"Apparently, Poland is moving to actions to seize western Ukrainian territories," said Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security Council. But the appearance of Polish troops in Ukraine may lead to their clash with the Russian Armed Forces. How strong is the Polish army and what is worth knowing in order to defeat it?
There are reports that Poland is planning to send troops to Ukraine to regain the lands that were torn away in 1939. This, in particular, is directly stated by the Russian authorities – both the Foreign Ministry and the Security Council. The Poles themselves deny this so far, but without attracting attention, they have already called reservists to part of their formations, and then, under the pretext of exercises with the Americans, they fully deployed their troops and brought them to a high degree of combat readiness. Also, the Poles have transferred part of their forces to Romania and are conducting exercises there right now.
President Putin promised that when trying to interfere with Russia in Ukraine, the countries that do this will face consequences that they have never faced before in history. Thus, if the Poles still try to enter Ukraine, there will be a risk of a military clash between Poland and the Russian Federation. It may also arise as a result of the hypothetical inappropriate behavior of Poles in this case. What should be kept in mind in connection with the risk of a military clash with Poland? First, a little bit about the enemy.
The Polish Army
The Polish army is a typical European "medium-sized" armed forces. They are not small, and within the framework of the NATO alliance they may well become the core of a strong grouping even without mobilization measures. But at the moment their number is less than the number of the armed forces of Ukraine in peacetime – 125,000 people in active troops and 50,000 reservists (there were 194,000 in the Armed Forces of Ukraine). Poland is now at the beginning of the process of increasing the number of troops to 300,000 people.
However, numbers are a tricky thing. Let's look at this with two examples.
There are 62,000 people in the Polish Land Forces. The basis of the ground forces are four divisions – the 11th Armored Cavalry, 12th, 16th and 18th mechanized, approximately 14,000 men each. Russia has a lot more troops in Ukraine than Poland in general. However, the Poles are clearly going to fight in divisions, and not in consolidated formations from battalion tactical groups, like the Russian troops. And this means that although Russia has numerical superiority in general, Poland may have it in places of combat contact.
For example: when the same 11th Division receives an offensive strip of 20-25 kilometers, which would be more or less the norm for NATO, its three brigade directorates will move 9 battalions and 3 artillery divisions (they have an artillery battalion), covered by brigade air defense units and supported by a divisional artillery regiment and a divisional anti-aircraftrocket regiment. At the same time, the Poles can afford a large expenditure of ammunition, because logistics in the division has been rebuilt – there are six automobile battalions in the division, one in each unit. Shells and fuel will flow in a continuous stream.
And how many battalion groups can Russia have in a 20-kilometer band? Without revealing any details, let's say that on our only bridgehead beyond the Dnieper, near Nikolayev and Krivoy Rog, their density per kilometer of the front is several times less. That is, Russia has an advantage in numbers, but it still needs to be implemented.
Another example. Poland has fewer fighters capable of conducting air combat than Russia has Su-35 alone. At the same time, the Su-35 is several times stronger in combat than both the F-16C and the MiG-29. It turns out that on paper Russia has not only overwhelming technical superiority, but also numerical superiority. But again details appear.
Firstly, Polish aircraft will rely on NATO support in any case, even if the entry of Polish troops into Ukraine will not be approved by all of NATO. For example, American and other NATO long-range radar detection (AWACS) aircraft will provide Poles with full information about the air situation. About where and what our planes are in the air now, whether there are mass takeoffs of fighters. Russia, with its fleet of AWACS A-50 aircraft, does not have such opportunities in the same volume.
The second question is to what extent the Americans were able to train the Poles to use aviation in air offensive operations. Western aviation operates according to the algorithm – the destruction of enemy aircraft and the suppression of air defense, then work on the ground. At the same time, the American "school" of air warfare requires the use of aviation in massive strikes, including actions against enemy fighters. Well, or easier – the Poles will throw dozens of cars into the attack. And the question, in fact, is whether they know how to control such forces. What if yes?
Then Russia, which has never taken massive aviation actions in Ukraine, may face the same thing in the sky as on the ground – the numerically inferior (and technically inferior in the sky) enemy in every battle will have numerical superiority, sometimes overwhelming, with the existing (thanks to NATO) superiority in knowledge of the situation. In other words, the command of the VKS of the Russian Federation should check the readiness of its aviation to act with large forces based on the A-50 AWACS aircraft. Until this check is carried out, it is pointless to talk about the numerical ratio with Poland.
There are other factors to consider. So, when analyzing the air defense capabilities of the Polish divisions, its weakness catches the eye – the air defense of the Poles is disproportionately worse than that of the APU, and it cannot be compared with ours. But this weak Polish air defense will work together with an undisturbed strong Ukrainian one. And this changes a lot.
There are many such "little things". For example, Polish Mi-24 helicopters are inferior to our Mi-28 or Ka-52. But they are part of the ground forces, and the request of the Polish ground forces for an air strike goes through fewer command instances than we have where helicopters are in the VKS.
In other words, everything does not come down to the list of Polish troops and "paper" characteristics. You look at them on the Internet – everything is bad, you figure out how it can turn out in reality – and a lot of things seem different. But the main risks associated with Poland are different.
Artillery and counter-battery fire
It is no secret that artillery is the main force on the battlefield in Ukraine. "Artillery duels" constantly pop up in the media and telegram channels. What does it all mean? The fact is that both Russia and the APU are trying (in the case of the APU, it is more correct to say they tried) to assign the maximum tasks for defeating the enemy to artillery. This is correct, since spending shells is much better than spending people. However, again there are nuances.
There is such a term as counter-battery fighting. Special artillery reconnaissance units, using mobile ground-based radar stations (radars) specially designed for detecting shells, determine the location of enemy artillery firing right now. Then the command of the artillery unit, using a drone or other means, clarifies the position of the enemy's firing guns and then strikes them with artillery itself. Of course, the belligerents own this tactic, understand it, and, having shot back from the position for several minutes, then leave it at the utmost pace so as not to fall under counter-battery fire. This is the "artillery duel".
So, Poland is technically capable of conducting counter-battery fire disproportionately better than Ukraine. And the Poles' ability to prevent the defeat of their guns is disproportionately higher than even Russia's. Of course, here again the question arises as to whether the Poles are really trained to fight like this. But from the point of view of the available military equipment, communication and control systems, as well as NATO's methods of warfare, they should be able to fight at about the American level. And the Americans, based on the experience of fighting in Iraq in 2003, "take out" any artillery opposing them within a matter of hours.
We have all the resources to conduct a counter-battery fight against Western-level artillery. However, this requires a number of organizational measures that should be put into practice right now.
Cruise missiles
Poland is armed with American-made JASSM-ER cruise missiles. This is a small-sized, inconspicuous cruise missile launched from an F-16 aircraft. Its specificity is the range, according to press releases exceeding 900 kilometers. To make it clear: the Polish F-16, being in the air somewhere about fifty kilometers west of Zhytomyr, that is, on the eastern border of what is commonly called Western Ukraine, can strike Moscow.
Of course, this missile can be shot down along the way. On the other hand, the goal is difficult, even for the S-400. And it is impossible to stick the entire border between Russia and Ukraine with a stockade of anti-aircraft missile systems.
How many such missiles does Poland have? The first delivery in 2017 was in the amount of 40 units, in total, the US Congress approved the delivery of 70. Whether there were classified supplies, unknown to the media, is an open question. But in case of emergency, the United States will transfer hundreds or thousands of such missiles to Poland from the presence. And Poland, if everything goes completely wrong, will not be limited in the choice of targets by warehouses with weapons.
Escalation factor – Kaliningrad
If Russia effectively deals with the Poles in Ukraine, then Poland has a trump card that can turn the war in Ukraine into at least an all–European one - this is the attack of Kaliningrad. It will be extremely difficult to keep him. Poland started talking about the need to take Kaliningrad away from Russia with the beginning of the operation in Ukraine, when the real combat capabilities of the Russian army became obvious. And although they were conducted by military retirees, none of the Polish officials ever tried to defuse the situation on these occasions.
The Kaliningrad exclave is very far away – the delivery of a military unit or part of a more or less significant number is possible only by sea and lasts a day. The distance from our ports to Baltiysk by water is about 1000 kilometers and most of them are a narrow corridor of the Gulf of Finland, the southern shore of which is occupied by NATO, and after Finland enters there, the northern one will also be occupied.
If we assume that two divisions will go to Ukraine, it means that Poland will have two more and one airborne brigade to Kaliningrad, plus the fact that it will be possible to transfer there from Ukraine, plus parts from reservists. Poland will easily outrun Russia with the transfer of troops to Kaliningrad, easily create fire superiority. Our ships at the Baltiysk naval base can be destroyed by Polish artillery fire from Polish territory without crossing the border.
Poland has few ships with missile weapons, but in its conditions, aircraft can perform strike missions over the sea. The Poles also have coastal missile systems with NSM anti-ship missiles, unobtrusive and not sensitive to traditional interference. And they also have the ability to quickly put mines in large quantities and numerous minesweeping forces to destroy Russian mines.
In general, Poland is not Ukraine. With a smaller number of troops, it will be more difficult to crack this nut. And the Poles, in addition to their inadequacy and clearly manifested desire to shed the blood of our military, in addition to the well-known bravery of their soldiers, will also have very weighty trump cards listed above. Of course, they have no combat experience comparable to ours, and it is not known how ready they really are. But it's better to be prepared for any turn of events yourself.
Alexander Timokhin
