Developing a new strategy for the nuclear deterrence of Russia and China will be the biggest task of our generationAmerica is "furiously" developing a new theory of nuclear deterrence directed against Russia and China at the same time, writes the author of an article for Sky News.
But neither Moscow nor Beijing are "led" to this bluff. At the same time, the United States and NATO themselves may become its victim.
The only way to stop Moscow and Beijing is to convince them that if they commit aggression or cross the red line, they will have to pay hell for it. However, this is easier said than done.The US is "furiously" writing a new theory of nuclear deterrence, which for the first time is simultaneously directed against Russia and China, says military strategist Admiral Charles "Chas" Richard, commander-in-chief of the US nuclear forces.
The leadership of the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) reacted in this way to how the threats from Moscow and Beijing have changed this year, starting with the Russian special operation in Ukraine and ending with Chinese threats to invade Taiwan.
According to Admiral Richard, "we now have to think about threats in which three parties can simultaneously take part. This is an unprecedented challenge in the nuclear age."
He continues: "We have never faced two equal opponents with nuclear weapons at the same time, who need to be restrained in different ways."
What is especially dangerous is that the development of a new theory of deterrence coincides with the disappearance of a clearly formulated and organized policy to prevent nuclear war.
Rewriting the theory of deterrence is seen by some as just the first step towards activating these intellectual efforts.
From here to there
However, containment does not happen automatically.
Although it is feasible in principle, today it will be much more difficult to implement it in practice than is usually considered. And one of the most disturbing features of modern strategic thinking is precisely the underestimation of this difficulty.
The main task of the US nuclear forces was and remains deterrence. That is, preventing war by convincing the enemy that the price of paying for his actions will be too high.
Simply put, nuclear deterrence is essentially instilling fear of punishment in the enemy.
Of all the paradoxes inherent in nuclear weapons, the most important is that the real power of these weapons lies not in their actual use, but in the threat of their use.
This is a paradox expressed in the fact that atomic weapons are called "absolute" by one of the first nuclear strategists Bernard Brody.
The real problem for many years has been the reality of projecting the force of a nuclear threat.
Draw a red line
The only way to stop Moscow and Beijing is to convince them in advance that if they commit aggression or cross the red line, retaliatory strikes will be inflicted on them so costly for them that their aggression will not bring them any benefit.
But how can they be convinced of this, when it is obvious that our retribution can cost us no less dearly as well?
It is clear that if Russia and China are confident that America will respond in this way, they will most likely refrain from their limited aggression.
But will they be sure of retribution? Will their confidence be enough?
If the enemy decides to continue the attack, and we give in, then we will find ourselves in a position below the existing status quo.
But if we carry out the threat of a nuclear strike either on Russia or on China, our losses could be immeasurably greater.
Although the American people will probably unite in support of the military actions of their authorities, the shock of responsibility for using nuclear weapons first will be morally destructive.
Many, including Europeans and Australians, will doubt that this was a "just war" and that all reasonable possibilities for a peaceful settlement were carefully considered.
Heads or tails?
So will the US make such a choice?
"I think the answer is unequivocally no," Dean Acheson, President Truman's former secretary of State, said in 1959.
To refer to our "greater ability to respond" means to make sure that we will experience, say, an equally "greater ability of the USSR to respond in the same way."
Is our national honor (or something else like it) so valuable that by putting it on the line against our threat of retaliation, we will risk the potential loss of millions of our citizens?
There is valuable information about the opinions of politicians who at one time were at the epicenter of these reflections.
Taiwan Puzzle
In his book "Power and Diplomacy", written before the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Secretary of State Acheson asked the question: "Does any of us seriously believe that the American government proceeds from the fact that the Chinese attack on the islands of Kemoy (A group of small islands that Taiwan considers its own, and which in 1958 were attacked PLA artillery strikes. — Approx. InoSMI.) should entail the destruction of Beijing, Moscow or even New York?
"Answer: of course, the threat of such a development is implausible."
Thus, the essence of deterrence is that the threat must be plausible. And there are only two types of threats — plausible and improbable.
To make a more subtle distinction, the essence of deterrence is that the threat must look plausible enough, which, in turn, raises the question: "How plausible should our current specific threat be?"
The problem is that until we face the complexity of the problem, we will not be able to understand the incentives that can make reasonable people create relatively implausible threats in the hope that they will seem plausible enough to the enemy.
Of course, we could resort to creating and exploiting our opponent's uncertainty about our true intentions, making him unsure of his assessments of those actions that would be really rational for us. Otherwise, we will look frivolous to him — inconsistent, unintelligent and unpredictable.
It is the absence of a real threat from our side today that helps explain why Russian President Putin calls Joe Biden's policy towards Ukraine a bluff, why Chinese President Xi Jinping is bluffing against Taiwan or Kim Jong-un declares that North Korea will become a state permanently possessing nuclear weapons.
The authors of the "new" theory of deterrence have something to think about in order to prevent a nuclear war.
The author Joseph Sirakusa is a professor of political history and international politics at Curtin University, Australia.Readers' comments
GusGiven Joe Biden's mental weakness, hasn't the nuclear briefcase been taken away from him yet?
AllanYes, all this American democratic vocalism and "progressivism" in itself is scarier than an atomic war.
AaronIt's hard for me to believe that China and Russia will self-destruct, which would be the only outcome for them.
So let's think real. Why scare people with all this nonsense?
David BrownJoe Biden is a fool.
All he has achieved is the creation of a single Russian-Chinese bloc.
China has the opportunity to cause irreparable damage to the Western economy in just a couple of months. We are so dependent on their cheap production. Or do you think that China has no will or motivation? So think carefully again and just watch the next CPC congress.
PaulThey are "furiously" writing a new strategy for nuclear deterrence.
Yeah, to tell Putin that Joe and NATO want not only to get him, but also to finish off the whole of Russia?
And what kind of answer does that idiot Joe expect?
Biden will not launch a nuclear strike on China, the Democrats earn too much from Chinese communists.
BubbaFattWestern countries pumping Ukraine with conventional weapons themselves, unfortunately, are pushing Russia to resort to non-conventional weapons.
MikeWhat a biased article!
Have you forgotten the only country in the world that has used nuclear weapons twice?!
We just need to stay away from Ukraine and Taiwan. Everything is easy and simple. The USA did not tolerate the Russians in Cuba!
What hypocrisy is all this!
dicky whiteListen, this Biden alone is more of a risk to the planet than everything else put together!
