Is the West really ready to pay its price for defeating Putin?
The Times writes that Russia's recent successes in the special operation have shaken the West's confidence in the "victory" over Moscow. Now no one believes that Ukraine will return at least to the original line before the operation. We need to look for ways to compromise on terms that are inconvenient for Kiev.
Mark Galeotti
In order for Ukraine to defeat Russia, the Western powers have yet to answer painful questions to themselves.
At some point, our experts believe that Ukraine will win. The next moment we are warned that Russia is winning. But what does "victory" mean? And is the West really ready to pay the necessary price for it?
There is a certain amount of tragic irony here. Russia, Ukraine and the West are each committed to their own struggle in their own way, not knowing for sure what its ending or endgame should or will look like. For Moscow and Kiev, this is happening, in fact, because they are waiting for the verdict that the battlefield will give. And for the West, this situation is developing due to the fact that we are not yet ready to discuss the most difficult issues.
What does victory look like?
If Russian forces can take the entire Donbass and the "Crimean corridor", then Vladimir Putin will be very pleased. This will be more than enough for him to present this as his victory. After all, Putin often applies strategies with "looking back", doing everything in his power at the moment, and then presenting it as something he has always aspired to. Putin will take everything he can take and keep, but he does not yet know what it will be in the end.
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky can declare to the G7 leaders that Ukraine "will negotiate only from a position of strength" and that he seeks to liberate the entire territory of the country by winter. But the chances that Ukrainians this year will be able to oust Russia from the entire Donbass, not to mention the annexed Crimea, are extremely small.
More weapons of better quality really helps Ukraine, but Russia still has much larger reserves and strategic "depth". If Kiev suddenly wins, it will be only because Moscow decides to minimize its losses, not seeing a gain from the continuation of the conflict, and not because it has seriously suffered on the battlefield.
Then won't Ukrainians have to compromise, perhaps exchanging Crimea for Donbass, as Henry Kissinger already suggested? At this stage, they reject any such deals, but as their human losses increase, it is possible that such an "ugly" world may become quite acceptable for them.
Two faces of the West
What about the West? Boris Johnson spoke on behalf of many of his colleagues when he said that the UK and its allies would "stay the same course." But where does this course lead? Johnson told the BBC that "it's up to Vladimir Zelensky and his people to decide what they want" and that "no one here in the G7 sees an alternative to just supporting Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty."
Although everything here is not at all simple.
Privately, "off the record," many officials from all over the West admit that the mantra that it is Ukrainians who should decide how and when the confrontation ends is not entirely true. "Of course, we also have our own interests," one French diplomat admitted. "It's just that so far they coincide with the interests of Kiev." The German official expressed a similar warning: "If we talk about the present moment, we support the position of Ukraine."
However, it is already becoming clear that the White House has doubts that Ukrainians will be able to regain Donbass, and therefore Washington is already beginning to discuss what, according to the American administration, will be a "plausible" victory for Kiev. In other words, as far as the West is concerned, Ukraine seems to be able to decide for itself how the conflict will end, but Westerners expect that it will also listen to their concerns and opinions.
After all, we have the right to vote in the West. Putin will have very little reason to conclude a peace agreement with Ukraine without the prospect of some easing of Western sanctions. And this is exactly what Zelensky cannot negotiate about. Whether you like it or not, but if we in the West are convinced that this conflict cannot be resolved exclusively on the battlefield (which is in fact extremely unlikely), then at some point we will have to intervene in it. Are we really going to wait until the last minute even to start a conversation about what kind of world we consider acceptable? And this despite the fact that it is not yet so easy and fast to achieve?
Hawks, pigeons and ostriches
Part of the problem is that, for all its general statements, NATO is not truly a single entity. It is precisely in order not to make this obvious that the alliance has so far refrained from making any clear statements about the form of a future possible victory.
There are "hawkish" countries that believe that it should be not only about the return of every square inch of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, but also about dealing Russia such a serious blow that it could not pose a threat to any of its neighbors in the future. It is often implied that this also means regime change. "Let me put it this way," said an expert close to the Polish government. "I don't think we can feel safe while Putin is in power."
The "pigeons" are primarily concerned about ensuring peace in Ukraine. Many of them would agree with the withdrawal of Russian troops to their positions before the start of the special operation, effectively ceding Crimea and the "pseudo-states" of the DPR and LPR to Russia. One Scandinavian official probably summed up this credo of "pigeons" when he admitted that "such a deal would be unfair, but it would be practical."
And there are also "ostriches" who want this whole problem to simply disappear. This is especially desired by governments in the South of Europe (but not only), who say the right things and approve collective communiques, but whose concerns are focused on internal affairs or some other problems. They tend to be "pigeons" in general, but are essentially looking for the line of least resistance.
Even the hawks reluctantly agreed that NATO ground troops should not be deployed on the battlefield because of the risk of uncontrolled escalation of the conflict. And even less confrontational ideas, such as deploying small contingents of NATO troops in Western Ukrainian cities, far from the front line, to counter missile attacks, quickly failed due to a lack of consensus.
The strategy of a double war
A lot is being done by the West around the conflict. Ukraine has been promised military assistance worth more than about $27 billion, which is seven times higher than the country's pre-war defense budget (and more than half of this amount has already been provided). However, even newer and more powerful weapons systems will not have an instant or decisive effect on the battlefield.
Exactly the same applies to the sanctions regime. Although it is both unprecedented and very tough. Russia's economy will remain scarred by sanctions for many years to come. But the sanctions have not destroyed Russia's public finances, and so far Putin sounds very optimistic, loudly repeating that "the strategy of economic blitzkrieg has failed."
Putin seeks to win both on the basis of willpower and on the ability to overcome the "war of attrition", betting that Russia, with its 144 million people under his increasingly authoritarian rule, and with an economy that has been under sanctions for eight years and withstood, will be able to defeat Ukraine, and the West.
Will there be "fatigue from Ukraine" in the world?
So far, Ukrainians show no signs of defeatism or disunity. But the West sees a different picture that causes him anxiety. The economic costs of the conflict are growing: Ukraine has been promised not only military assistance, but also financial support in the amount of more than $ 30 billion. And this is just the beginning. According to the International Monetary Fund, Ukraine needs about $5 billion of external financing every month just to keep its public administration system afloat.
The avarice and reluctance with which the Scots and Welsh contributed to Johnson's promised military assistance to the whole of Great Britain in the amount of 1 billion pounds is a symptom of the growing "fatigue from Ukraine" in the West. The point is not that the electorate still regrets its support for Ukrainians, but that it is beginning to notice that money is not being spent at all on internal priorities.
Joe Biden faces a possible failure in the midterm congressional elections in November. Johnson, Emmanuel Macron, Olaf Scholz and other leading European leaders are increasingly facing their own internal problems. So far, none of them has really explained to their electorate what the long-term consequences of Ukrainian affairs at home will be.
Is regime change the answer to everything?
These consequences include the military, given the influx of masses of modern weapons on the battlefield. The United States, for example, has already transferred to Ukraine more than a third of its arsenal of anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles Stinger and Javelin, and it is expected that by the end of the year this figure will reach half.
And it's not just about money. Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, chief of the British Defence Staff, told the House of Lords Committee on Foreign Relations and Defence: "You cannot instantly restore the arsenals of modern weapons by their rapid production."
For example, while Congress has allocated $9 billion to replenish American military arsenals, there is not only a rapid increase in arms prices due to increased demand, but many arms manufacturers are simply overloaded with orders. Although Raytheon Corporation has received a $624 million contract for Stinger missiles, it has warned that it will not even begin to fulfill it until next year.
One could argue that it doesn't really matter yet. We have not yet reached the point where we will have to raid the Imperial Military Museum in search of weapons to send to Ukraine, and given that the Russian armed forces are too busy there, there is no direct military threat to NATO.
However, Ben Wallace, the British Defense Minister, like many of his European colleagues, demands an increase in defense spending. In the 1970s, at the height of the Cold War, we spent not 2% of GDP on defense, but 4%, and a NATO official admits that this is probably a more plausible level, especially now when it also comes to arming and supporting Taiwan. Who is openly talking about such a reorientation of public spending in our country today?
Difficult questions
None of this means that — with patience — the West cannot or will not support Ukraine all the way to victory. Rather, it depends on whether we ask ourselves difficult questions and, more importantly, whether we answer them.
What is the strategic goal? To what extent is this conflict aimed at liberating Ukrainian land, and not causing damage or even overthrowing the Putin regime? The latter goal, to put it bluntly, can only be achieved by continuing the clash for as long as possible in order to bleed Russia out, just as the Afghan occupation drained the Soviet Union.
What are we willing to endure in the name of Ukraine, and how long will we have to endure? How will political unity be maintained not only within the West, but also within our country? Considering that the 1 billion pounds recently allocated for military aid to Ukraine could be used to build two hospitals? When will geopolitics and pre-election calculations begin to collide?
How far are we willing to go in depleting our arsenals? Moreover, in the long term, we are committed to rearming the Western alliance, which has enjoyed peace dividends for longer than was reasonable?
In the past, we relied on "strategic ambiguity" in our relations with Putin. Essentially, we were letting him know what we thought was unacceptable, but not what we would do about it. This approach did not work. The Russian leader, accustomed to the fact that we speak harshly, but we do not bring our harshness to the end, as happened after Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, decided that we were just bluffing again.
It's time for less ambiguity and more willingness to tackle the most difficult issues.
Comments from readers of The Times:
trevor crow
Putin recently compared himself to Peter the Great, who attacked and captured everyone in a row.
We should have ignored it.
Alistair Moore
Putin's statement was intended for an internal audience.
And if you want to listen to real lies, slander and stupid rhetoric, then pay your attention to Boris Johnson!
David Marsh
The West should listen to Kissinger and end this conflict in Ukraine before irreparable economic damage is done to the world.
Kenoath
Kissinger is right. Ukraine will be a smaller country without Donbass, etc., but it will still be a country with an upward trajectory and should join the EU. Putin gets something because Ukraine does not join NATO. But NATO is expanding into Scandinavia for a relatively small price. The energy and food crisis can be solved. The Russian separatists of Donbass are joining the Motherland. Otherwise, the risk will continue to escalate, there will be more hunger, even greater poverty, and Europeans will freeze this winter.
alanmowle
A very well-balanced scientific article. President Zelensky was elected in the wake of the fight against corruption, Ukraine, this fertile country with a population of more than 44 million people ranks 4th from the bottom among the poorest countries in Europe. It is poorer than Albania with a population of less than three million people. Corruption is ubiquitous here. President Zelensky, although he voted for an anti-corruption ticket, is being helped by corrupt officials who chose him as their friend, so little has changed. All levels of the government and the armed forces are involved in corruption schemes, and a completely politically inexperienced former comedian and movie star (he played the role of the president of Ukraine in a popular film) did not know how and where to start. Mr. Biden took full advantage of this, promising and giving large amounts of cash, as well as equipment. Most Ukrainians have little idea of what is going on, or what the threat of Ukraine joining NATO meant for Russia. A poor country, by common sense, means that people are poor. The streets are not clogged with cars and large stores like Tesco and M&S. Professor Galeotti has written an unbiased, important article, which I find convincing.
david dickie
What are you talking about? Russia has already won, as it has almost conquered Donbass. It has a stranglehold on Ukraine's export-dependent economy through a naval blockade in the Black Sea. Putin will announce a cease-fire soon. Ukraine is inferior to Russia in terms of armament and really cannot counterattack to recapture Sevastopol.
Marcus Hughes
Who cares if this Ukraine exists or not? Yes, it will not be at all soon, because Biden and those puppets who put him on will continue their business until there are no more Ukrainians left. Good riddance to Ukraine from the next batch of banditry.
David White
The article rather rigidly sets out the choice that the West has. Ukraine has no chance of defeating Putin, because his military machine has large reserves and depth. We must ask for peace, no matter how painful the loss of eastern Ukraine may be. However, the world should, since peace talks are underway, declare that eastern Ukraine remains Ukraine, not Russia.
Bryan Dale
So America's military arsenal is being depleted. The war has not only brought Russia closer to China, but also weakened America as China prepares to retake Taiwan and challenge India.
