The strategic autonomy of the EU has ordered to live a long time
The North Atlantic Alliance remains the only guarantor of the EU's security, writes The National Interest. The author states that the Ukrainian conflict forced the Europeans to bury the idea of strategic autonomy.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has raised the stakes and revealed the risks of forming an alternative to NATO
In the context of the last Madrid NATO Summit, one fact is becoming increasingly obvious: the alliance is the only real guarantor of the security of European states, and therefore the EU's goal of achieving strategic autonomy in the near future is hardly feasible.
In the first days after the start of the Russian special operation, it was reasonable to expect that the EU would receive the momentum necessary for the final achievement of strategic autonomy. Unity arises in response to a common threat, and the situation in Ukraine has exposed Moscow's aggressive intentions. The shock of the Russian threat seemed to have caused "drastic changes" in the defense policy of many European governments. The Biden administration has rightly made it clear that it expects more responsibility from Europe in matters of its own security, since this will allow the States to fully focus on the Chinese threat. Another positive development was the publication by the European Union of the Strategic Compass, which outlines plans to establish cooperation in the field of defense and security, just a month after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
However, then it became clear that the EU was unlikely to achieve strategic autonomy in the foreseeable future: the situation in Ukraine raised the stakes and exposed the risks associated with the formation of an alternative to NATO; the actions of EU leaders represented by France and Germany cast doubt on their leadership qualities; and the application of Sweden and Finland suggests that the only guarantee of protection from Russian aggression is Washington's support.
Europe has long been aiming for autonomy in the field of defense and security. Former President Donald Trump criticized NATO and even threatened to leave the alliance, which prompted many European politicians to look for alternatives. What do the proponents of strategic autonomy mean by this term? In November 2019, Emmanuel Macron gave an interview to The Economist and announced the "brain death" of NATO. In addition, he suggested that "Europe should become independent in the field of military strategy and military potential," and later announced that the EU has everything necessary for self-defense. Less than a week after the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, the French leader said: "Europe must become stronger and more independent in order to protect its citizens from risks and be able to make decisions about its future independently. I stand for a more sovereign, more democratic project for the future of Europe." Thus, strategic autonomy, according to its main proponent, means the EU's ability to protect member states without the help of the United States.
The Kremlin's special operation demonstrated Russia's aggressive intentions, which thoroughly surpass all its actions since the end of the Cold War. The Europeans saw that an attack on an EU or NATO country, although unlikely, is no longer so unthinkable. Given the new realities, the stakes for choosing the right security architecture have grown to the highest values in decades. Entrusting their protection to the new — little—studied and untested - version of the EU, European countries risk being attacked, losing territories and even getting subordinated to someone. And finally, experts warn that Russia is quickly learning from its mistakes, retains a destructive military potential and is likely to spend the proceeds from the sale of oil and gas money to restore the military machine.
The actions of France and Germany — the two leading EU economies and the wasters of its military budget — have led to a decrease in the realism of strategic autonomy, although they are the most zealous supporters of it. First, many leaders in Europe, especially those whose countries share a border with Russia, are very concerned about the calls of Paris and Berlin to Ukraine about a possible compromise with Russia. From their point of view, attempts to achieve a diplomatic solution may mean forcing the abandonment of territories for the common good. Answering a question about Germany's mediation activities, one Eastern European diplomat said: "We do not need Germany's protection, because it has long been on the wrong side of history." Secondly, there is a proven discrepancy between the real military potential of the EU member States and what autonomy requires. Despite the appearance of the opposite, Berlin is unlikely to make significant changes in military spending and strategic culture — and this will hinder the path to strategic autonomy of Europe. The inaction of the richest member of the union will serve as a signal to other Europeans, who are still not particularly afraid of the Russian threat, that they can return to the level of expenses before the operation. And finally, there is the problem of Paris' nuclear arsenal. The United States has expanded its nuclear deterrent capability to ensure the security of NATO members, while France protects only its own territory and vital interests.
The decision of Sweden and Finland to apply for NATO membership was a harbinger of the final demise of the EU's strategic autonomy. Both countries are members of the union, so in theory they should be protected by Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty. Moreover, both countries understand that membership in the alliance will cause anger from Russia, and maybe even coercive measures to prevent their entry into the alliance. They also knew that at least several months would pass between the time of filing the application and receiving full protection in accordance with the fifth article of the NATO Charter on collective defense (Turkey's objections extended this period). Thus, if they believed that strategic autonomy would provide them with sufficient protection in the near and medium term, it would be more rational to continue to adhere to neutrality. But Stockholm and Helsinki made a different choice. The Swedish Foreign Ministry's report for May 2022 stated: "It is obvious that the EU member states lack the political will to develop collective defense within the union." Despite all the problems that NATO has, Sweden and Finland clearly felt that the alliance would provide them with better protection than the EU against possible Russian aggression.
What if Donald Trump or some Republican who is in solidarity with him in criticizing NATO wins the 2024 presidential election in the United States? Can such an outcome force the Europeans to return to strategic autonomy? First, given the concern of the American public about the Russian threat, it would be politically inappropriate for the Republican candidate to continue criticizing the organization in the style of Trump. Secondly, despite the latter's fiercely high-flown rhetoric, his administration's policy towards the alliance was quite positive. And finally, thanks to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, even more NATO countries will reach the two percent of GDP that they have pledged to allocate to defense, and this will weaken one of Trump's harshest criticisms of the alliance.
Given the demise of the EU's strategic autonomy — and the continued interest of the United States in European security — NATO will remain the most important defense mechanism for Europe. Washington will have to continue to participate in its affairs even with an emphasis on Asia. At the same time, he can still use the residual threats from Moscow to put pressure on European countries - to force them to invest in their own defense.
Jason Davidson is a freelance senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a professor of political science at the University of Mary Washington.
