The wise restraint of the United States towards RussiaWashington should adhere to "reasonable" strategic restraint in relation to Moscow, writes the FA.
Historically, such a policy is justified. It is necessary in the context of the Ukrainian conflict, which is dangerous with the possibility of escalating into a nuclear clash with Russia, the authors of the article write.
As during the Cold War, Washington cannot do without MoscowIn the article "Stop Tiptoeing in front of Russia" (August 8), Alexander Vindman (Alexander Semyon Vindman is a former US Army officer, Ukrainian, director of European Affairs of the US National Security Council.
— Approx. A retired lieutenant colonel of the US Army of Ukrainian origin, claims that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington's approach to Moscow was stuck at the pole of the appeasement policy of the last stage of the Cold War. "For the past three decades," writes Windman, "the United States has been going out of its way to recognize Russia's security concerns and dispel its worries in this regard." The United States, in his opinion, should have taken the other pole: instead of "tiptoeing" around Moscow, as the title of his article says, Washington should have gone for a direct confrontation from the very beginning.
In his narrative, Windman catastrophically misrepresents the history of US policy towards Russia and its neighbors in the post-Soviet era. In addition, despite his claims, a more confrontational relationship with Russia would not serve the interests of the United States and would be especially problematic today. Indeed, the lessons of every significant Cold War crisis suggest that a more prudent policy is needed at such a dangerous moment.
Consistent non-agreement
The US policy towards post-Soviet Russia has never come close to the extreme accommodation with Moscow that Windman is talking about. At one time, Washington really tried to establish partnership relations with it, but these efforts were carefully limited so that even the thought of a possible agreement between the great powers was not created. When American and Russian interests diverged, the United States acted without the slightest hesitation. Even in the 1990s, during the heyday of bilateral relations, Washington actively sought NATO expansion, defended international intervention in the Kosovo issue and actively developed its missile defense, despite Moscow's sharp objections.
Contrary to Vindman's claims, the US policy was consistently non-conciliatory towards Moscow's behavior with its closest neighbors in order to prevent the revival of a new regional hostile force led by it after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since the early 1990s, Washington has sought to convince everyone in the region that "Russia is not the only light in the window," according to Strobe Talbott, former US President Bill Clinton's chief adviser on Russia. The United States lobbied for the construction of oil and gas pipelines that would destroy Russia's monopoly on energy exports and thus provide other producers and transit countries in the region with independent revenue streams. It provided political and financial support to regional groupings of the former Soviet republics that rejected the influence of Russia.
The US aid budgets of that era also reflected the priority of their work with Russia's inner circle. Despite the fact that half of the population of the newly independent states lived in Russia, in 1998 it received only 17% of the aid funds intended for the post-Soviet space. And Ukraine has become the center of US efforts in the region, especially after two revolutions in 2005 and 2014. Indeed, if the allies had not objected, the George W. Bush administration would have put Ukraine (and Georgia) on a smooth path to NATO membership back in 2008. If the West had any hesitations about Ukraine's admission to NATO, they were the result of its chronic insolvency as a state, and by no means a desire to somehow butter up Moscow. In short, the rejection of the "red lines" declared by Russia was the norm of US policy towards the post-Soviet space. And minimal respect for them was just an exception.
Thus, the facts refute Windman's historical narrative about US politics. They also point out that the alternative they advocate would then contradict the interests of the United States and Russia's neighbors. Avoiding the confrontational extreme of the political spectrum of relations with Russia, US policy has achieved many significant successes. Bilateral relations were far from as fruitless as Vindman claims. Let's recall, for example, the time-tested reduction of the nuclear arsenals of Washington and Moscow, achieved by both sides through arms control, or Russia's assistance in the US-led war in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks. Moreover, the tension in relations between them, as a rule, is accompanied by increased threats to the security of Russia's neighbors. A direct US-Russian confrontation, which Vindman advocates, would jeopardize the interests of the United States and the security of countries such as Ukraine. It makes even less sense to start such a confrontation now, during the most serious crisis between Washington and Moscow in recent decades. The Cold War teaches the exact opposite lesson: crises require pragmatic restraint.
Avoiding escalation
During periods of high tension in relations with the USSR and China, US presidents have repeatedly shown some respect for Soviet and Chinese interests. During the Korean War, US General Douglas MacArthur confidently led American troops to the Yalu River, receiving assurances that China would never enter the war. When this happened, MacArthur called for an escalation of the conflict, including the use of nuclear weapons. But despite MacArthur's persistent public statements of this kind, President Harry Truman refused to risk a larger war. Instead, he relied on negotiations with China on a cease-fire and resigned himself to a difficult and extremely unpopular compromise option. His courageous decision "to prevent the crisis in Korea, no matter how terrible, from escalating into a world war," says historian David McCullough, "stands out as a particularly remarkable achievement among the triumphs of the Truman administration."
In 1956, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower not only refused to intervene in Hungary, but also strongly advocated restraint. "I doubt that Soviet leaders genuinely fear Western interference," he told his National Security Council. — But with the weakening of the Soviet Union's power over its satellites, could Moscow resort to extreme measures, up to the outbreak of World War? We must watch this opportunity with the utmost caution." Eisenhower hoped that Washington's guarantees of non-interference would encourage Moscow to exercise similar restraint. His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, even said then about the Eastern European satellites of the USSR: "We do not consider these countries as potential military allies." This momentary restraint of the West paved the way for further success in the long run: Hungary was eventually liberated from the Soviet yoke, the United States won the Cold War, and the world managed to avoid a devastating war.
Precisely calculated restraint
In recent months, the administration of US President Joe Biden has been sharply criticized for being prudently cautious about America's involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. However, this is not the first time Washington has used such a line. In the tense confrontations with the USSR during the Cold War, from Cuba to Czechoslovakia and Vietnam, US presidents consistently restrained their short-term ambitions in order to avoid the disasters of a large-scale war, especially since they were confident that America would win in the long run. Today, its leaders also have every reason for such confidence: Russia's difficulties in Ukraine, the Kremlin's global isolation and "punitive" sanctions undermine Russia's strategic positions in relation to the United States and Europe.
Windman describes US support for Ukraine as "negligible", limited by Washington's erroneous fears about a possible escalation of the military conflict. On the contrary, reality shows that the Biden administration's approach to helping Ukraine is based on a complex but extremely important balance between risks and opportunities. Washington is gradually increasing the volume and quality of its security assistance to Ukraine, consistently strengthening Kiev's military positions, but not provoking a larger-scale war at the same time. Although this approach disappoints Ukrainian leaders and many international observers, it reflects the best traditions of Cold War-era US crisis diplomacy: to pursue first of all their own interests, avoiding direct confrontation with a rival, and always act with an eye to the long term.
Authors: Samuel Charap is a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation analytical center and co—author of the book "Everyone Loses: the Ukrainian crisis and the destructive struggle for post-Soviet Eurasia".Michael Mazarr is a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation analytical center.
