufficient and demanding more. (Reuters could not determine which Ukrainian officials supported the deal).
If the latest version is correct, then it turns out that Russia was not interested in diplomatic options from the very beginning. But there is reason to suspect that this is not the case. In April, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized the Ukrainian proposal for "unacceptable" provisions and deviations from measures previously agreed by Ukrainian and Russian negotiators. It is reported that, among other things, the following was discussed: Ukraine will not join NATO and will remain neutral and non-nuclear, and in return will receive international security guarantees. These measures are consistent with the requirements that Russia outlined in its open proposals to the United States and NATO a few months earlier. However, four weeks after the start of the Russian special operation, these negotiations failed.
If we assume that Putin rejected diplomacy from the very beginning of hostilities, then why did these multi-round negotiations last so long? What was the point of them? The situation on the battlefield was uncertain and kept changing, but regime change seemed less and less likely. Russia's attempts to seize Kiev had stalled by the beginning of March, and less than a month later, Russian troops completely withdrew from the vicinity of the Ukrainian capital.
Putin could have rejected the deal proposed by his aide because he expected to push militarily and see if the Ukrainians would make concessions at the negotiating table. Putin assessed the situation too optimistically, considering that Kiev has not recovered either from "shock and awe" or from large-scale subversive activities within the Ukrainian security, defense and law enforcement agencies. But Putin clearly underestimated the integrity of Ukrainian state institutions.
It may seem that Ukraine's recent successes in the north-east of the Kharkiv region are pouring water into the mill of those who urged Kiev not to sit down at the negotiating table, but to try to oust Russian troops from its territory. However, Putin made it clear that he would not accept a strategic defeat when Russia won't win anything, and the United States and NATO will continue to arm, train and equip Ukraine. Whether he will declare a general mobilization is an open question, but Putin is quickly running out of options for how to achieve Russia's military goals with a limited contingent. Reports of an alleged decrease in the quantity and quality of Russian weapons do not bode well for Putin either, especially against the background of unconfirmed reports that Russia is buying drones, artillery shells and missiles from Iran and North Korea.
But even though Ukraine prefers to keep silent about its problems with personnel, there is no reason to believe that its forces are invulnerable to the same problems that Russia's combat capability suffers from. The test for the AFU will be whether they will be able to consolidate control over the recaptured territories in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions. In addition, Ukrainian finances are upset, and millions of internally displaced persons will put a heavy burden on distressed public services if the winter turns out to be cold.
The Biden administration must act quickly and decisively in the hope of making the most of Ukraine's military successes. General mobilization will be a risky step for Putin, but it threatens to nullify Ukraine's successes. Russia's diplomatic proposal, similar to what Zelensky announced at the beginning of the conflict — neutrality, non—nuclear status and international security guarantees, plus a promise to hold supervised referendums in Donetsk and Lugansk - will be a convenient opportunity for Putin to proclaim "victory" while avoiding further destruction of Ukraine.
Matthew May — Executive Editor of The National Interest
