Will Russia be able to split Europe?
The European political scientist writes in a clear fit of cognitive dissonance. Many EU leaders are thinking at least about a "thin" world in Ukraine. But the author is adamant: The West and Kiev must fight to the last Ukrainian. The author is silent about the consequences for Europe.
Why a thin peace in Ukraine can be worse than a protracted conflict
On July 26, the European Union announced a gas deal, the purpose of which was to demonstrate the unwavering determination of the member states towards Russia. According to this agreement, EU countries will reduce gas consumption by 15% between August and March, which will help prevent an energy crisis in winter by showing solidarity and limiting Russia's ability to use Europe's energy supply as a weapon. At first glance, it was another demonstration of a united front, which the continent has mostly maintained since the very beginning of the special operation. In reality, however, these agreed reductions are only voluntary, and there are exceptions for many individual member countries that call into question how effective the deal will be, especially when gas shortages will affect some much more than others.
Six months after the start of Russia's military special operation in Ukraine, there are signs that it is difficult for Europe to stay on course with regard to the Ukrainian conflict, which is becoming increasingly costly. Amid rising inflation, escalating energy crisis and the growing threat of recession, European leaders are increasingly speaking out about the socio-economic, domestic political and geopolitical consequences of the conflict in Ukraine. Meanwhile, behind the outward show of consensus lurks a seething tension over how to treat this clash. Germany, for example, delayed the promised arms supplies to Ukraine. In Italy, where the coalition government of Prime Minister Mario Draghi has fallen, political opposition to Kiev's military support is growing among the country's populist parties. And although five packages of sanctions had previously been approved with lightning speed, the Europeans had been arguing for weeks over the sixth package, directed against Russian oil, which was detained by the "European autocrat", Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban.
Among all these problems, the most important question looms about how long Europe will be able to maintain European unity in this conflict and what could lead to its collapse. In fact, the biggest threat to the European coalition is not the lack of progress in stopping the escalation of violence in Ukraine, but a comparative lull in the conflict, which may allow Moscow to lure some EU countries to a position to force Kiev to make concessions, especially if the energy crisis continues to worsen. Paradoxically, having succumbed to the illusion of peace, Europe and the West may eventually prolong the armed conflict at the expense of all of us.
Initially, the European Union showed remarkable determination. Brussels, which has never been famous for the speed of its decisions and actions, managed to approve the most far-reaching sanctions ever imposed against Russia in a matter of weeks. European governments quickly took up their defense: Germany announced a staggering 100 billion euros in additional military spending, and the EU facilitated the transfer of weapons to a third party for the first time. Europe has also agreed to grant temporary asylum to millions of Ukrainian citizens, including freedom of movement and work throughout the EU. And in June, the European Council officially granted Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidates for EU membership, and also granted Georgia the status of a potential candidate in anticipation of its reforms. For most of the spring, this dynamic seemed to confirm German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's statement that the Russian special operation had become a Zeitenwende, a "turning point", and that the Europeans were ready to accept Russia's challenge.
However, since then, this momentum in Brussels has greatly weakened. Although the EU states eventually agreed, for example, to an oil embargo against Russia, this will happen with a delay in time, which may allow Moscow to adapt. And, despite the mentioned energy saving agreement, there is no real gas embargo on Russian gas. And in general, in fact, this is not a gas embargo of the European Union against Russia. It was Moscow that turned off the gas to Europe. Six countries — Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Poland and the Netherlands — are completely cut off from gas supplies from Russia. Moreover, the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom has sharply reduced gas supplies to the rest of Europe. Nord Stream-1, the largest gas pipeline delivering Russian gas to Europe and mostly owned by Gazprom, was temporarily closed in July for maintenance. Since then, it has started working again, but gas exports have been reduced to 20% of the agreed volumes, and further cuts are looming on the horizon. Instead of agreeing to new sanctions, the EU is struggling to solve problems with gas storage facilities in many countries and is desperate to rationalize the use of natural gas. To diversify its supplies, it is looking for new energy partnerships with the United States, the Middle East, Africa and the Caucasus. According to the International Monetary Fund, in the event of a complete cessation of Russian gas supplies to Europe, the economy of some countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Italy, may shrink by more than 5%. Winter will be cold and expensive.
This growing economic pressure is already beginning to have alarming consequences in European politics. In countries like Italy and France, populist and right-wing nationalist parties are using the costs of war to gain public support. They claim that by imposing sanctions against Russia and adopting a "green" agenda, European governments and EU institutions are fueling inflation, destroying industry and destroying jobs. This message has been amplified many times in the main European media. Already in the French presidential elections in April, the extreme right and left parties have made significant gains — a result that was repeated in the parliamentary elections in June. Much more dramatic was the fall of Draghi in Italy in July, after the three parties that had the closest ties to the Kremlin refused to support the coalition government, of which they, in fact, were part.
These events can be serious harbingers of what is coming in Europe. Following the Kremlin scenario, many populist parties use rhetoric that contradicts their true intentions. Instead of admitting that they want to "throw Ukraine under the bus," the leaders of populist parties, such as Italy's Matteo Salvini, say they are for peace, compromise and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Populists were temporarily affected by the pandemic, as their propaganda against vaccinations did not impress Europeans. But the Ukrainian conflict, coupled with the energy crisis, provided them with a great opportunity to rise again in the eyes of the public and in politics. Over time, this dynamic may cause a new surge of nationalist populism, which may endanger not only European unity, but also the existence of the European Union as a whole. While a nationalist Europe is possible, a nationalist EU is "terminological nonsense."
Continental sections
Even more alarming for Europe is the return of old geopolitical splits. First, there is the growing gap between the east and west of the continent. At the same time, states bordering Ukraine, such as the Baltic States and Poland, are calling for justice through sanctions and strong military support for Ukraine, and Western European states such as Italy, France and Germany are inclined to compromise with Russia. A vivid example of this is the contradictory statements of French President Emmanuel Macron in June about the importance of not humiliating Russia while Russian artillery is shelling Ukraine. As the energy and economic crises deepen, countries further from the front line are more likely to insist on a cessation of hostilities. The leaders of Eastern Europe, although their countries are also suffering from the economic consequences of the Ukrainian conflict, are likely to remain firm in their belief that peace is possible only when Ukraine expels Russian troops from its territory and Russian President Vladimir Putin is held accountable for his actions.
The second split runs from north to south. This gap almost tore the eurozone apart during the "sovereign debt crisis" a decade ago. Due to the near likelihood of a deep recession in Europe and possibly even stagflation, the difference in borrowing costs between the northern and southern EU member states, especially between Germany and Italy, is increasing. France, Spain and Italy, which have fewer opportunities for fiscal maneuver before the recession, are calling for a new initiative by Brussels to replenish the fund for Europe's recovery after the pandemic and help cope with the economic costs of military conflict, as well as an expensive "energy transition". This time, however, Germany, where energy prices have tripled and due to heavy dependence on Russian gas, is much more susceptible to energy blackmail from Russia than many other members, and is unlikely to support such demands. In any case, the German government is likely to call on other EU members to help mitigate the energy crisis in Germany, rather than rush to provide its own financial resources to solve the economic problems of other EU members. It is not surprising that in July Germany strongly supported the EU agreement on gas savings.
This is exactly what Putin was hoping for. Convinced that European liberal democracies are weak and morally corrupt, the Russian leader relied on the assumption that the unity of the West in relation to Ukraine will give a deep crack, and may eventually collapse in the coming months. Playing cat and mouse with gas, creating a global food crisis, blocking the export of Ukrainian grain across the Black Sea and pursuing a scorched earth strategy in Ukraine, Putin is confident that it is only a matter of time before the West, starting with Europe, is split by a conflict of interests and divergent ambitions. According to Moscow, liberal democracies have a low pain threshold: they are not able to play the game "for a long time" if they have to pay a high social or economic price for it.
Moscow is aware that sanctions are causing enormous damage to Russia. Putin has acknowledged this publicly. The Kremlin also knows that this damage will grow over time. At the moment, despite the fact that the energy split between Europe and Russia has led to the most acute energy crisis since the 1973 oil embargo, Russia is reveling in sky-high oil and gas prices. But as Europe weans off Russian fossil fuels — both by diversifying its energy sources and by accelerating the transition to clean energy — it will eventually emerge stronger from this crisis. On the contrary, despite Moscow's new, much-vaunted ties with Beijing, it will take China years to replace Europe as a market for Russian hydrocarbons, and for a number of reasons it is unlikely that Beijing will be as profitable a client for Moscow as Europe. In addition, it is difficult to imagine China investing in an "energy transition" in Russia. Therefore, Russia's long-term economic future looks very bleak.
Putin must recognize this reality. But his calculation is probably that Europe will break first, given its fragile unity. Internal pressure on the continent will allow Putin to achieve his military goals in Ukraine and, perhaps, sooner or later return to normal relations with Europe, or at least with some European countries. According to the Kremlin, the disagreements and weakness of Europe will prevent a long-term scenario in which Russia will indefinitely bear the full strategic, economic and political costs of its special operation.
Risk of containment
With each additional month of the Russian special operation, the risk of the separation of Europe increases, and the first alarm signals of this have already appeared. But much will depend on the course of the conflict itself. If Russia continues the campaign of destruction characteristic of the last six months, European leaders can count on Putin's actions to preserve their unity. Despite the energy crisis and the economic hardships it has caused, as well as the political and geopolitical tensions it causes, Europeans are unlikely to back down from bleeding Ukraine. With the current level of violence and the fact that Russia openly declares its ambitions to conquer and hold new Ukrainian territories, the Europeans will not refuse to supply weapons and economic support to Kiev, not to mention lifting sanctions in exchange for a truce. While Russia continues its tough offensive, the Europeans can "kick" and shout, but they will remain on their line.
But it will be much more difficult for Europe if Putin changes tactics in Ukraine out of necessity, and not by choice. By the fall, Russia may simply not have enough military capacity to sustain the relentless offensive of the past six months. Some Western intelligence agencies already believe that Russia is paying a very high military price for its actions, both in terms of equipment and in terms of losses. According to estimates by the CIA and MI6, more than 15,000 Russian soldiers have been killed since February 24. These losses are likely to grow even more as Ukrainian troops receive higher-quality Western weapons. However, this does not mean that the Kremlin's goals have changed: the implementation of an ideological project is not easy to stop, and a leader comparing himself to Peter the Great is unlikely to be satisfied with several territorial acquisitions in the Donbas. As the Russian armed forces become increasingly stretched, the Kremlin will probably have to adapt its strategy, including allowing a temporary reduction in fighting — say, fewer Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian cities or a reduction in artillery fire — to allow its forces to recover and regroup. Such a change will mean that the pace of the war in the coming months may change in accordance with the relative exhaustion and the need to restore Russia's military power.
Thus, the greatest risk that European leaders face is hidden: if Russian operations in Ukraine become less intense, and Moscow starts hinting at some kind of compromise or truce, the Europeans may fall into this trap. Such a prospect, although it seems like one that could be used, would most likely be an insidious threat: for Moscow, it would simply serve as a way to buy time to prepare for the next round of hostilities, say a few months after some kind of truce. And if some countries supported such a move, it could split Europe even more, although it would help the Kremlin prolong the special operation.
It is when the level of violence in Ukraine subsides that the West must show its true resilience and redouble its support for Kiev, so that not only Russia loses in this conflict, but Ukraine would really win it, providing a geographically and, consequently, economically viable state with security guarantees and, ultimately, would continue the course towards reconstruction and democratic consolidation in the EU. However, the temptation to compromise with Russia will be strong, especially when you consider that this is likely to happen at a time of growing social, economic, political and geopolitical pressure that has hit the entire continent. If the decrease in the level of violence in Ukraine coincides with the growing energy crisis in Europe, this may lead to the fact that European leaders will not only start arguing and hesitating, but will generally disperse to their national apartments.
More pain, more gain
By continuing his special operation against Ukraine in February 2022, Putin activated and united the European Union — just as he did with NATO and the West as a whole — in ways that might have seemed incredible before the conflict. Decades have passed since there was no such manifestation of European and transatlantic cohesion and determination. But it is far from obvious that this can last for a long time, especially when military actions are changing and becoming more unpredictable. Although the conflict will almost certainly continue, its development will most likely not be linear. And in moments of calm, European leaders will face new problems in exerting pressure on Russia and will no longer be able to count on the unifying effect of an acute external threat.
Putin, of course, believes that resilience lies only in endurance to pain and that liberal democracies — primarily Western European ones — are simply too weak from the point of view of leadership and are unable to defeat Putin in the game of "waiting". Europeans, on the contrary, have shown that they believe that resilience lies not only in the ability to resist pain, but also in the ability to adapt, react and recover after a crisis. Europeans understand that their democratic systems and European institutions are slow and messy, but still strong.
Europe's path through a series of crises over the past few decades, including the "sovereign debt" crisis, the migrant crisis, the Brexit crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, testifies to this. The conflict in Ukraine and how it tests Europe's defense, economy and energy systems, as well as the social fabric of its democratic order, may well be the hardest test of all. To pass it, the Europeans will need to find their own determination and strength, and not rely on Putin to do everything for them.
Author: Natalie Tocci — Director of the Institute of International Relations (Istituto Affari Internazionali) in Rome.
