The Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons turned out to be a dummy
The first Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (NWFZ) was held in Vienna in June. It took place against the background of a sharp increase in military and political risks in the European region, an increase in military spending and capabilities, failures of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of arms control.
The day before the start of the conference, the NWFZ was ratified by several non-nuclear-weapon States (NWS): Cape Verde, Grenada and East Timor. Thus, the number of ratifications has been brought to 65. And more recently there were only 50 of them.
The composition of the conference participants was mostly unsurprising. With bewilderment, they met only the absence of Japan, even among observers. As the only victim of the use of nuclear weapons, Japan has a special aura among supporters of disarmament. Her participation would definitely generate a positive propaganda effect. However, in the context of geopolitical tensions, Japan's allied commitments turned out to be stronger.
The Conference was marked by a number of concrete decisions of a practical nature, which are reflected in the adopted declaration and action plan. We are talking, in particular, about the establishment of two "deadlines". The deadline for the disarmament of a nuclear-weapon State (10 years after joining the NWFZ). And the deadline for the removal of nuclear weapons from the national territory for States deploying nuclear weapons of other States (90 days after joining the NWFZ).
On the one hand, two "deadlines" should give the JIAO a more stable foundation. The term of 10 years is allegedly based on the current state of science and technology and is not arbitrarily established. The 90-day deadline puts the US allies in front of the most specific conditions for refusing to deploy nuclear weapons, eliminating legitimate space for maneuvering and manipulation.
On the other hand, the specification of legal and political obligations, not accompanied by the specification of the technical verification component, may well weaken the contract. A clear time frame may seem particularly unattractive for individual Europeans who, perhaps, would like to refuse to deploy foreign nuclear weapons, but do not see an opportunity for this in the circumstances of 2022. If one of the countries hosting nuclear weapons (or possessing nuclear weapons) suddenly signs a contract and does not meet the specified deadlines, the question of the non-operability and futility of nuclear weapons will inevitably arise.
Another noteworthy provision of the documents adopted at the conference is the item on complementarity (complementarity) of the NWFZ and international disarmament, as well as the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The parties undertake to support the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and "all measures that can effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament." An unambiguous thesis about the obligation to support the NPT can be an important step towards neutralizing the argument of opponents of the NWFZ about the incompatibility of the two treaties.
Otherwise, the decisions of the conference confirmed the previously undisguised and propagandistic (in a purely neutral sense of the word) normative focus of the JIAO. The sides condemned any nuclear threats ("whether explicit or implicit") regardless of the circumstances in which such threats were formulated.
It is expected that Russia is condemned first of all, in the statements and decisions of its political leaders, many Western politicians and experts have found such threats since February of this year. At the same time, Russia, for its part, denies threats of a nuclear nature.
The intention to carry out "further delegitimization and stigmatization of nuclear weapons" is indicated. The humanitarian basis of the treaty is emphasized, and the commitment to the positive obligation to provide compensation to victims of the use and testing of nuclear weapons is confirmed.
The Governments of the participating States will have to appoint officials responsible for the work on the universalization of the NWFZ within 60 days. It is planned to conduct diplomatic visits to inform about the NWFZ, expand support for resolutions for the NWFZ in the UN General Assembly, coordinate work with partners. It was decided to actively include the gender dimension in the work.
Several working and advisory groups are being created:
– on universalization (Co–chairs - South Africa and Malaysia);
– Victim assistance, environmental restoration; international cooperation and assistance (Co-chairs – Kazakhstan and Kiribati);
– On the implementation of Article 4 (Co–Chairs - Mexico and New Zealand);
– scientific advisory group.
Singling out the implementation of Article 4 of the NWFZ as a separate area of work indicates that the need for institutionalization of the nuclear weapons prohibition regime by supporters of "nuclear zero" is acutely realized.
The Conference marked a new, fundamentally important stage in the development of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as an idea, a model of the future and an element of political reality. A dozen years ago, the rejection of nuclear weapons was thought of as another natural step on the path of disarmament – in addition to the agreements that have already repeatedly reduced the arsenals of the leading world powers.
The JIAO signed in 2017 was no longer a purely "peaceful" time agreement. However, the logic of progressive disarmament has not yet been broken. But the subsequent events – including the erosion of Russian-American arms control, signals of the accumulation of nuclear weapons by China and the UK, the unfolding of the hypersonic arms race and, of course, the escalation in the European theater – change the very coordinate system in which the NWF exists.
The contract is no longer logical and in line with the spirit of the times. It creates a parallel reality in which nuclear disarmament is an imperative task that remains important regardless of geopolitical and military contexts. Even the States parties to the treaty, which are close to the Western bloc, have avoided the temptation to adopt the concept of deterrence as corresponding to their security interests, despite the hostilities on the territory of Ukraine.
Moreover, today supporters of the JIAO insist that deterrence does not prevent conflicts, but, on the contrary, inflames them. According to the argument given, the leading powers can wage offensive wars under the guise of their nuclear arsenal – with almost complete confidence that external players will refrain from direct intervention in the conflict. The thesis is clear to representatives of different political currents and regions of the world: after all, it is applicable to almost all conflicts involving nuclear powers.
Although the conference has ended, its transformative impulse may not be limited to the decisions and statements of the anti-nuclear activists themselves. Supporters of the NWFZ are trying to integrate their activities into the real political process, as indicated by the unequivocal positive references to the NPT in the documents of the June conference. If counter steps are also taken by the nuclear States (both official and unofficial), then the meeting in Vienna can be called a success. And regardless of whether all new participants will join the JIAO.
It is hardly possible to overcome the inherent flaws of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The main one is, of course, the absence of nuclear States in the treaty, without which nuclear disarmament is hardly possible both politically and technically. Work on the errors, however, is underway. This means that the approach of the NWFZ States to the problem of nuclear disarmament is still more sensible and closer to reality than its opponents have stated from the very beginning. History will judge whether this note of realism and pragmatism will help the cause of nuclear disarmament.
Artem Kvartalnov
Artem Aleksandrovich Kvartalnov is a junior researcher at the PIR Center.
