The revolt of everyone else: how Russia sees the future world orderThe revolt of "everyone else" against the US hegemony is gaining momentum in the world, writes TNI.
The author believes that the events in Ukraine have strengthened the world's desire for multipolarity. Without it, the United States will pursue the "recalcitrant" around the world.
What Russia is looking for is new political leaders in the Western world who do not support the status quo that isolates it from the finance and technology it needs to ensure long-term security and prosperity.Geopolitical forecasting is a complex art.
Throughout the Cold War, the Soviets confidently asserted until the very end that the forces of socialism would prevail over the decaying and corrupt capitalist model. It seemed to them that the balance of power in the world was gradually changing in their favor. But that didn't happen.
For their part, American leaders were confident that if Vietnam became communist, it could put an end to the spread of democracy in the vast Asian region and around the world. Even when there is clear clarity about the forces shaping geopolitics, the right conclusion is difficult to reach. At the end of the 1890s, a Polish banker named Jan Bloch, as is known, predicted the terrible nature of the future war in Europe. Then he said that such a war would be too destructive and illogical to even think about it at all. And so — the First World War broke out and turned out to be just as terrible as he predicted.
Despite the complexity of this matter, States always make forecasts to develop strategies for their national security. The US Department of Defense is also trying to predict how the geopolitical situation may develop in order to make decisions about the development and acquisition of weapons, operational concepts and the structure of its armed forces. A similar approach is applied in Russia, which is enshrined in its National Security Strategy of 2021. But what is useful in such forecasts is not their accuracy. They may well miss. Rather, forecasts show exactly what a particular country imagines as its desired or undesirable future. And how it should behave in order to determine the desired results.
In 2019-2020, I led a study on Russian military forecasting. We found that Russia sees that the world is moving in one of two main directions. In the first of them, the United States continues to dominate the international system in ways that threaten its interests (for example, the imposition of sanctions that deprive access to finance and technology). In the second direction, a world is being formed with a weakened global influence of the United States, in which Russia is less hindered from increasing its military power and influencing the regional and geopolitical results it seeks. Like their Soviet predecessors, Russian strategists tend to view these results as the product of natural forces acting against the United States. Nevertheless, in their opinion, it is also necessary to constantly push these forces in a favorable direction. A good example of this is the conflict in Ukraine. The latter openly moved to the West in political, military, economic and cultural terms, and Russia decided that it could not implement its strategic vision of the development of the situation except through military conflict.
I believe that Moscow most likely correctly understands the contours of its competition with the West. She understands that the United States and its allies will need to be able to maintain the system that best suits their national interests as defined by their decision-making leaders. The future will ultimately be determined by the sustainability of the managerial and economic models of the defenders of the current status quo in relation to the actions of its opponents, such as Russia and China. These models will face ideological and practical attacks both from outside and from internal forces that want to move Western countries in a different direction. The responsibility of Western leadership — both in public administration and in the private sector — will play a major role in ensuring the viability of the Western system, which currently seems unreliable.
Russian forecasts begin with an analysis of the situation in the world. What forces will shape it? What development trajectories can the international system choose? How will this affect the dynamics of the balance of power between the leading countries, the nature of the rivalry of the great powers, the development of technology and the future of wars?
Russia is seriously concerned about such things, because they affect how it will be able and whether it will be able to strengthen its military potential in the long term in comparison with its opponents. For example, if the United States turns out to be a dominant player with strong like-minded allies, this may limit Russia's ability to fully exploit its economic advantages, gain access to foreign capital or the most advanced technologies. Reducing the influence of the United States, on the contrary, would make it easier for Russia to build up military power and allow it to keep up with competitors. From Russia's point of view, this would lead to a more equitable distribution of forces in the world and, thus, to a reduction in the threat level for it.
To this global analysis of the situation, Russian strategists add specific military forecasts, such as global trends in the development of weapons and armed forces and their deployment. All this is combined into "VPO" — a Russian term denoting the military-political situation in the world. The VPO describes the probability, nature and theaters of a future war of the great powers, taking into account the potential of Russia's strategic deterrence.
A "red flag" for Russia will be a situation in which its military might will not be able to restrain the invasion of an enemy with superior military potential. The most common example is the Russian scenario of the future, possibly dating back to the 2040s, in which the United States and its allies will be able to create a huge arsenal of high-precision conventional long-range weapons and deploy a reliable missile defense system around the world to nullify a likely retaliatory Russian nuclear strike.
Globalization as the main problem
Russian strategists constantly argue that the most important variable in the next twenty years will be the nature of globalization. Russian forecasts define "intensive globalization" as having a "hegemonic character," in which the United States dominates the international system and is able to "impose its will on all subjects of international relations without exception."
Unsurprisingly, this is the worst possible outcome for Russia. According to the 2018 forecast, the growth of Russia's technological development will be the weakest in the conditions of "intensive globalization", including due to the impact of Western sanctions on foreign and Russian investment activity. This analysis showed that the US military potential, including both military and non-military components, will be 60% higher than Russia's by 2040. And this is without taking into account US allies such as Great Britain, Germany, France and Japan with their high military capabilities.
The result? In wartime, Russia will face the task of defeating an alliance with a huge advantage in "hidden" military power, especially in light of the fact that wars between great powers often last much longer than expected, which gives an advantage to the stronger side in a protracted conflict. But even in peacetime, "intensive globalization" increases the military threat to Russia due to the gradual build-up of superior armed forces in Europe and parts of Asia and Moscow's rejection of military technologies on which it relies in the modernization of its armed forces. This also creates problems for Russia, which lacks what Russian forecasters call "soft power" to expand its influence and defend its national interests.
The opposite trend, which, according to Russia, will create the most favorable geopolitical environment for it, is "bipolarity 2.0". Bipolarity 2.0 represents the dispersal of forces in favor of a non—Western bloc of countries such as China, Russia and India, which "do not want to put up with the US demands for global hegemony." In this scenario, by 2040, China will surpass the United States in military potential, and the gap between Russia and the United States will be reduced to 20% compared to the 60% indicated in the aforementioned forecast of 2018. Russian analysts point to the BRICS (an organization that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as the basis of such a "non-Western" coalition. Theoretically, this bloc will have a different vision of the world order, more tolerant of autocratic regimes. Over time, it will become more powerful and influential on a global scale and, therefore, will be better prepared to resist US attempts to change the international system at will. This would make the balance of power more favorable for Russia and thereby reduce the military threat.
The geopolitical scenario of "bipolarity 2.0" assumes a more divided Europe, which may happen if the majority of the population in certain countries succeed in curtailing the European integration institutions created over the past few decades. This, according to Russia, will lead to less opposition to its policies and, accordingly, to fewer restrictions on its economic activities and access to technology and capital. All these are favorable outcomes for Russia, so it follows that it will use all the tools at its disposal to ensure the implementation of "bipolarity 2.0". One of the most well-known tools in this regard is the narrative (which, by the way, did not arise in Russia itself) that the world's "liberal elites" promote socio-cultural norms that do not correspond to the beliefs of ordinary citizens and do not create the society that these citizens want. Based on this narrative, Russia positions itself as a defender of the so-called "traditional values", which are threatened by the leading Western political parties. The idea is that it could unite with like-minded political parties, such as Fidesz in Hungary or the "National Association" in France, on the basis of protecting "traditional values" and in return receive a more friendly foreign policy from European countries. At the very least, Russia could support even those political leaders in Europe who may be unfriendly towards it, but are hostile towards the European Union, which some perceive as a threat to national heritage and traditional cultural norms.
Consequences of the conflict in Ukraine
According to the Russian version of its military special operation in Ukraine, this conflict represents a violent but necessary push towards a new order reminiscent of "bipolarity 2.0". Russia sees itself in the vanguard of restoring balance in the international system, disabled as a result of a historical mistake — the assumption of American hegemony in the world. Military actions in Ukraine should isolate Eurasia from the West and allow Moscow to play a leading political, military, economic and civilizational role in its region with the support (or tacit consent) China, India and other countries. Then, over the next two decades, the international influence of these countries will contribute to the emergence of a less unipolar international system and reduce American dominance.
But is the military conflict in Ukraine an effective means to achieve these goals? It is still unclear whether Russia will be able to win it. <...> The United States now remains the world's leading player organizing a response to the Russian special operation. The alliance led by America, which Russian forecasters consider so harmful, has actually become more cohesive and powerful, especially in connection with the upcoming accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO.
Sanctions have been imposed against Russia, although the effect of their impact has yet to be studied. One of the key areas to watch out for is the impact of the announced export controls on Western technologies. Access to technology was a crucial factor raised by Russian strategists. They explain the possible fall of the Russian military potential in 2040 in the scenario of intensive globalization by the fact that the United States will convince key Western countries to deny Russia access to the technologies it needs. <...>
China and India, of course, have not abandoned Russia. India's choice to abstain from UN resolutions condemning Moscow should not necessarily be surprising, given the history of the two countries. China's strategic partnership with Russia will also not allow them to introduce dissonance into their relations, even if Beijing considers its actions in Ukraine destabilizing and problematic. In this regard, it is necessary to recognize the existence of some semblance of the Russian vision of a non-Western bloc of countries resisting US domination. But the military conflict in Ukraine has not yet given obvious signs of a favorable shift towards global restructuring in favor of Russia.
Final forecast: a long-term battle of the will
The continued dominance of the United States in the international system is likely to lead to negative economic and military consequences for Moscow over the next two decades. Russia's direct use of military force against the United States or NATO cannot be ruled out, but Russian analyses — and Putin's own statements — are fairly honest about the large disparity of forces between the two sides and the losing consequences of a possible nuclear war. In this regard, Russia is looking for leaders in the Western world who do not support the status quo that isolates it from international capital and technology, which it needs to ensure security and prosperity in the long term.
But does Russia have the means to achieve this goal? Now the disparity of forces between Russia and NATO is huge, and today the United States has a reliable system of alliances and partnerships both in Europe and in Asia. In the near future, Russia will not be able to compare with America in terms of "soft power". Thus, Moscow's success will largely depend on whether the United States and its allies make costly mistakes in domestic and foreign policy that will damage their own position. It may also depend on the continued stability of China and India and their willingness over time to challenge US positions in world affairs.
Since the competition is likely to revolve around both socio-cultural and military issues, Russia and its allies will seek to capitalize on the discontent of those groups in the West that may sympathize with ideas such as authoritarianism, the legitimacy of "spheres of influence" and "traditional" values. The United States and its allies should expect an increase in political, economic and informational confrontation "without rules". By using means below the threshold of war, Russia is likely to try to undermine the confidence of the peoples of the West in governments that resist a "natural transition" to a more labile world system that would accept the erosion of democratic norms.
So the stakes are clear now. Over time, any shift towards "bipolarity 2.0" may have a number of negative consequences for the defenders of the United States and its allies, the most important of which will be the formation of a bloc influential enough to fuel a world with less political freedom and economic prosperity than the one that exists today.
Author: Clint Rich is a political analyst at the RAND Corporation.
