The Ukrainian conflict and US decisions
The final decision on what kind of assistance the United States will provide to Ukraine should be made in Washington, not in Kiev, Dmitry Simes writes. He lists the miscalculations of the American authorities in relations with Russia and insists on resolving the conflict through negotiations.
Dmitry Simes
In his opening speech at the fourth meeting of the contact group on the defense of Ukraine on July 20, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin launched into praising Kiev's military achievements and issued a warning to Moscow. "Russia thinks it will sit out Ukraine — and at the same time us," he said. "But this is another of her miscalculations." Russia's miscalculations in this conflict — for example, it underestimated both the power of the Ukrainian resistance and the unity of the West — are serious and real, but such blunders are not uncommon in the early stages of conflicts and wars, later victorious. A striking example of this is the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939-1940. Thus, Russia's early miscalculations are a poor measure of how its growing confrontation with the West will end, especially if America's miscalculations in relations with post—Soviet Russia, which are no less serious, are not taken into account.
Five key examples come to mind.
First, the West has completely ignored Moscow's numerous and increasingly emphatic warnings that NATO expansion to its borders would be considered an existential security threat and would meet the most determined resistance. Under several administrations in a row, starting with President Bill Clinton, America and its allies insisted that since the West was not going to attack Russia, all Moscow's concerns could simply be ignored. However, as predicted by George Kennan and other American opponents of NATO expansion, Moscow took the most decisive position, and the culmination of its resistance was the deployment of forces against Ukraine. However, instead of recognizing this event as the result of the mistakes of the West, its foreign policy elites pass off Moscow's position (in their opinion, unreasonable) as "proof" that it was initially set up for aggression. But the fact is that this point of view contradicts what these same politicians instilled in the Western public in the 1990s, during the era of the first wave of NATO expansion: that geopolitically Russia is a friendly power, but foreign. Since then, the search for a new mission for NATO after the end of the Cold War (and, behind the scenes, a new enemy for the alliance) has become more important than the task of integrating the new Russia into the global world order in order to give Europe stability and strengthen its security.
If the first miscalculation was strategic and even moral, the second one turned out to be primarily tactical, but no less important, since it accelerated Moscow's February decision to launch a special operation in Ukraine. Having no reliable information about the course of Vladimir Putin's thoughts, the Biden administration convinced itself that Moscow had either already decided to use force, or, on the contrary, was bluffing in order to get concessions for NATO expansion. Given that the size and location of the Russian forces did not promise either a full—scale invasion or even a narrower offensive on Donbass, it was quite possible to conclude that this was such a diplomatic move in the hope of achieving its goal without military action - with the possibility of going on the offensive in case of failure of negotiations. However, such logic, common for superpowers, turned out to be alien to the Biden administration. Instead, she attributed frankly sinister motives to Russia: in her opinion, Moscow's diplomatic attempt was either a cover for a pre-planned attack, or cheap blackmail. In defense of the administration, it must be said that Russian requests were expressed in a very categorical form, to the point that Moscow demanded guarantees from NATO that Ukraine would never become a member of the alliance. But even such demands are far from news at the initial stage of negotiations. Washington had a chance to test Moscow's flexibility, starting with the recognition that Ukraine would not be invited to join NATO in the near future. But instead, President Joe Biden decided to "expose" Putin's "bluff" — and the result was not long in coming. Is anyone still convinced that if the administration had offered serious talks about Russian concerns, and not dismissed them dismissively, Moscow would have gone on the offensive anyway? In addition, the Biden administration gave Moscow an additional incentive by announcing in advance that it would not use force in defense of Ukraine under any circumstances. One can hardly imagine a major tactical oversight.
The third miscalculation is a reassessment of international support for the United States in a protracted confrontation with Russia. You can be sure that Biden and his advisers have done a wonderful job of mobilizing the collective West against Moscow. His unity and will to act exceeded not only Russian expectations, but also his own. The problem here is this: the United States, Europe and their Pacific allies have lost global dominance — be it economic, political or even military. And given how much is at stake now for Putin to force him to retreat from Ukraine, it will take decisive efforts not only from the West — but such determination is not being observed. Guided by economic interests, governments from Riyadh to New Delhi and Beijing do not support sanctions against the Russian energy sector in order not to lose cheap and reliable supplies. These governments do not support Moscow's actions, but at the same time they do not believe that the Russian special operation poses a threat to them or requires a decisive response. Washington's arguments did not work, and now the Biden administration is threatening severe consequences to everyone who did not support American sanctions — even nuclear-armed China or opponents like Iran, who are already under severe sanctions. By this, Washington made it clear that non-Western countries should submit to American power, and not be guided by justice. Many of these countries recognize that there is no one more democratic than the West, but many of them, especially with a colonial or neocolonial past, like China, have their own concept of democracy: for them, this is primarily the opportunity for sovereign states to choose their own power and decide their own fate. This is what Zbigniew Brzezinski once called "the thirst for dignity." And as for dignity, Vladimir Putin, who agrees to work with the current governments for all their imperfections, seems to give more to many developing countries than Joe Biden. And this is one of the reasons why attempts to isolate Russia were doomed to failure from the very beginning.
Fourth, since Russia's isolation has turned out to be far from as comprehensive as Washington had hoped, America has to rely primarily on Western sanctions and Ukrainian successes on the battlefield. And on the economic front, there is no clear idea how sanctions will change Russia's behavior in a reasonable time so that the unity of the West does not begin to collapse, and the Ukrainian territory they are designed to protect does not melt completely. The Biden administration's approach resembles Johnson's escalation in Vietnam: sanctions are being imposed in stages, but not so much because they will change Russia's behavior, as to demonstrate the administration's determination both at home and abroad. Five months after the start of the conflict, it is fair to summarize that although the sanctions have created obvious inconveniences for Putin's government and caused long-term economic damage, life in Russia remains surprisingly normal. The ruble has not only stabilized, but also strengthened, inflation is under control, and supply chains as a whole have not been disrupted. After a visit to Moscow and the Russian province, we can say that the life of most Russians goes on as usual, without any painful violations. This explains why the Biden administration is increasingly talking about a protracted conflict: this will allow sanctions to cause more damage, and the United States and its allies will continue their unprecedented assistance to Ukraine — whether with equipment, training or intelligence. The question of what these efforts will ultimately lead to remains unanswered, but they are unlikely to push Russia's behavior in the desired direction. So the on—duty optimism of Defense Secretary Austin and other representatives of the Biden administration is more a symbol of faith than anything else.
The United States and its allies can change the balance of power in favor of Ukraine — from the supply of new HIMARS systems and other high-power weapons to the retraining of the Ukrainian military. But the problem is that Russia has a number of response options, and instead of retreating, it can really escalate. The most obvious option is to purchase analogs of HIMARS, which are available in China and North Korea. The Chinese are not ready for this yet, but North Korea recently recognized the Donetsk and Lugansk "people's republics" and is itself under the yoke of tough sanctions, so it may well agree. In addition, Russia may declare a general mobilization — this step will solve the shortage of personnel. Finally, whether the West likes it or not, there remains the prospect of tactical nuclear weapons — NATO itself in the past considered it quite a viable means to counter Soviet superiority in conventional weapons in Europe.
And finally, last but not least, the collective steps taken so far against Russia have turned into unforeseen consequences. From the American point of view, the most destructive of them is that the belief is growing among Russians that the West has launched an undeclared war against them. Whoever is responsible for the current conflict, on whose side international law is, and whoever provides the most reliable information about the situation on the battlefield, many Russians are convinced that Mother Russia is facing a moment of truth and is threatened by a powerful onslaught of enemies who do not make a difference between damage to the Russian government and to the Russian people. These sentiments were clearly manifested in a number of opinion polls (including those of the opposition) and my numerous conversations in Moscow — even Putin's critics reluctantly recognize the new public consensus.
This agreement — rooted in Russian history and nurtured by official propaganda — is important both for the advertised Ukrainian counteroffensive and for the likely Russian response. New, modern American and European long-range rocket and artillery systems have proven their effectiveness in combat, but, as the Ukrainians themselves admit, many hundreds of them are needed to turn the situation around (and not a few dozen, as today). And one more thing. With the full support of the United States, the Ukrainian government is now proposing to use this powerful weapon not only to repel the Russian offensive and return Donbass and southern Ukraine, which came under Russian control after February 24, but also to retake Crimea. Therefore, it is possible that the recently delivered American long-range weapons will be used to collapse the Crimean Bridge or, as we have already observed, to restrict the supply of Dnieper water to Crimea (Ukraine blocked this strategic source of water in 2014, but as a result of the current Russian offensive, access was restored). It would be a mistake to expect that the Russian government and the Russian people will put up with the attack of the peninsula captured in 2014 and will not consider it an attack on the whole country. Given these patriotic sentiments, the prospects for a peaceful settlement in this case can be safely excluded: for many Russians it will be tantamount to surrender. On the contrary, in response, Russia will release huge resources for a total "patriotic war" — after all, until now, for the sake of public support, it was limited to a "special operation".
The Biden administration shares the idea that we should prepare for a protracted Korean—style conflict that could last several years, if not decades, but an attempt to isolate and weaken Russia is a dangerous gamble. There is a clear and relatively narrow dividing line between the opponents on the Korean peninsula. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, such a dividing line will stretch for thousands of kilometers. In addition, a number of Central and Eastern European states, especially Poland and the Baltic states, will have sharp grievances against Russia. To expect that this explosive mixture will be able to be kept under control indefinitely is reckless optimism. A more promising course is to seek a negotiated settlement that is definitely achievable, even if not immediately, but within a few months, not years.
The United States and its allies have apparently concluded that no one has the right to dictate Ukraine's position at the negotiating table - including on the surrender of territory, if it comes to that. At the same time, it would be a violation of American sovereignty to allow a foreign government to de facto control US support in a confrontation with another nuclear power, hoping against hope that at a critical moment Ukraine will automatically receive military support, like a NATO member. Although National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stressed that America sympathizes with Ukraine's desire to get more weapons in order to conduct more effective military operations, the final decision on what kind of assistance America will provide and for what purpose should be made in Washington, not in Kiev.
Dmitry Simes — President of the Center for National Interests, publisher and CEO of The National Interest
