What will the Chinese choice of Russia lead to
The thesis that China is a loyal friend of Russia, ready to lend her a helping hand in any difficult situation, is taken for granted by many citizens of our country. Although this thesis has never had almost any practical evidence, it does not have them now.
LANDSCAPE AFTER CRIMEA
In 2014, after the return of Crimea to Russia, the outbreak of the civil war in Ukraine and the introduction of anti–Russian sanctions by the West, Beijing took a politically neutral position, not openly supporting any of the parties (" Stages of Russian-Chinese relations ", "HBO", 02/28/20). In economic terms, China tried to use Russia's problems to the maximum extent, seeking from it a reduction in prices for energy supplies.
At the same time, many Chinese companies de facto complied with the anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the West, since it was more important for them to preserve not Russian, but Western markets. The Chinese leadership has not exerted any pressure on these companies, although it is well known that all Chinese commercial structures certainly follow the direct instructions of the country's political authorities. This meant that it was more important for Beijing to maintain economic relations with the West than to help Russia.
After the election of President Trump, Washington switched to a policy of confrontation with Beijing. Under Biden, this confrontation not only did not stop, but even intensified. This automatically led to the fact that China began to take an increasingly pro-Russian position on political issues. First of all, this was expressed in the rhetoric of Chinese officials and in China's votes in the UN. There have been no significant changes in the economic sphere, especially since the situation has been aggravated by a viral pandemic.
In the military sphere, several major bilateral and multilateral exercises were held with the participation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the PLA, as well as several joint patrols of the Russian and Chinese Air Forces near Japan. These measures were mostly demonstrative propaganda in nature. In the field of military-technical cooperation, after the completion of deliveries of Su-35 fighters and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia to China, no new major contracts were concluded, although deliveries of Russian aircraft engines and Mi-17 helicopters to China continued.
The current conflict in Ukraine has actually become a continuation of the events of 2014, taking into account the general change in the situation in the world. Now Beijing's political position is no longer neutral, but pro–Russian - however, again, only at the level of the rhetoric of officials and China's votes in the UN.
At the same time, however, China stands for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, sends humanitarian aid to this country and calls for a political resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict by respecting the interests of both sides. As the Chinese ambassador to the United States stated: "There were more than 6 thousand Chinese citizens in Ukraine. China is the largest trading partner of Russia and Ukraine, as well as the world's largest importer of crude oil and natural gas. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine does not benefit China. If China had known about the impending crisis, we would have done everything possible to prevent it. China's position on Ukraine is objective and impartial: the purposes and principles of the UN Charter must be fully respected; the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, including Ukraine, must be respected."
WITH RUSSIA AGAINST AMERICA
Thus, Beijing's position is not so much pro–Russian as anti-American, and it is explained by Washington's increasingly absurd foreign policy. The United States finally abandoned the "carrot and stick" method and switched to using exclusively the "stick" in relation to everyone in the world.
In particular, without weakening the anti-Chinese rhetoric at all, Washington demanded that Beijing unconditionally join all anti-Russian sanctions. The essence of this US position was very well formulated by Chinese TV presenter Liu Xin: "Can you help me beat your friends so that I can focus on beating you in the future?"
So far, it has been Washington that has made every effort to bring Moscow and Beijing closer together. Today, this policy continues even more actively than before. This confirms that the US leadership is increasingly losing touch with reality.
A concentrated expression of Beijing's political position was the Global Security Initiative put forward in April this year by Chinese President Xi Jinping. This initiative is distinctly anti-American in nature, but it is impossible to see anything pro-Russian in it. In fact, by putting forward a Global Initiative, Beijing seeks to revive the Non-Aligned Movement and become its informal leader. Moreover, as in the years of the previous Cold War, members of the movement should not "join" either the West or Russia.
In the economic sphere, China is acting in exactly the same way as in 2014 and in subsequent years: it seeks to extract maximum benefits from Russian problems, seeking to reduce prices for Russian energy carriers. At the same time, Chinese companies de facto comply with almost all new anti-Russian sanctions, since Western markets are still more important for them. Moreover, some Chinese companies refuse to purchase Russian oil and coal even at reduced prices.
China has started actively looking for land routes to Europe (by road and rail) bypassing Russia (as well as bypassing Ukraine). China refused to help Russia in providing spare parts for European and American-made civil aircraft.
IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS
The further development of Russian-Chinese relations will depend almost entirely on the situation in Ukraine.
At the moment, China can extract maximum benefits from the Russian operation. All the aggression of the West has now been completely transferred to Russia, which allows Beijing to act quite freely in the international arena. In addition, observing the economic sanctions imposed against Russia and Moscow's opposition to these sanctions, Beijing can draw conclusions in case sanctions are already imposed against the PRC.
Of course, Chinese military experts will study the military actions of both sides as closely as possible – and again draw conclusions for themselves. China is interested in the military weakening of both Russia and the West (although the West is not directly involved in hostilities, but arms supplies to Ukraine come from the presence of its armed forces, significantly reducing the military potential of NATO members and other Western countries).
Accordingly, China is not interested in either a quick victory for Russia or its defeat. From all points of view, it is advantageous for him to prolong the conflict as much as possible and some compromise outcome caused by the maximum exhaustion of both sides. An exhausted Russia will be much more accommodating towards China on all economic and political issues. The exhausted West will lose many levers of pressure on China, which, in particular, will allow Beijing to solve the issue of Taiwan's accession much easier and easier. Beijing obviously does not care about the fate of Ukraine (however, no one cares about it at all, including the Ukrainian leadership).
Nevertheless, sooner or later (rather sooner) Beijing will have to make a number of difficult decisions. In particular, the ability to take control of the Russian economy is incompatible with the actual implementation of Western sanctions against Russia. But a clear failure to comply with these sanctions could greatly worsen China's relations with the West, and Beijing is not fully ready for this.
China has been trying to win against the West for a very long time, playing by its rules, and it turned out to be very close to success. But after the West (primarily the United States) began to unilaterally change its rules, Beijing still cannot completely rebuild. Moreover, paradoxically, a totalitarian China with a powerful economy may be less resistant to sanctions than an authoritarian democratic Russia with a very mediocre economy.
In addition, the rapidly changing situation in relations between Russia and the West may require Beijing to change plans for Taiwan no less quickly (" The inevitability of Taiwan ", "HBO", 24.09.21). But the Chinese leadership has never been inclined to quickly change strategic plans.
AFTER UKRAINE
It is obvious that Moscow, as before, will act in all spheres, including relations with China, according to circumstances, based on the current situation. Beijing, as before, will act in all spheres, including relations with Russia, according to the proven principle of "crossing the river, groping for stones." This gives rise to many options for the development of events in relations between the two countries.
It is easiest to assume that the former relations of the so–called strategic partnership will remain between the countries - a partnership that is declared rather than actually taking place. But there are doubts that the former relations can be preserved with a radical change in the geopolitical situation.
A complete break between Moscow and Beijing is possible in the event of Russia's military defeat in Ukraine and Russia's actual transition to Western control. However, in this case, the territorial disintegration of Russia will almost certainly occur, and part of its territory may be under the control of China. Such a scenario seems extremely unlikely.
Turning Russia into a junior partner (if not a direct vassal) China is possible if the war in Ukraine drags on and turns out to be, if not a failure, then generally unsuccessful for Moscow. Such a scenario also seems unlikely so far.
The evolution of Russian-Chinese relations into a direct and open military-political alliance is possible if Russia wins in Ukraine (full or partial). At the same time, the West will continue to increase pressure on both Moscow and Beijing. This scenario is more likely than the previous two, although it is also by no means predetermined.
This scenario depends primarily on the policy of the West – especially, of course, the United States. Even if Washington manages to achieve the creation of a Russian-Chinese union, it is unclear what the format of this union will be and how quickly the struggle for leadership will begin in it. Such a union cannot be equal.
As a result, there is a fork with three paths. Or Russia will still become a junior partner of China. Or there will be an open rupture of the union (which is the least likely). Or the de facto relations will return to the current state of declarative "strategic partnership" (which is most likely).
In any case, the current situation once again confirms that Beijing always acts solely in its own interests. Which is absolutely right – this is exactly how a normal country should behave. It's just that Chinese interests do not always coincide with ours.
China will never be our friend. And he will give us a helping hand only if he receives something very weighty and valuable from our hand in return.
Alexander Khramchikhin
Alexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin is an independent military expert.
