Ukraine is an incredibly rich country with huge potential, but the elite simply destroyed it
The reason for today's conflict in Ukraine is what has happened there over the past 30 years, according to former First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic Petr Drulak. In an interview with Rádio universum, he noted that the disintegration of the country has continued continuously all these years.
Martina Kotsianova
At the beginning of the year, probably all the peoples of the world hoped that the two-year torment due to the coronavirus would finally stop, and the old, quiet times would return. But the fighting started in Ukraine, and everything changed. It is clear that this conflict will change the world, perhaps radically, and this is considered a fact, perhaps, by everyone without exception. But what preceded this conflict? What led to it? What will happen now? How will the world change? How will international relations, trade, and movement around the world change? How will this affect the formation of geopolitical associations of different countries, and how tense will their relations be? Is the quiet peacetime over for the Western world? Is an era of violent conflicts or even violence and wars waiting for us in the international arena? I asked Professor Petr Drulak, a political scientist, former First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, former ambassador to France, lecturer at the Western Czech University, about this and many other things.
Rádio universum: Now they are constantly talking about the armed conflict, about combat operations, losses, but they do not talk about where the Ukrainian crisis came from. Emotions are ruling now, but tell me, is it worth going into analysis at all and looking for the causes of this conflict?
Peter Drulak: I think it makes sense. In the difficult situation in which we find ourselves today, such an analysis will not help us momentarily, because when an armed conflict is raging, fighting will continue until the opposing sides agree; until they recognize that their losses are already large enough to conclude a truce and come to some long-term solution.
Nevertheless, of course, you need to understand why all this happened, and what preceded it. After all, these things affect the position of the two sides in the negotiations. This will also determine what they will eventually agree on, whether peace will reign for a long time, or only a truce will come, which will be interrupted in a few years. Therefore, if we are really interested in long-term peace in Eastern Europe, we need to understand for ourselves what has happened over the past 30 years.
― And what has happened in the last 30 years? You have just explained to me that even at such an emotional moment, it makes sense to look for the causes, the roots of this conflict. Then let's list together all the important reasons for what shocked many, and try to distribute them from the most important, main reasons to secondary ones.
― Then it will probably be an hour-long lecture.
― We have time.
― I will try to highlight important things, and if anything, interrupt me or ask questions. I think it is important to refer to the events of the 90s. That time for us in Europe was a moment of liberation, and, as I think, most of society, not all of course, perceived it that way, no matter what the economic difficulties were. But for a part of society, the 90s turned out to be difficult, because there was a large-scale redistribution of property, often semi-legal and illegal. Nevertheless, the spirit of freedom and the opportunity to rejoin Europe, of which we feel ourselves a part, was in the air. It was a time of incredible euphoria.
Since we are talking about freedom, in my opinion, today we no longer have the freedom that we had then. I'm moving away from the topic, but the important thing is that neither Russia nor Ukraine experienced anything like this, because they had other trajectories, and for Russia the 90s were a fall into chaos. We "followed" Yeltsin's democracy from here and said that, they say, it's good that there is no dictator there, and that Russia is also on the path to democracy, that maybe it will become European. However, in my opinion, we underestimated, firstly, the people who went there and who were engaged in Russia, and there were few of them, because everyone looked more to the West. Secondly, we underestimated the colossal degree of corruption, chaos and violence that Russia plunged into in the 90s. Therefore, those years are considered dark. I must say that I also succumbed to this illusion when, as a young man, I said that the Russians had chosen the right trajectory. The novel "Second-hand Time" by the Belarusian writer, Nobel Prize winner Svetlana Alekseevich opened my eyes quite late.
(…)
For Russia, the 90s were disastrous. Ordinary people who wanted to live a normal life could not lead it. There was freedom there, more freedom than ever, but the basic social and state structures were in complete decline. Pensions were not paid; state institutions did not work; people lost their jobs. The new elite was formed from farcists, from representatives of former law enforcement agencies, and those with sharper elbows formed the new Yeltsin elite. For most Russians, it was a very difficult period when Russia, this huge country with huge industrial and natural wealth, was divided among themselves by oligarchs.
― And the sale of the country began.
- yes. Exactly. The sale of the country began with the help and participation of financial investors. The Western media, which are often associated with these investors, of course, applauded and trumpeted that Russia is open, that there are huge business opportunities there, and how wonderful it is. That is, the Western media were delighted.
― All this turned into a joke with the words: "Yeltsin is so funny."
― Yes, and Yeltsin was helped, so to speak, to buy elections. Even the International Monetary Fund gave him a lot of money for his campaign, thanks to which Boris Yeltsin stayed in power for a while. Then his strength began to leave him, and he had to look for a shift. The choice fell on Putin. Putin was an experienced manager, a native of the special services, and besides, he had no pronounced ideological coloring. Putin collaborated with the mayor of St. Petersburg Sobchak, who in Soviet times was a typical reformist, and therefore Putin seemed to be a good successor and a trustworthy person. He was entrusted with the power.
The truth is that at the beginning of his reign, Putin did not pursue an anti-Western course. On the contrary, he sought to continue cooperation with the West. But at the very beginning, he said that the chaos reigning around could not continue any longer. He chose a forceful solution because that was the only way he knew how to solve problems, because he came from law enforcement agencies. Putin was not a democrat or a liberal, and so he called the oligarchs and told them that if they submitted to his new government, which he represents, he would allow them to do business, leave them their property, which they had stolen. They say, let them manage it, and when necessary, they will also finance what is needed.
― This is a scene from a documentary by Oliver Stone.
- yes. That's about how he agreed with them to agree to his terms, and if they don't agree, then there will be problems. Some agreed, and some did not. Some emigrated, for example Berezovsky, who used to be one of Yeltsin's closest associates. Some joined the fight with Putin. For example, Mikhail Khodorkovsky*, who got behind bars, and now lives in exile. Ordinary Russians appreciated Putin because he brought order to the country, and the state began to function again for ordinary people. He restored the state. Of course, he did not restore democracy, because democracy in Russia does not have such roots as in our country.
Putin is not a person who would think democratically. That is, from the point of view of the standards of liberal democracy, already, say, at the turn of the 90s and 2000s, he probably disappointed many, because he deviated from democracy. But if you look closely at what democracy looked like in the 90s, then from the point of view of most of the public in Russia, Putin's arrival was for the better. He brought stability and confidence.
― You told us what the 90s were like in Russia, and we got into it. But what happened then, after the 90s and up to the present day, after the arrival of Putin? What path did Putin and the West take if they eventually came to this conflict, which could drag us all into long disasters, and it is already clear that Europe will have a hard time?
― But there is another important point: what happened in Ukraine? This also needs to be said, since Ukraine is a country where the disintegration continued in principle continuously, and no Putin came to power.
― Every new president there contributed to the collapse of the country.
― In fact, the oligarchs were playing their games there, and it didn't matter which president was in power, it didn't matter who he was. It didn't really matter. Sometimes Ukraine was drawn more to the West, and sometimes to Russia, but in fact the oligarchs were the bearers of power.
― And what did the so-called Orange revolution give?
― The Orange Revolution took place there thanks to people like, for example, Tymoshenko. This is one of the key figures. She subsequently became Prime Minister. She was called the gas princess, and this was one of the oligarchic clans. There was no question of fundamentally changing the regime. The regime continued to exist and only portrayed a more pro-Western course, giving signals like: "We want to go to Europe." But in fact, Ukraine continued to be plundered. If you look back, Ukraine in the 90s and after 2000 squandered everything. Ukraine is an incredibly rich country with huge potential, but its elite simply destroyed it. This should also be remembered when talking about these two countries.
And what did the West do? This is also important to say. The West saw opportunities, including privatization, both in Russia and in Ukraine. Of course, this was a case only for the most nimble, with sharp elbows, and some managed a lot. There was another aspect ― security. In recent years, this aspect has come to the fore in relations between Russia and the West, including in connection with the expansion of NATO. The Russians remind us that in the early 90s, when Gorbachev agreed to the unification of Germany, and without his consent this would not have happened, there could be no question of NATO expanding. It's true. If we recall how the statesmen then conducted negotiations, then no guarantees of non-expansion of NATO were given. This is also true. It just never occurred to anyone that NATO could begin to expand.
But in the 90s, the alliance began to expand, and Yeltsin's Russia, though with discontent, eventually swallowed it. We are talking about the expansion of NATO in Central Europe, which rejects Russia and makes it clear. But we'll get to that. By the time Putin came to power, NATO had already expanded, and the war in Kosovo had also ended, which became an important event for the Russians, since Serbia, Russia's traditional ally, was bombed.
― Putin always remembers this when he wants to defend himself. He says: "What about Kosovo?"
― Yes, he remembers. The fact that he says that doesn't necessarily mean it's not true. Of course, there is a lot of misinformation and propaganda coming from Russia, but in some matters Russians have the right to complain. The bombing of Yugoslavia is one of those things. However, it is important that NATO continued to expand, and the Russians somehow lived with it, although they did not like it. This meant the approach of a competing association, a competing alliance to their borders, and at the same time it was quite clear that the Russians were uncomfortable, although this did not entail a direct threat to Russia.
― Why did the West do this? You said it was clear: Ukraine cannot join NATO, never, and no one has even thought about it. But in 2008, President George W. Bush lifted the taboo, saying that he allowed the expansion of NATO at the expense of Ukraine. Why did it happen then?
― In 1990, it was impossible to imagine the Czech Republic joining NATO, let alone Ukraine. The reason is that the Russian Empire is collapsing, and we, the inhabitants of Central Europe, feel danger in our region. We see that NATO is an effective alliance with American guarantees, and we see in it guarantees of our security, protection from the chaos that is spreading across the eastern regions. That's what we were guided by in the first place. The Americans, in turn, believed that they were thereby expanding their sphere of influence, and this is the logic of the powers. There are governments that are friendly to you, and if you need something, they will obey. This is how NATO works, where there is a certain hierarchy, and there is no equality.
― Then why these North Atlantic games with Ukraine?
― Here's what's happening. Russia makes it clear: "Yes, we have agreed that NATO has expanded in Central Europe, the Baltic States and parts of the Balkans, but it is unacceptable for us that Ukraine and Georgia should join it." Then there was a neoconservative clique in the White House, formed around George W. Bush, who said: "We are a world power, and we have the opportunity to expand our sphere of influence, and therefore we will use this opportunity. Now the authorities in Ukraine are in our favor." It's about the government headed by Tymoshenko. Then they started talking about the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO.
The Ukrainian government was striving for this, although public opinion was split. In the west of Ukraine, the population mostly supported joining NATO, while the east was against it. The government then represented the interests of the West, stating: "We'll go for it." For the Americans, this was a strategic expansion of the territory at the expense of the Black Sea. The Black Sea space is extremely important from a strategic point of view, and the powers tend to expand and seize those territories that they may someday come in handy. To, for example, become a trading empire, you need strategic assets that will come in handy. That's how the powers reason. Ukraine also looked like a territory that could come in handy.
But for Russia, this territory is even more important than for the Americans, and precisely because it can serve as a springboard for an attack. Russians proceed from historical experience and are sure that no one can be trusted abroad. They can no longer believe the Americans after they promised them and did not fulfill anything. Russian Russians, therefore, are reasonably confident that they cannot trust the Russians, and Russians justifiably believe that they cannot trust the Americans. In an atmosphere of such distrust, it is very irresponsible to start talking about Ukraine's accession to NATO. In 2008, there was no consensus on this even within NATO. The Americans wanted this, as did their allies from Central Europe, including us, that is, the clique that supported, for example, the war in Iraq.
At the notorious NATO summit in Bucharest, this coalition turned around without giving a clear answer "yes" or "no". The final communique said that NATO is open to Ukraine and Georgia. But these forces compromised with France and Germany, two countries that opposed Ukraine and Georgia in NATO, and without their consent it is impossible to begin the accession procedure in practice. Nominally, NATO said: "Yes, the doors are open for Ukraine and Georgia," but in fact the way was closed to them, and it was impossible to proceed to the preparation of the program for accession.
― Did you get a little provocation?
― This was a provocation. Nevertheless, the idea itself began to live its own life. Ukrainians began to exaggerate this topic, saw membership as a goal worthy of every effort, and there were also various disputes, since there was no unity about NATO in Ukraine. In any case, this topic was raised, and Russia has repeatedly made it clear that this is unacceptable for it. A few months after the Bucharest summit, there was a war in South Ossetia, which is the territory of Georgia. This conflict was provoked by the actions of Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, who was the first to climb into Ossetia. The Russians reacted and threatened to take Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, in a short time, although in the end this did not happen. The Russians stayed in Ossetia, saying that they did not want to occupy Georgia, that they were not interested in it. They were well aware that it was too expensive for them, and in general it would be difficult from a military point of view to take mountainous Georgia under control. But they kept Ossetia for themselves, and I must say that the Ossetians were happy about it then, because they had much more problems with Tbilisi than with Moscow. Ossetians did not consider the actions of the Russians an occupation, but saw them as liberation.
― As far as I know, they asked Russia to intervene.
― Of course, they asked. The Russian society did not consider this operation questionable, unlike the current operation in Ukraine, which is opposed by a large part of the Ukrainian population. It was different in Ossetia. Of course, if they had gone to Georgia, the situation would have been different, because the Georgians would have resisted them. But Ossetians have a different attitude. Thus, this was one of the first consequences of the NATO summit in Bucharest. Then the Obama administration came, and Barack Obama was a man who radically tried to end the neoconservative expansive policy of the Bush administration and did not want to get involved in new wars.
― And untied many.
― It's not that simple. It is important here which wars he started. On the contrary, he was reproached for not being sufficiently active in Libya and Syria. The French constantly criticized him for not supporting them when the Assad regime allegedly carried out a chemical attack. They just appreciated what the Americans could and could not do, and besides, they saw the consequences of previous wars. In general, Obama participated in wars with great restraint.
Subsequently, the Americans allowed themselves to be drawn into the Syrian conflict, but participated in it indirectly. Obama made the main bet on diplomacy, and the faithful Atlantists from Central Europe all can not forget it to him. For them, Obama is a traitor. Their ideal is George Bush, and Obama is a traitor to them because he did not show principles, that is, he did not send American troops to every hotbed of tension on the planet.
The situation in Ukraine also no longer escalated. It is important that after the Tymoshenko government, a new cabinet came to power there, which represented the east of the country. We are talking about President Yanukovych, who did not talk about joining NATO. He wasn't interested. However, the situation was aggravated by the European Union.
― In what way?
― The European Union made a very attractive offer to Ukraine under President Yanukovych, who was more pro-Russian. In fact, she was offered an association agreement that would open the European market and European funds to Ukrainians according to the model used by countries preparing to join the EU. No, there was no talk of preparing for accession, but it would have certain advantages over other countries with access to the European system, the European Union market, EU programs and finances. For the government, which is predominantly pro-Russian, it was still a very attractive offer, because it promised huge economic opportunities and huge money.
The catch was that Ukraine maintained close ties with Russia within the framework of various Eurasian integration associations, and it was clear that these two things were incompatible. You can maintain close ties with either Brussels or Moscow, but not both at the same time. Ukraine got into a difficult situation, because it faced a choice: to go to Brussels or to Moscow. Brussels has made it clear that it will not tolerate double orientation. The Ukrainian government was dodging. On the one hand, Yanukovych wanted Brussels money, and on the other, he knew that he could not break off relations with Moscow, and still hoped that he could get both. It is unclear whether he was pretending to blackmail both sides: Moscow ― Brussels, and Brussels ― Moscow, or actually believed that some kind of agreement was possible, that it was possible to stay between them and maintain privileged relations with both. We don't know that.
It is clear that he started the game with Brussels, agreed on a treaty that was being prepared for ratification. When it came to signing, ratification, Yanukovych went to Moscow to discuss everything. There he was told that this was unacceptable and would mean the termination of relations with Russia. After returning from Moscow, Yanukovych said that he could not sign the contract, and at that moment in 2013, the Maidan began. Kiev and Ukrainians were terribly disappointed. There was already an agreement that Yanukovych's people agreed on, and he suddenly comes and says he won't sign anything because it would threaten relations with Moscow. This was the main impulse that brought people to the streets to declare: they want to the West, not to Moscow.
It should be understood that we are talking only about a part of Ukraine: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kiev, probably, but in Donetsk and Lugansk people thought differently. So the process began, which dragged on for several months and was called the Maidan. It was partly spontaneous, because part of Ukraine was genuinely disappointed, and I think you understand why. Because their hopes were not fulfilled. But we need to understand that the organizational force of the protest used not only emotions. There were activists who wanted to overthrow the Yanukovych regime, and we know that they were supported by the United States. Influential American funds acted against Yanukovych, which is quite understandable. Americans do that. If an unfriendly government is in power in some country that they consider strategically important, and they considered Ukraine important, then they support the opposition.
― This is natural, however, they denied it.
― They denied it, but it can be proved. The National Endowment for Democracy, which is a foundation that officially exports American democracy, has implemented a very extensive program in Ukraine, and their annual reports say that they invested in Ukraine.
Then the situation on the Maidan escalates. The shooting started there, and 2014 is coming. Yanukovych's regime was brutal, not at all democratic, and therefore demonstrations were brutally suppressed, and, of course, there were deaths. But what is important, not all the shooting on the Maidan in 2014 is on Yanukovych's conscience. There are quite interesting investigations.
― We can still only guess about this. In fact, I never heard the evidence that would convince me, and I would say to myself: "Yes, it was." And you?
― There is an interesting investigation conducted by a scientist of Eastern European origin. I don't know if he's from Ukraine or from Russia. So he prepared a study that is in the public domain. In it, he tried to reconstruct and explain why it is impossible to blame the entire shooting on the Maidan on Yanukovych. He proves very convincingly, as it seems to me, that the second side fired. This investigation is available, and I have quoted from it. When I write journalistic materials, I rely on this investigation. It is important that, in his opinion, the other side shot accurately, and if you remember who was standing on the other side, then his assumption looks plausible.
In addition to the majority of sincerely democratic and pro-European demonstrators, there were forces that can be called fascist. Fascists were there. They were called the "Right Sector"**. There were not many of them, but they knew how to work with the crowd, they knew how to manipulate it, and, apparently, they had their own people capable of violence for the sake of discrediting the Yanukovych regime. It is also important that the European Union in those fateful days at the beginning of 2014, in February, tried to mediate between Maidan, that is, activists, and Yanukovych. An agreement was reached between them, but as soon as the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France left there, radical elements of the Maidan immediately attacked Yanukovych. He got scared and ran away. After leaving Kiev, he headed to the east of Ukraine, and then to Russia. After that, the Maidan was already in control of the situation, that is, something happened that can be called a putsch. There was no question of any democratic methods. Of course, then the elections took place, and to some extent the situation was legitimized.
― Just a revolutionary process that led to the elections...
― It was a revolutionary process that caused fermentation in Eastern Ukraine, in Donetsk and Lugansk, where people did not support these events. Russia took advantage of this by deciding: "We are losing our government in Kiev. He's gone. Now the Americans will come there." The fact is that part of the events in January 2014 took place under the leadership of the Americans, and this is provable. Take, for example, the famous conversation of Victoria Nulland, who then held a high post in the State Department, with the US ambassador to Ukraine, that is, with her subordinate. She explained to him who would be in the Kiev government and who would not. And when the ambassador asked about the opinion of Europe, she replied: "To hell with her." Then it was on all the front pages. This proves what position the United States takes on the Ukrainian issue in relation to Europe. Thus, the Americans played a very important role in this process, primarily in the overthrow of the Yanukovych regime and the coming to power of pro-American forces.
* entered by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in the register of natural persons - foreign agents
** an extremist organization banned in the Russian Federation
