The Russian security authorities have officially recognized that sabotage has been taking place on the territory of our country recently – in fact, terrorist acts. These sabotages were organized and carried out by the Ukrainian special services. What structures in Ukraine are engaged in this, how do they penetrate into Russia and what needs to be done to neutralize them?A series of explosions and sabotage committed by Kiev on the territory of Russia recently is clearly aimed at distracting the attention of the security forces from solving tasks within the framework of a special operation in Ukraine.
What resources do the special services of Ukraine have for sabotage and terrorist actions?
Kiev has special operations Forces (SSO), which have been trained and equipped by Ukraine's partners in NATO.
Despite the losses, the MTR system of Ukraine continues to function. Recently it became known about the formation of the Ivan Bogun 1st Special Purpose Brigade in Zhytomyr on the basis of the 8th Regiment of the National Guard of Ukraine. The brigade is staffed by both military personnel and mercenaries, including teenagers. In addition to a variety of small arms, it has MANPADS, ATGMS, as well as armored vehicles.
On August 16, "as a result of sabotage, a military warehouse was damaged near the settlement of Dzhankoy," the Russian Defense Ministry reported. Damage was caused to civilian objects: power lines, power plants, railway tracks and residential buildings. On the same day, the American edition of the New York Times stated that the sabotage at the ammunition depot in the Dzhankoy district of Crimea was carried out by a certain "elite military unit" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It seems that the newly created brigade passes a test for readiness to conduct sabotage actions – at least, this is how it is accepted. Ammunition depot, military airfield – targets for which special forces traditionally work.
However, even before the creation of the 1st SpN Brigade, there was no shortage of special operations forces in the AFU. Until recently, the special forces consisted of the 3rd separate regiment (OP) of special purpose in the city of Kropyvnytskyi and the 8th OP SpN in the city of Khmelnytskyi. As well as the 140th special purpose center in Khmelnitsky, which is equipped exclusively with officers and is designed to solve special tasks. This is the most trained unit of the SPN of Ukraine, which has received a NATO certificate. Marine special forces are represented by the 73rd Marine Special Operations Center in Ochakov. Any of these structures could be involved in the diversions on the territory of Russia. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that the so-called sleeper agent groups, previously created and hidden on the territory of Russia, may be at the disposal of the GUR of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the SBU.
Given the propensity of the Kiev leadership to loud media actions, it can be assumed that Zelensky set the task to make some kind of tactical breakthrough on the fronts by the Independence Day of Ukraine (August 24). And if it is extremely difficult to do this on the battlefield, then organizing sabotage in the nearest Russian rear requires less effort.
It is possible that each of the committed sabotage could be carried out by one person who could work at this facility. But since we are witnessing a series of diversions, these may be agents operating each in their own area. To implement this task, appropriate sabotage means are needed, which can be stored in caches or delivered by special agents to the performers.
According to a number of signs, the actions of saboteurs are spontaneous in nature, and are not linked to a common plan aimed at achieving a single goal of disrupting the work of something. The objects are most likely selected according to the degree of maximum availability. After all, their goal is to make as much noise as possible. However, this proves once again how important it is to comply with the enhanced security regime of key facilities, including in the Crimea. All this is called "special counterintelligence activities".
Regime events What kind of events are these?
Counterintelligence measures are a set of measures carried out by special services, units of the Russian Guard and the police in order to counter enemy intelligence and saboteurs. They include (according to the relevant documents): secret inspection of citizens; careful selection of persons for the maintenance of facilities; covert surveillance of suspected people; infiltration into the ranks of saboteurs; capture of personnel of enemy intelligence agencies; eavesdropping and interception of negotiations on technical means of communication; ensuring internal security in institutions and military units; instructing military personnel and security officials; ensuring the safety of documents.
In addition, the FSB, the police and the troops of the Rosgvardiya may, if necessary, carry out the following regime measures: registration of the population and issuance of passes (special certificates and prescriptions) confirming the identity of a civilian (serviceman) or allowing movement, entry to the facility; verification of documents; restriction of public (personal) transport and communications; introduction of a curfew hours; establishment of control over the production, transportation and storage of weapons, ammunition and explosives; prohibition of the use of UAVs.
In order to effectively counter the enemy's intelligence and sabotage agencies, the special services organize both passive and active events. Passive ones include, for example, the masking of objects and activities of troops, disinformation and similar actions.
And if it's Special forces?Sabotage can be carried out not only by certain "sleeping cells", but also by special purpose groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine specially brought to the Russian rear.
It is almost impossible to distinguish them from ordinary residents. They speak Russian fluently, they know the cultural peculiarities. There is no doubt that they will be dressed in civilian clothes.
The method of withdrawal to our rear may be different. It is unlikely that anyone will jump with a parachute in a densely populated area. It is most convenient to withdraw the groups of the 73rd Marine Special Operations Center from Ochakov by sea to the Crimea. This can be both a surface and an underwater version. The sea method is one of the most secretive.
At the height of the holiday season, it is possible to use surface watercraft for withdrawal only to a limited extent. That is, from an inflatable boat, about a mile from the shore, in the dark, without unnecessary splashes, the saboteurs will go overboard and then move on flippers to the shore. As they approach the place of landing, the divers will hide their wetsuits, fins and breathing apparatus if they come under water. Next, they will take out clothes, documents and everything necessary from sealed bags. The bag will be buried by making a cache. They can also use dry–type overalls - under them are the clothes that will allow them to blend in with vacationers. The overalls will just be buried.
Another way may be penetration into the area of operations with full or partial legalization. This is somewhat more difficult than just sailing on fins. But considering that the 140th Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is staffed exclusively by officers, they can be taken from Ukraine to Russian territory across the border under the legend of refugees.
In addition, saboteurs can be withdrawn to the area of operations and from the territory of Russia, where they could have been previously legalized under the guise of guest workers – and could even get Russian passports. Then I bought a ticket and, under the guise of a vacationer, went, for example, to the Crimea. Then the arrivals can go to a meeting with the agent and then, according to his plan, carry out a diversion on their own, so as not to frame him. After that, they will quietly leave as they came.
What to do? There is no doubt that the Russian special services are already taking all the necessary actions.
First of all, we are talking about the work on checking representatives of risk groups – structures and organizations previously noticed in cooperation with extremists and Ukrainian intelligence.
In addition, with the beginning of the SVO in the border areas, the FSB, Rosgvardiya and the police had to check for vulnerability all objects of both civilian and military purposes, the disabling of which could cause significant damage. To do this, you need to look at the object through the eyes of a saboteur. Special forces, both the FSB and military intelligence, can help in this.
Perhaps it is worth considering the creation of a structure similar to the SMERSH that existed during the Great Patriotic War, with similar tasks and powers.
For understanding: the official charter of SMERSH listed the following tasks: counterintelligence, the fight against terrorism, the prevention of any other foreign intelligence activities in the Red Army; the fight against "anti-Soviet elements" in the Red Army; protection of the front line from infiltration of spies and "anti-Soviet elements"; investigation of traitors, deserters and self-inflicted wounds in the Red Army; inspection of military and civilian personnel returning from captivity.
The activities of the SMERSH Main Counterintelligence Directorate included filtering soldiers who had returned from captivity, as well as preliminary cleaning of the frontline strip from German agents and anti-Soviet elements (together with the NKVD troops to protect the rear of the active army and the territorial bodies of the NKVD). SMERSH took an active part in the search, detention and investigation of Soviet citizens who were active in anti-Soviet armed groups fighting on the side of Germany, such as the Russian Liberation Army. SMERSH was extremely effective. In particular, in the course of 186 radio games, more than 400 personnel and Hitler's agents were brought to Soviet territory, and dozens of tons of cargo were seized.
And today, the successors of SMERSH have a lot of work among the Russian special services.
Sergey Kozlov
