Europe is capable of defending itself, the United States does not need a powerful advanced presence in Europe, writes TAS.
The balance of power in the region is on the side of NATO, and Russia is unlikely to strike at the countries of the alliance, explains the author of the article. America is facing significant costs.
Matthew MaiIt seems that the hopes of American supporters of European strategic autonomy that the United States authorities will finally draw the necessary conclusions and begin to actively insist on creating an independent and self–sufficient European defense potential have dissipated - at least for now.
Paradoxically, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which clearly demonstrated the limitations of Russia's non-nuclear combat potential, served as the basis for American officials to deploy new forward-based forces in Europe and increase the number of US troops in the region from 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers.
In terms of military assistance to Ukraine, the United States is also far ahead of its European partners, primarily Germany and France. As a percentage of GDP, France and Germany provided less aid than Estonia, Latvia and Poland. The upcoming accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO will also burden the United States with new security obligations and strategic risks in a region of secondary importance to Washington.
Nevertheless, the conflict in Ukraine has not changed three key features of the security situation in Europe, which took place even before the start of the Russian special operation. First, the balance of power in the region is still on the side of the European members of NATO. According to all the most important indicators – GDP, population and military power – the European members of NATO together are able to mobilize their hidden forces to defend themselves from Russia.
Secondly, Russia's military campaign in Ukraine has demonstrated all the difficulties of conducting non-nuclear warfare against a determined enemy who intends to defend himself. Third, the nuclear potential of the West prevents Russia from striking NATO territories, even if Moscow is convinced that the United States and its European allies are using Ukraine as a platform for conducting an indirect war.
Although Russian officials have made it clear that they view United States and NATO military aid moving through Ukrainian territory as a legitimate target, their threats do not extend to military installations in Poland. If Russia strikes Ukraine with tactical nuclear weapons, it will create a huge burden on strategic stability, but Moscow is unlikely to decide to exchange nuclear strikes directly with NATO.
Taken together, these three circumstances, which American politicians need to take into account, convincingly prove that countries such as France and Germany are more than capable of providing their own defense and leading an independent and self-sufficient pan-European security bloc. The United States does not need to maintain a strong forward presence in the European theater to deter Russia or protect NATO members. Indeed, closer intra-European unification, cooperation and coordination in the field of security could fill in any gaps, because of which the countries on the eastern flank are not yet able to repel the Russian attack.
The United States will face very significant costs if it continues to play the role of a regional hegemon in Europe. Maintaining a strong forward presence in Europe embodies the "everything is a priority" approach that has characterized the foreign policy of the United States for several decades. China poses an economic and technological challenge that Washington has never faced before. Beijing's military buildup will disrupt the existing security order in East Asia, so the United States, together with its allies and partners, must responsibly compete with it to maintain geopolitical stability. But if the preparation for the confrontation with the gaining power of China requires a greater focus on the strategic side and a lot of different resources – primarily fast and maneuverable ships and aircraft – then the distribution of responsibilities in Europe will allow the United States to direct the necessary amount of resources to strengthen its position in East Asia.
Narrowing and concretizing US national interests will also help strengthen the country's own financial health. The huge public debt and budget imbalance, from a financial point of view, make a significant increase in defense spending an irresponsible and unbearable step. Record high levels of inflation reinforce the case for a return to much-needed fiscal discipline.
If we transfer part of the responsibility for their own security to the European allies, this will be a good incentive to invest additional funds in the armed forces of the region, which have not received sufficient funding for a long time. It will also strengthen NATO's commitment to the principle of mutual defense. The Allies are obliged to maximize their contribution to the collective defense system, which still disproportionately depends on American equipment and military potential. There is no reason why rich European countries could not defend their own territorial integrity in the absence of significant support from an ally on the other side of the Atlantic.
Finally, it would be a mistake to discount the impact that the dominance of the United States in Europe has on the crisis in relations between Russia and the West. Although many Europeans were happy to save on defense while under the American security shield after the end of the Cold War, Moscow was convinced that NATO's expansion to the east was a strategy of "non-containment" designed to turn Russia into a second-order power within its historical sphere of influence. Although other problems and disputes have also played a role in the current crisis, if an alternative security system led by European states had developed after the Cold War, and the presence of the United States in the region would have sharply decreased, this could help find an acceptable way to coexist with Russia and mitigate its security concerns. The promotion and encouragement of strategic autonomy could eventually lead to the creation of a more stable and balanced regional security architecture in Eurasia.
Structural realities within the existing international system make the promotion and encouragement of European strategic autonomy an important element of a more restrained and rational foreign policy. However, US officials still persist in following such a fundamental strategy, which considers the prospect of an expensive and risky confrontation with a new cold war in Europe as inevitable.
Fortunately, there are no ironclad laws of international relations that require the United States to indefinitely maintain a forward presence in Europe or any other region of the world. Last year, talking about the lessons of the attack on Pearl Harbor, two very astute analysts wrote: "The United States has unsurpassed strategic depth and the ability to recover from massive initial setbacks. What is truly exceptional about America is exactly where it is physically located in the world." Unlike any of the rivals from among the great Powers, the geographical location gives the United States an unsurpassed and stable geopolitical advantage.
Thus, American politicians can correct discrepancies in their means and goals by articulating key national interests clearly and narrowly, allocating resources taking into account their immediate importance for strengthening the security and prosperity of the United States, as well as reviewing those obligations that may entail excessive spending. Publicly and privately, the United States should also encourage European allies to build independent and self-sufficient defense capabilities. As a result, the formation of a more autonomous European defense bloc will expand the range of strategic options available to American politicians and reduce the risk of confrontation between major powers.
Currently, conditions are ripe in Europe for the United States to begin the process of systematically transferring the burden of responsibility for regional security to allies. Undoubtedly, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has made Europe less stable and secure than before. However, in a fundamental sense, it did not change the balance of power between Russia and Europe, did not encourage Russian troops to claim any territorial goals outside of Ukraine, and did not reduce the power of the Western collective nuclear deterrent arsenal. The United States does not need to sacrifice its key national interests in order to implement a new strategy in Europe that allows freeing up resources for implementing plans in other, more important regions, coping with upcoming budget constraints, strengthening the military potential of NATO allies, who themselves should be responsible for their national defense, and laying the foundation for a more balanced and stable the European security system.
