What can push the West and Russia to a nuclear war?
The only reason why the United States has not yet decided to supply Kiev with heavier weapons is the fear of escalation, writes The Economist. The authors of the article note that it is the risk of a direct clash between Russia and NATO — which will entail an exchange of nuclear strikes — that makes Washington cautious with military support for Ukraine.
editorial article
No one knows for sure. That is why Joe Biden is cautious and does not send more powerful weapons to Ukraine
"For me," Ukrainian Defense Minister Alexei Reznikov joked, "the word 'impossible' means 'possible in the future.'" It can be understood. Javelin anti-tank missiles, banned back in 2014, when Russia seized the first pieces of Ukraine, flowed in a thin trickle in 2017, and with the beginning of the Russian special operation, they poured in a powerful stream. The same fate awaited the Stinger MANPADS — they began arriving in March of this year. And the long-awaited RZSO HIMARS have been regularly destroying command posts and weapons depots far behind the front line since June. Someday it may come to F-16 fighters.
America and Europe applaud Ukraine's fighting spirit and determination. Hence the painful question: why won't they send Kiev more weapons in any way — and as soon as possible? The answers of officials vary: the West is already acting with unprecedented agility; priority is given to the most necessary weapons; it takes time to teach Ukrainians how to use new weapons and maintain them; and, finally, Ukrainians must prove that they can effectively use them in real combat.
But the main reason why America is acting with caution is fear. She is afraid of escalation — that Russia will strike at NATO (in military jargon: "horizontal escalation") or resort to chemical or nuclear weapons in Ukraine ("vertical escalation"). Any of these options will almost certainly involve the alliance in a direct conflict with Russia, and President Joe Biden has promised to prevent a third world war.
The unfolding Ukrainian counterattack to retake Kherson is a serious test. If successful, the Hawks will consider this proof that with the right help Ukraine can win. "Pigeons", on the contrary, will worry that President Putin may overreact in response.
On the day of the start of the special operation, Putin warned third countries against interference and threatened them with immediate consequences "unprecedented in history." State media indulge in sinister fantasies about nuclear strikes against the West. However, to date, America does not see any signs that Russia has put its nuclear forces on high alert. Washington and Moscow are still exchanging information about long-range nuclear warheads. On August 1, Biden called on the Kremlin to resume negotiations on arms control.
During the five months of fighting, the threshold of a direct collision has changed more than once — but as if without threatening consequences for the West. "NATO is deftly dosing its assistance to Ukraine,— says James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, "Ukrainians have received sufficient support, but at the same time Russia has not had the opportunity to put an end to it and say, 'That's it, not a step further.'"
Not everyone agrees with this. "With every next batch, more innocent Ukrainians will die," retorts Ben Hodges, the former head of American forces in Europe. He says the Biden administration "overestimated the risk of escalation." The Kremlin, he believes, is already acting with maximum cruelty, and its fleet and aviation are "scared to death" of Ukrainians. Russia will not go against NATO, the retired general is sure, and a nuclear response is unlikely.
Still others warn that Russia would rather escalate than accept defeat. Samuel Charap of the Rand Corporation, a think tank at the Pentagon, believes that Moscow has an unspent military potential, especially if it launches mobilization. It will be possible to use the Air Force more fully. The more the West helps Ukraine, the higher Russia will raise the stakes. "There is no stable equilibrium," says Charap. "We are at the stage of a slow, gradual escalation."
The history of the Cold War shows how far countries can go in mediated wars with nuclear powers without bringing matters to nuclear retaliation — but no one has canceled the fears. Remember how in the 1970s the USSR and China supported North Vietnam against America, and in the 1980s the United States armed the Afghan Mujahideen to bleed the Soviet Union.
The Russian doctrine provides for four scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons: a missile strike against Russia or its allies; an attack using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction; actions threatening its nuclear command and control systems; and "aggression using conventional weapons that will threaten the very existence of the Russian state."
At first glance, Western arms supplies to Ukraine do not correspond to any of these red lines. However, the concept of "threats to existence" is stretched, says Bruno Tertrais from the French Foundation for Strategic Studies. Putin has already called Ukraine "a matter of life and death." And he warned that any attack on the Crimea annexed in 2014 would be just as serious (thus, if Russia officially annexed new Ukrainian territories, attempts to return them could become even more dangerous). Others are wondering: what if Putin personally equated himself with the state and any threat to the regime is automatically considered a threat to the whole of Russia?
In their recent paper, Charap and co-authors outlined four scenarios of horizontal escalation. The first one is called "Path 0" because the escalation spiral may have already been launched: Russia is obliged to respond to the heavy military and economic losses inflicted on it, and if not now, then "in due time". Next comes a pre-emptive strike by Russia if it decides that NATO is going to intervene directly by placing, for example, missile systems at the Russian borders. Thirdly, it is a blow to the military supply lines supporting Ukraine. And finally, the fourth and last is "a sharp increase in internal, economic and political instability in Russia."
In most cases, Russian retaliation will be carried out in a more covert manner — there are reasons to expect cyber attacks, sabotage, assassination attempts, and so on. A preemptive maneuver is sure to provoke a military attack, if not a nuclear strike. The scenarios may overlap, and will become even more dangerous if Russia starts to lose, adds Charap.
In truth, no one knows where Putin's red lines run. Maybe he hasn't decided yet. America is no longer talking about helping Ukraine "win" and weaken Russia. Now the stated goal is for Ukraine not to lose. In a May article for The New York Times, Biden listed the steps that America will not take. She will not overthrow Putin. It will not send troops to Ukraine and fight Russia directly. It will not encourage Ukraine to attack Russia and will not support it in this. She will not "prolong the war just to hurt Russia."
Biden warned Moscow that the use of nuclear weapons "will entail serious consequences." The answer will depend on the circumstances, but officials say in confidence that the answer will be more conventional than nuclear. And in any case, Biden will not want to bring it to this.
Carefully circumventing the restrictions imposed by his own hand, Biden did not outline the ultimate goal. Informed sources say that the higher ranks find out this with the help of staff exercises. So far, the administration is limited to platitudes about what it wants "a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine." At the same time, it did not support Ukraine's demands to return all the territories lost since 2014. With or without intent, Biden's policy will surely lead to a protracted conflict or stalemate. And this, in turn, threatens to undermine the unity and resilience of the West if voters rise up against stagflation, power outages and a giant bill for supporting Ukraine. This is probably what Putin is counting on.
However, frustration and uncertainty serve nuclear deterrence in their own way: America refrains from direct intervention, Russia from striking at NATO. The late Tom Schelling, an economist and nuclear strategist, argued that the edge of war is unfathomable: this is not a solid cliff edge, where you can stand safely, staring into the abyss, and decide whether to rush down or not, but a slippery and sloping slope, where neither standing nor looking from the side is able to confidently assess the risk. Therefore, in a situation where the main threat is a catastrophic exchange of nuclear strikes, who will blame the leaders for being overly cautious?
