According to the theory of international relations, the war of the great Powers is comingFor many years, the theory of international relations has mostly inspired optimism, writes Foreign Policy.
But lately, the author of the article complains, all the "pacifying" forces are falling apart before our eyes and increase the likelihood of war between the great powers.
Matthew KroenigThe United States, Russia and China are in a state leading to confrontation
This week, thousands of students around the world will begin studying international relations.
If the professors have already adapted to how the world has changed in recent years, they will tell them about the upcoming conflict of the great powers.
For many years, the theory of international relations has mainly inspired optimism, saying that major powers can maintain constructive cooperation and resolve all differences, avoiding armed conflicts.
Realistic DoD theories that emphasize strength have for decades considered the bipolar world of the Cold War and the unipolar world after it, dominated by the United States, relatively simple non-conflict systems. And nuclear weapons, in turn, increased the cost of conflict and made war between major powers unthinkable.
Meanwhile, liberal theorists have argued that a triumvirate of causal variables (institutions, interdependence, and democracy) promotes cooperation and mitigates conflicts. The dense array of international institutions and agreements created after the Second World War (UN, WTO, NPT, etc.) — including expanded and dependent on them since the end of the Cold War — provided the major powers with platforms for the peaceful settlement of differences.
Moreover, economic globalization has made armed conflicts too costly. Why quarrel when things are going well and everyone is getting rich? And finally, according to this theory, democracies are less likely to fight and more likely to cooperate, and over the past 70 years, many large waves of democratization have swept across the globe, making it less belligerent.
At the same time, constructivist scientists explained how new ideas, norms and identities have changed international politics in a more positive way. In the past, piracy, slavery, torture and wars of conquest were commonplace. However, for many years, the strengthening of human rights norms and prohibitions on the use of weapons of mass destruction have hindered international conflicts.
Unfortunately, almost all of these pacifying forces began to fall apart before our eyes. According to the DoD theory, the main driving factors of international politics say that a new cold war between the United States, China and Russia is unlikely to be peaceful.
Let's start with power politics. We are entering a more multipolar world. Of course, the United States is still the leading world power by almost all objective indicators, but China has taken a solid second place in military and economic power. Europe itself is an economic and regulatory superpower. A more belligerent Russia has the largest stockpile of nuclear weapons, and the major powers of the developing world, such as India, Indonesia, South Africa and Brazil, are choosing the path of non-alignment.
Realists claim that multipolar systems are unstable and prone to major wars due to miscalculations. The First World War is a classic example of this.
Multipolar systems are unstable in part because each country has to think about numerous potential adversaries. Indeed, the US Department of Defense is currently worried about possible simultaneous conflicts with Russia in Europe and China in the Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, President Joe Biden said that the use of military force remains relevant as a last resort to solve the Iranian nuclear problem. There can be no question of a war on three fronts.
Wars due to miscalculations often arise when you fail to appreciate the enemy. States doubt his strength or determination to fight, and therefore challenge them. Sometimes the enemy bluffs, and the challenge pays off, but the determination to defend their interests is fraught with a major war. Russian President Vladimir Putin probably miscalculated by launching a special operation in Ukraine, mistakenly believing that everything would end easily and quickly. Some realist scientists have been warning for some time about a brewing conflict that could spill over the borders of NATO and escalate into a direct US-Russian confrontation.
In addition, there is a danger that Chinese President Xi Jinping may miscalculate regarding Taiwan. Washington's confusing policy of “strategic ambiguity” regarding the protection of the island only increases instability. Biden said he would defend Taiwan, while the White House denied his words. Many leaders are confused, including perhaps Xi himself. He may mistakenly believe that he will get away with attacking the island, and then the United States will intervene to stop him.
As for the Iranian nuclear program, after the empty threats of several US presidents to "consider all options", Tehran may well assume that further work in this direction will not cause a response from the United States. If he makes a mistake about Biden's determination, a war could break out.
Realists also focus on changes in the balance of power and worry about the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. The theory of the transfer of power says that the fall of the dominant great power and the rise of a new contender for this role often lead to war. Some experts fear that Washington and Beijing may fall into this " Thucydides Trap ".
The ineffective autocratic systems of Beijing and Moscow are unlikely to allow them to usurp global leadership in the near future, but historically, wars of conquest sometimes begin at the moment when the expansionist ambitions of the players intersect. Like Germany in the First World War and Japan in the second, Russia may be trying to reverse its decline, and China may be weak and dangerous.
Some will argue that nuclear deterrence will continue to work, but military technology is changing. The world is going through a "fourth industrial revolution" as new technologies promise to transform the global economy, society and the battlefield. We are talking about artificial intelligence, quantum computing and communications, additive manufacturing, robotics, hypersonic missiles, directed energy, and so on.
Many defense experts believe that we are on the threshold of a new revolution in military affairs. It is quite possible that these new technologies could, like tanks and airplanes on the eve of World War II, give an advantage to the military, increasing the likelihood of war. At a minimum, new weapons systems can complicate the assessment of the balance of power, contributing to the aforementioned dangers of miscalculation.
China, for example, is leading in several of these areas, including hypersonic missiles, some applications of artificial intelligence and quantum computing. These advantages — or even Beijing's false notion that these advantages may exist — could prompt China to invade Taiwan.
Even more generally optimistic liberalism gives rise to pessimism. Of course, liberals are right that institutions, economic interdependence and democracy promote cooperation within the framework of a liberal world order. The United States and its democratic allies in North America, Europe and East Asia have rallied stronger than ever before. But the same factors are increasingly fueling conflict on the borders between the liberal and illiberal world orders.
In the conditions of the new cold war, international institutions have become just another arena for competition. Russia and China are infiltrating these institutions and directing them against their intended goals. Who will forget how in February Russia presided over a meeting of the UN Security Council when its troops entered the territory of Ukraine? Similarly, China uses influence in the WTO to prevent an effective investigation into the origin of COVID-19. And dictators are vying for seats on the UN Human Rights Council so that their egregious violations go unnoticed. Instead of promoting cooperation, international institutions are increasingly exacerbating the conflict.
Liberal scholars also argue that economic interdependence plays the role of a mitigating circumstance. The problem is that it is difficult to separate cause from effect here. Is trade the driving force of a good relationship, or vice versa? We see that the answer shows itself in real time.
The free world recognizes excessive economic dependence on enemies in Moscow and Beijing, and is trying its best to eliminate it. Western corporations left Russia overnight. New laws and regulations in the United States, Europe and Japan restrict trade and investment in China. It is simply inappropriate for Wall Street residents to invest in Chinese technology companies that are working with the People's Liberation Army of China to develop weapons designed to kill Americans.
But China is also separating from the free world. For example, Xi Jinping prohibits Chinese technology firms from registering on Wall Street because he does not want to share confidential information with Western powers. The economic interdependence between the liberal and illiberal worlds, which served as a ballast against conflicts, is now being destroyed.
The theory of the democratic world asserts that some democracies cooperate with others. But the main fault line in the international system, as Biden explains, is "the battle between democracy and autocracy."
Of course, the United States still maintains warm relations with some undemocratic countries, such as Saudi Arabia. But the world order is increasingly torn between the United States and its democratic allies focused on the status quo in NATO, Japan, South Korea and Australia, on the one hand, and the revisionist autocracies of China, Russia and Iran, on the other. The echoes of the conflict of the free world against Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and imperial Japan are visible to the naked eye.
Finally, constructivist arguments about the pacifying effect of global norms have always been accompanied by doubts about whether these norms are truly universal. China is engaged in genocide in Xinjiang, and Russia is issuing blood-curdling nuclear threats, so now we have an answer to this question.
Moreover, constructivists could point out that the split between democracy and autocracy in international politics is not only a matter of governance, but also of lifestyle. The speeches and works of Xi Jinping and Putin are often ideological tirades about the superiority of autocratic systems and the shortcomings of democratic ones. Whether we like it or not, we have returned to the twentieth—century confrontation between democratic and autocratic governments in terms of their ability to serve their people in the best possible way - albeit now with a more dangerous ideological element.
Fortunately, there is some good news. The best understanding of international politics can be found in a combination of theories. Most of humanity prefers a liberal international order, and it is possible only thanks to the realistic military might of the United States and its democratic allies. Moreover, two and a half thousand years of theory and history show that democracies, as a rule, win these contests of hard power, and autocracies eventually fall into catastrophic decline.
Unfortunately, clarifying moments that tilt history towards justice often arise only after wars between major powers.
Let's hope that today's applicants at graduation will not remember where they were and what they were doing at the beginning of the Third World War. But the theory of international relations gives more than one reason for concern.
Matthew Krenig — Deputy Director of the Center for Strategy and Security. Scowcroft at the Atlantic Council and Professor at the Department of State and the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. His latest book is titled "The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy — from the Ancient World to the United States and China."
