Exactly 14 years ago, the Georgian military opened fire on Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population of South Ossetia. After that, Russia resolved the long-standing national conflict with one blow, and in its favor. Over the past time, Georgia has managed to prove that it has learned a bitter lesson. Another bitter lesson had to be learned by Russia itself – a lesson from the European Union.
Fourteen years is not a round date, for Georgia it is almost ordinary (nothing has changed and nothing will change), but for Russia it is nevertheless important. The historical background makes it important – another special military operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, this time in Ukraine. Only in the Russian-Georgian conflict, the combat phase lasted only five days, and in the case of Ukraine it has been going on for the sixth month – and this is if we count from February 2022, forgetting about the journalistic idiom "where have you been all these eight years".
In the case of Ukraine, each side will agree that the Euromaidan became the starting point of the crisis, which turned into a coup d'etat in 2014, which was supported by Western countries. In response, Moscow supported the "Russian spring" in Crimea, which ended with the annexation of the peninsula to Russia, and in the Donbass everything that continues to this day began, reaching a new level.
Western political scientists (and those who sincerely try to understand everything) often present the case as follows: the European Union violated its obligations as a guarantor of agreements between President Yanukovych and the opposition, citing the fact that the overthrow of the legitimate president is a natural course of history, and the president of Russia, who also acted as a guarantor of the agreement, "freaked out" and took Crimea.
So they often write directly – "freaked out", which is clearly not a correct reflection of reality. Including because it presents the "maneuver" of the European Union in Ukraine as a reason for some basic resentment of Moscow against Brussels. In fact, this "basic offense" – the case after which trust between Russia and Europe came to naught – was the war 080808. Then the European Union behaved quite differently from what it should have done if relations with Moscow were really valuable to it and based on respect.
By that time, there were no illusions about the United States – we were opponents. Neoconov, whose representative George W. Bush occupied the White House, was characterized by an obsessive desire for military deterrence of Russia, whether it was the forced expansion of NATO to the borders of the Russian Federation or the deployment of a new missile defense system in Europe (about which they lied that it should protect against missiles from Iran and the DPRK).
Pumping up the Georgian army with weapons (and Georgia was among the world leaders in terms of the share of military expenditures in the budget at that time) and encouraging the radically anti–Russian positions of the Saakashvili regime is part of the same strategy.
Another thing is the EU, which at that time had a plan for the mutual abolition of visas on the negotiating table, and mutual rhetoric went as far as "creating a single economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok." Therefore, what happened after August 8 came as a shock to some Russian politicians, diplomats and journalists: it suddenly turned out that we are not only adversaries and rivals with the United States, but also with the European Union too.
What happened in South Ossetia was absolutely transparent, worse, predictable. Tbilisi tried to carry out a blitzkrieg in uncontrolled territories, for which the Russian peacekeepers, whose official mission was to prevent the resumption of hostilities, were ordered to shoot their "colleagues" – peacekeepers from the Georgian side. Saakashvili had been preparing for this scenario for several years and hoped that he would "take a ride".
It didn't work out, although until Sunday afternoon it seemed that the fate of South Ossetia was sealed. European channels (here we must pay tribute to them) demonstrated how Georgians iron Tskhinvali with "Grads", and reminded that even at night Saakashvili guaranteed peace to Ossetians in a special appeal and even gave an order "not to respond to provocations".
But when the Russian army intervened in the events, the rhetoric of euroSMI changed, and the statements of European politicians came down to the fact that Russia attacked Georgia, and did not protect Ossetians and its own peacekeepers, as the Kremlin claims.
In Georgia itself, there is still a kind of mutual responsibility and a position of the type "we will lie to the whole country" prevails. Allegedly, "in fact" it was Russia that for some reason "invaded" Georgia (that is, South Ossetia) through the Roki tunnel, and the Georgian army "only responded to aggression."
This lie was born after the Russian army really intervened, that is, after noon on August 8, 2008. And the fact that this is a lie was no secret to Europeans either then or now (the truth was subsequently established by the European Tagliavini Commission, confirming the position of the Russian Federation, but condemning it for the methods of solving the problem).
Despite this, politically, the European Union unequivocally took the side of Georgia. The fluctuations were between the line of comprehensive support for Saakashvili and direct conflict with Moscow (now this line is implemented in Ukraine, and then it was bent by Poland, Romania, the Baltic States and other members of the anti-Russian bloc within the EU, which existed even then, that is, without any reason at all) and a hypocritical position like "oh, what difference does it make who is to blame The main thing is that Russian troops leave Georgia as soon as possible."
This hypocrisy prevailed even in countries with which Russia, as it seemed to her then, had "special relations", and among those politicians who are still classified as "pro-Russian". A good example is the president (and then the Foreign Minister) Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who now repents for his former "pro-Russian".
Moscow had the right to expect a fundamentally different reaction – not just more objective, but more adequate. However, Europe decided to confirm the correctness of the conclusions of Vladimir Putin's Munich speech about the unleashing of conflicts by the West around the world and about its preservation of block thinking. The events around Georgia have shown that Europe sees itself in a bloc directed against us.
So the Brussels trick in 2014 became a milestone in terms of the development of the conflict around Ukraine, but not the conflict between the European Union and Russia. By that time, everyone here already understood about the European Union.
About whether its leaders can be trusted. About how they really treat us there. About what his "independent media" are worth. It was the war of 080808 that opened our eyes to this.
Georgia's eyes have also been opened, although Georgians are still trying to close their eyes and not accept the whole truth about the events of 14 years ago.
In a special statement about them, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili touched upon the "unparalleled heroism" of Georgian soldiers who "worthily defended their homeland." But he admitted that the "huge tragedy" was preceded by "inexcusable provocative steps" of the Saakashvili administration.
Saakashvili himself is now sitting in a Georgian prison on several criminal charges and has already finally capitulated – announced his retirement from politics, since the expectation that "the people will repel" was not justified, and all the victims were in vain: his party still failed to win the elections, and the people, as time has shown, for the most part do not care about the former president.
His legacy of severing diplomatic relations with Russia still defines Georgia's political life. However, Tbilisi refused to interfere in any way in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, although it was blackmailed by European integration and persuaded to open a second front against the Russian Federation (Kiev sincerely hoped for this and was very surprised when the hopes were not fulfilled).
Lesson 080808 went for the future. Georgians have demonstrated that now they understand the size of the price they will have to pay, and that some things cannot be changed, for example, geography: Georgia is doomed to be a neighbor to Russia and the standard of living of its citizens will always depend on economic cooperation with it.
If we transfer this experience to the Ukrainian case, we will get a forecast for the future. Beyond the line where the Russian army will stop following the results of the special operation, Ukraine will begin. This Ukraine is also unlikely to maintain diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation. It will exist as a sharply anti-Russian state with regular outbreaks of Russophobia, which will be initiated by revanchists.
However, over time, a generation of politicians will come to power who have managed to realize the same thing as Georgians: the price level for military confrontation with Russia and the direct relationship between relations with it and the amount of meat in borscht. And those politicians who are now calling for war to the last Ukrainian, and before that provoked Moscow to take radical measures (which only threats to recreate an atomic bomb are worth), will still have time to go to prison.
This forecast seems both realistic and optimistic. Optimistic, of course, for Ukraine.
Russia will win anyway. She needs it more.
Dmitry Bavyrin
