The German Foundation for Science and Politics (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) published an interesting report in March 2022 Florian Schöne "Zur Notwendigkeit der Zentralisierung von Hubschraubern in der Bundeswehr" ("On the need to centralize helicopter control in the German Armed Forces") on the prospects of creating a unified helicopter command in the German armed forces.
.
Airbus Helicopters Tiger combat helicopter (tail number 74+14) of the Army Aviation of the German Land Forces (c) www.flugrevue.de
Changes have begun in the system of the German armed forces, which will also affect the structure of the helicopter forces. Although the "fundamental reform" has been suspended, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future the direction of structural transformations will change markedly, that is, further reform ideas will probably have to be based on a document on the "key provisions" of the reform of the armed forces. The financial resources that were promised at the extraordinary meeting of the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, also do not allow an excessive increase in the forces and means of the armed forces. The additional money, at least 100 billion euros, currently allows only to implement the plans already adopted, that is, the armed forces should solve problems with the current equipment of equipment, and not create new combat capabilities. The number of weapons systems to be upgraded will not increase significantly. The provision from the government coalition agreement that "the personnel, logistics and finances of the armed forces must be subjected to a thorough inventory" still needs to be implemented. The unsatisfactory level of logistics and high personnel costs are also decisive factors for the helicopter forces. Thus, the armed forces will have to change according to the "key provisions", despite the additional funds allocated, in order to strengthen operational readiness and respond to demographic challenges, namely, a decrease in the birth rate and, accordingly, a decrease in the number of recruits. The document on key issues of the future of the armed forces remains relevant in its conclusions and serves as the basis for analysis in the framework of this report.
Orientation to "dimensions" (air/space, land, sea, cyberspace) is still relevant and requires internal restructuring of the armed forces. The Ground forces, the Air Force and the Navy now independently operate their helicopters, which leaves almost no room for synergy. Aircraft are expensive to operate and maintain. This implies a gradual reduction in the available flight fleet, a decrease in reserves and a growing need for effective joint operation. The document on the key provisions of the future of the armed forces also called for a shift in attention to the effectiveness of the actions of the troops. This means fewer headquarters, less bureaucracy and more full-time positions in combat units. The necessary reallocation of full-time positions is included in further consideration.
The disbandment of the Joint Support Forces [Streitkräftebasis], discussed in the document on the key provisions that are currently responsible for the common tasks of the armed forces in the field of logistics, military police and protection against WMD, does not imply that the top military leadership considers the centralization of these functions no longer necessary. Upon closer examination, tasks such as military police, even when transferred to the ground forces, more precisely, to the land dimension, should still be available to all types of armed forces. The same applies to the possible integration of the armed forces aviation directorate into a single "Air System" (Air Force/air dimension). The transferred tasks are simply located elsewhere. Thus, the need for joint actions with specialists from other "dimensions" remains.
Why helicopters?
Helicopters provide the military with unique capabilities. Their speed, flexibility and ability to work in hard-to-reach areas are absolutely irreplaceable. From a military point of view, helicopter operations are described by the term "air mobility" [Luftbeweglichkeit]. Essential for this function is the combination of different types of aircraft, such as heavy and light transport and attack helicopters.
Airmobile operations are crucial on the battlefield, for example, when capturing and holding bridges. They are indispensable in the so-called preparatory operations, the purpose of which is to create conditions for the main forces to move into the combat area. Also, there are no special alternatives to them in the confrontation with the enemy, who invaded your airspace, in particular, through an amphibious operation.
In addition, helicopters are a scarce resource in the world and therefore have strategic importance for Germany from the point of view of security policy, which they proved in Mali and Afghanistan, including as means of cargo delivery and sanitary transports. It is unlikely that participation in the resolution of international crises in the future can be excluded from the functionality of the armed forces.
Helicopters in the German Armed Forces
Helicopters of the German armed Forces are distributed by types of armed forces or future "dimensions", that is, the army (land dimension), the Air Force (aerospace dimension) and the Navy (maritime dimension), and are under the jurisdiction of the Federal Office for Logistics, Information Technology and Operation (Bundesamt für Ausrüstung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung der Bundeswehr, BAAINBw). The inspectors and the head of the BAAINBw are responsible for the use of their "own" aircraft, while the regulatory requirements for combined arms operations are established and monitored jointly with the Aviation Directorate of the Armed Forces.
Each branch of the armed forces will choose its own organizational form in the future and will also have to maintain a working relationship with BAAINBw. The cost reduction recognized as necessary in the document on key provisions is unlikely to be achievable in this case. The Armed Forces have eight different types of helicopters, some of which are operated by several branches of the armed forces. The possibility of a certain "unification" of types, as it could be done on the model of the so-called "transfer of capabilities" [Fähigkeitstransfer], the exchange of CH-53G and NH90 helicopters between the army and the Air Force, was not implemented. Similarly, the H145 helicopter is operated by the Air Force and Army, and the NH90 by the Army and Navy. It is assumed that this number will be reduced to about six different types of helicopters, since part of the fleet will have to be decommissioned due to age.
Accordingly, four different organizations could arise in the armed forces, only partially sharing operational competencies. In addition to parallel use, this means parallel training environments and differing technical processes and procedures.
Operation or application?
Depending on the point of view from which the topic of "optimization" is considered, the recommendations also change. Basically, two approaches should be distinguished: operational and tactical application [Einsatz] and operation management [Nutzungssteuerung]. While the first approach focuses on achieving military goals, the second is primarily focused on reducing costs, that is, on the efficiency of processes. Until now, both approaches have been partially opposed to each other due to chronic underfunding, as cost savings often imposed operational constraints. For example, fewer flight hours resulted in less trained helicopter crews. Other things being equal, the effectiveness of the use of Einsatz should take priority, whether it is the tasks of territorial or national defense or the management of international crises, but economically justified solutions remain a necessity regardless of the available financial resources of the armed forces. Thus, the optimization of helicopter forces should improve operational management without reducing operational capabilities.
Prospects of "operation management"
Combining all the helicopters of the armed forces into one command seems generally reasonable. In this way, it is possible to obtain synergies, for example, in training, maintenance and technical modernization, and to achieve a reduction in operating costs. Such an institution (new in relation to the established ones) will also be responsible for coordinating operational application, which will provide the required centralized management. This would create a single counterparty that would make the best use of the scarce helicopter resource.
Through the general management of access to various types of helicopters, the most cost-effective performance of tasks can be achieved, for example, the transportation of small loads by smaller machines. The Navy has its own peculiarities. Their helicopters are designed for use at sea and over the sea and are used, in particular, on ships and during marine rescue operations. Thus, the benefits of the merger for the Navy are more related to the further modernization and operation of NH90 helicopters.
International experience
Combining the capabilities of various types of armed forces follows the classical definition of a Joint Command ("Joint Commando"). The so-called "Air System" of the armed forces is expected to perform the same functions. However, this term, mentioned in the document on key provisions, has not yet received an exhaustive explanation.
Examples of joint helicopter commands in Europe are the British Joint Helicopter Command (Joint Helicopter Command), established in 1999, and the Helicopter Defense Command (Defensie Helikopter Commando), established in the Netherlands. In the UK, the evaluation of the success of this experience was last held in 2004. Although the National Audit Office has identified additional opportunities for optimization, it has confirmed that the UK armed forces are using helicopters more effectively. In particular, the efficiency has improved. However, the establishment of brigade-level headquarters in the British Army also showed the presence of operational vulnerabilities. From the British point of view, it is necessary to create a control mechanism that will simplify or take over the integration of helicopters into the operations of the ground forces.
The Armed forces of the Netherlands went even further. Here, the command and all vehicles are part of the Air Force, and the air component of the Navy has its own material and technical base, which gives the fleet a special role. The interaction of the helicopter forces of the Air Force and the 11th Airmobile Brigade of the armed forces is regulated by a common framework concept, which describes the order of exercises, the structure of formations, flight time standards and similar issues.
In Australia, helicopter forces operate in the army and Navy. Thus, there are different examples of the organization of helicopter troops with different advantages and disadvantages. This means that there is no standard solution. Consequently, several options will also need to be considered for the German armed forces. For example, the corresponding institute can be created as a joint command or as a separate branch of the armed forces.
Measures in the ground forces / the "Earth" dimension
In order to increase the efficiency of the use of their helicopters, the ground forces have created a Helicopter Command [Kommando Hubschrauber]. As a so-called specialized directorate, it is responsible for all operational and logistical issues, as well as regulatory competencies in relation to aircraft, aviation equipment and additional equipment in the ground forces and therefore does not differ much from the "joint command". Thus, the Helicopter Command could serve as a prototype of the Joint Helicopter Command of the Armed Forces. During the catastrophic flooding in North Rhine-Westphalia, the Helicopter Command was able to organize rapid assistance thanks to direct access to army helicopter formations and thus proved its fundamental usefulness. The same applies to the rapid transfer of NH90 helicopters from Afghanistan to Mali. This looks like a good example of how a Joint Command with direct access to all helicopters of the armed forces will reduce costs and use them more effectively at the combined arms level.
The Joint Helicopter Command of the Armed Forces should, apparently, be strengthened by the BAAINBw representative office in order to be able to interact directly with the industry. However, the best solution would be to transfer the authority to attract civilian contractors into one hand. To do this, it is also necessary to facilitate access to budget funds. Such centralization of control of one type of aircraft (helicopters) would at least relieve BAAINBw, in the long term it would probably be possible to reduce staff. From the point of view of operation management, the creation of a Joint Helicopter Command of the armed Forces seems necessary.
Subordination of command
The "joint Command" should be balanced in the distribution of leadership positions between the branches of the armed forces. It is still unlikely that interested parties will voluntarily abandon the independent use of "their" helicopters. Thus, the unification scheme for the armed forces should probably include two components: one is responsible for core tasks (charters / training and training / further development), and the other takes into account the specifics of the armed forces.
Another way of organizing helicopter forces, as mentioned above, is to transfer them to the so-called unified "Air system". Such an "Air System", following the logic of the distribution of responsibility according to the dimensions of the armed forces, will be part of the Air Force. Thus, the ground forces and the Navy will have to send their representatives there to take into account the interests of other dimensions of the armed forces. However, there is still no comprehensive definition of an "Air System".
If we think exclusively from the point of view of command management, there are only minor differences between the types of armed forces. It is still unclear whether the United Support Forces [Streitkräftebasis] will be disbanded. Without them, there will be no specialized structure in the armed forces to which such a command could be subordinated. It remains subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, that is, directly to the Inspector General of the armed forces. However, due to the staff available to the Inspector General, the non-alternative performance of combined arms tasks by him at this stage looks impractical. Here the absence of combined arms commands [Bundeswehrkommandos], which could provide centralized planning and management, makes itself felt.
Based on this, only the types of armed forces / "dimensions" remain and, thus, subordination to one of the commands of the future "dimensions". In principle, there should be enough personnel to ensure the management of the combined forces. It is important to create a Joint helicopter Command capable of integration with the forces and means of other types of armed forces.
Tactical management
The management of troops at the tactical level is traditionally not part of the tasks of this type of command, even if all helicopter units were subordinate to it. Tactical operations are managed at the level of formations, such as a brigade or division. To this end, Great Britain has created the above-mentioned brigade headquarters in the ground forces. They perform the functions of tactical management and support (fire support / fuel supply) and prevent the setting of tasks disproportionate to available forces and means (overcommitment). It is likely that such command structures will also be required by the German ground forces in the future in order to be able to plan operations within NATO, if the corresponding needs are not taken into account when creating a Joint Command. It is unlikely that the leadership of the three helicopter formations of the ground forces will be able to solve these tasks. Hence the need to endow the Joint Command with competencies in the field of tactical management so that it can either independently perform these functions or share them with the leadership of helicopter units of the ground forces and the Air Force. The Navy's special role involves maintaining the independent use of its own helicopters.
Prospects for "application": centralized management?
The document on the key provisions of the reform of the armed forces sets the goal: "to optimize the structures and eliminate the displacement and dispersion of responsibility." Thus, the goal of restructuring should be to reduce the costs of interaction and focus responsibility in one place. Although the joint helicopter command of the armed forces, subordinate to one of the branches of the armed forces, or the creation of a single "Air system" meets the requirement of structural optimization, at the same time another question arises: should helicopters be operated by the armed forces or do we need a separate authorized body for all "measurements", as is done in the Netherlands.
When considering from the point of view of tasks, two parameters should be taken into account: planning and actual execution [Durchführung]. As for the execution, we are talking about the personnel who have the skills to successfully complete the tasks. In particular, this means that the pilots are sufficiently proficient in their machines and that the interaction between the deployed units takes place smoothly. This factor can be considered necessary regardless of the type of troops.
In the field of planning, we are talking about understanding the tactical features of an operation, on the one hand, and the general operational plan, on the other. The latter means the ability to determine, especially in the context of large operations, where it is best to use helicopters and what results can be expected from this. This requires a basic understanding of the external conditions, which is also necessary for the purposeful further development of skills and abilities. For example, those who support special forces need knowledge about how special forces think and act; those who participate in army operations need knowledge about the specifics of army planning and command. The differences between the types of armed forces are obvious here.
Challenges in the context of "dimensions"
Due to the specialization of helicopters in the Navy, especially their use on ships, there are few points of contact for joint actions with other types of armed forces. It is important to understand the tasks to be solved in the marine "dimension" and their generic specifics.
If we consider the helicopters of the Air Force and the ground forces, there are strong similarities, starting with the performance of tasks on the ground. The main tasks for both are the transportation of personnel and military equipment, as well as fire support or cover, while only the ground forces have attack helicopters in the literal sense of the word.
Only ground forces face challenges related to air assault operations (Air Assault), that is, with the interaction of attack and transport helicopters and infantry. The problem in this case is not technical feasibility, but planning.
The effectiveness of air assault operations depends on the availability of medium and heavy transport helicopters. Without them, it is difficult to deliver heavy infantry weapons deep into enemy territory. Logistics support due to the insignificant size of the fleet would require too many flights. The longer the flight lasts, the greater the danger for the crews, since the chances of the enemy successfully using air defense systems are growing. But without the necessary supplies, the infantry will not be able to perform their tasks.
After the aforementioned "transfer of capabilities", the ground forces lost direct access to medium transport helicopters. Such Air Force helicopters are available for army operations only to a limited extent. This is partly due to technical difficulties caused by the age of the machines. A smaller fleet of new heavy transport helicopters will not solve this problem. Therefore, there is a question of prioritization and, thus, understanding the needs of individual helicopter users. The Air Force does not depend on the support of the army. Transportation tasks can be performed by the Air Force's own forces. In addition, they provide support for special forces and conduct rescue and search operations (Combat Search and Rescue - CSAR). None of these tasks requires special operational knowledge that goes beyond the usual procedures in the field of planning and interaction with other aircraft.
Effectiveness as a starting point?
From an operational point of view, the question arises whether it is necessary to distribute helicopters across several types of armed forces. In the end, the tasks of the special operations forces, closely related to the ground units, can be transferred to the army. The support of the Navy special forces will not be affected by such a step. Helicopter capabilities can also assist (reconnaissance/fire cover) during airmobile operations.
The tasks of search and rescue of crews in enemy territory (CSAR), performed wherever the Air Force is deployed, must be shared with the ground forces through an appropriate agreement, especially since the army already has its own search and rescue service within the borders of Germany. The same can be said about the performance of Air Force transport tasks. They can be provided with confirmed quotas of flight hours.
In principle, this argument can be deployed and arguments can be made in favor of transferring not only operational management, but also operational tasks of the Air Force. Of course, flight personnel, in addition to joint exercises, can be required to participate in tactical and operational training activities of the ground forces. In addition, it would be desirable to plan opportunities for the integration and further joint development of helicopter forces with the ground dimension of the armed forces. The transfer of helicopter forces to the Air Force seems to be more complicated and, therefore, involves more costs.
Europeanization?
Finally, there is the issue of institutionalizing helicopter management at the European level. Some of the transport aircraft (including crews) of the Air Force are also provided to other European countries within the framework of the European Air Transport Command (EATC), subject to certain restrictions on the German side.
The main advantage of the European Helicopter Command, as in the case of the Joint Helicopter Command, will be the use of synergy in the areas of training and advanced training, standardization and technical modernization. However, given the number of different types of helicopters in Europe, the expected increase in efficiency is currently small. Pan-European procurement can be organized through the European Defense Agency (EDA), which also contributes to the standardization of flight procedures and conducts training and exercises. However, it would be possible to transfer the powers of the EDA (standardization, exercises, training) to a new institute.
For completeness, standardization within NATO should also be taken into account. Thanks to the work of the Helicopter Inter Service Working Group (Interdepartmental Working Group on Helicopters), standardization agreements (STANAG) and Allied Tactical Publications (ATP) are in force in all NATO countries. We should also mention the OCCAR joint arms procurement organization, which is mainly engaged in the current management of joint weapons programs, in particular, for the Tiger attack helicopter.
Internationalization in the form of a common management body is also possible. In this case, other countries could also take part in its work. That would allow small states to maintain or build from scratch their own competencies in helicopter forces.
Joint training of pilots from various European countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as from various branches of the armed forces of Germany, is already taking place at the Army International Helicopter Pilot Training Center. The Center also participates in the development of international and NATO standards in basic helicopter pilot training. Thus, the points of contact for international cooperation have already been created.
Conclusions
In the foreseeable future, helicopters will remain a scarce resource, including at the international level. Expensive operation places increased demands on system management, and not only in Germany. Trying to avoid structural changes means taking on more costs than necessary.
Since there are no detailed published considerations about the so-called "Air System", it is impossible to definitively understand whether the operation management within such a structure will be more effective than in a joint command based on the fleet or army. However, both options seem to improve helicopter operation management and, as a result, meet the minimum requirements for efficient maintenance and increased efficiency. Concentrating the operation management of all aircraft in the "Air" dimension seems more likely if the focus is on the availability of helicopters. Thus, in the "Air" dimension, all aviation competencies are combined and the maintenance of all logistics chains is ensured.
However, this does not apply to the use of helicopters. The main recipients of the services of the Air Force and ground forces helicopters are army units, and the tasks are performed in the ground dimension. From an operational point of view, it is also advisable for the personnel servicing the vehicles to plan their deployment in the ground dimension. The same applies to the Navy.
Attributing helicopters to one of the dimensions, as shown above, is not an obvious thing by itself. Separation of this kind as machines in the "Air" dimension, and command staff in the "Ground" dimension seems to be a balanced decision, but in reality, probably not feasible. Decisions in the spirit of "giving more freedom to the personnel", "sole command", "cost reduction in interaction" are carried out with an eye to the division of responsibilities. Simply renaming the armed forces into dimensions does not solve this problem right away, but it can further blur the boundaries of areas of responsibility. The Combined Arms commands of the armed Forces, the Aviation Directorate (Luftfahrtamt) and the Space Command (Weltraumkommando), which may soon become part of the "Air" dimension, could demonstrate this.
In the current conditions, a focus on results is required. Therefore, the combined-arms helicopter command should be placed in the ground dimension. In this sense, it will be necessary to get rid of duplication of functions and reduce personnel costs.
In connection with the planned reorganization of the end-use sector of armaments and military equipment, work processes should be debugged in a new way. It can take years. The postponed changes in the structure of the armed forces threaten further approvals with those responsible for the operation. Therefore, the present moment for the implementation of the helicopter command project seems favorable.
