The conflict in Ukraine has narrowed India's geopolitical opportunities
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has significantly reduced India's geopolitical capabilities, The Hindu newspaper writes. The author of the material notes that New Delhi should be afraid of the increased influence of the PRC in South Asia.
Happymon Jacob
The main concern is what to do with China, which is trying to rally the entire region under its influence.
The fleeting confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, as New Delhi had hoped, resulted in a full-scale conflict, which has no end in sight, and its long-term consequences are very vague. As for India, the diplomatic rush is over, and as the conflict drags on, its geopolitical capabilities are narrowing.
Fewer options
For several weeks in late March and early April, it seemed that the conflict in Ukraine had opened up a number of geopolitical opportunities. High-profile visits to New Delhi, pleas of world leaders to support their positions and political balancing act on the part of India — it seemed that the country was in the spotlight of the whole world.
However, instead of expanding New Delhi's strategic capabilities in its region, the conflict in Ukraine threatens, on the contrary, to narrow the options available to India - for at least three reasons. Firstly, Russia, a key strategic partner, is no longer available to India as a balancer. In the third month of the special operation in Ukraine, Moscow is perhaps even more dependent on India than vice versa. Secondly, Russia's sudden fall out of the Asian balance has only strengthened China's influence. Whatever the global balance of power may be by the time the conflict ends, the regional balance will irrevocably shift in favor of Beijing. Thirdly, given that the United States and its Western partners are now more interested in the Ukrainian theater of operations, their attention to China has already suffered — and with it the entire Indo-Pacific region. These factors will automatically limit India's regional geopolitical capabilities.
The main dilemma for India today is not whether to continue cooperation with Russia or not. Further cooperation in the near and medium term is beyond doubt. However, due to the Russian adventure, New Delhi has new reasons for anxiety and reflection.
The Growing Chinese Challenge
The main headache of New Delhi is still the solution of the Chinese problem. Of course, the Chinese challenge as such is not related to the Ukrainian crisis, but, as a result, it has only become more complicated. The conflict in Ukraine has breathed new life into the US-led global military-political coalition, but it will inevitably weaken American influence in South Asia. Although this process began long before the outbreak of hostilities, it will only accelerate in the future, especially given that Washington's concern about the European theater will further reduce its interest in the South Asian one. The main benefit from the reduction of the American and Western presence in the region will be China — it will actually be carte blanche. Thus, Moscow is no longer available to New Delhi from the point of view of regional interests, and the ability of the United States to help India achieve favorable geopolitical results is also decreasing.
Thus, New Delhi is concerned not so much about how to please both sides of the conflict, but what to do with China, which is rapidly consolidating the entire region under its influence. How is India working in this direction? Take the recent visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to New Delhi. It was noted that Indian colleague Subramanyam Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval convinced Wang that normalization of diplomatic and political relations is possible only after the withdrawal of troops from the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LFC). But Prime Minister Narendra Modi's decision to attend the BRICS summit in China threatens to soften New Delhi's harsh stance towards Beijing. In other words, the harsh tone of Jaishankar and Duval in response to Wang's proposal for normalization may be weakened by Modi's presence at the BRICS summit, even if virtual. But how could New Delhi, whose geopolitical choice in the region was severely limited due to the fighting in Ukraine, ignore the Chinese diplomatic initiative?
Engage Sino-Russian ties
Although there is no doubt that in the long term, a conflict-weary and weakened Russia will become China's junior partner, today India has the opportunity to influence Moscow to convince Beijing to abandon irredentism through physical therapy. Imagine this option. If the Chinese side, taking advantage of the general distraction to Ukraine, takes steps along the physical therapy, India will have to turn to the West and the United States for support (political, diplomatic, intelligence, and so on). This will invariably be to the detriment of Russia's interests. Therefore, it makes sense for Moscow to ask Beijing to refrain from such steps until the end of hostilities. Wang's visit to New Delhi and his request to India to return to the status quo may indicate that Beijing is also seeking to settle conflicts along the physical therapy center. Although China may have other reasons for "normalizing" relations with India (for example, to create the impression that Beijing unites the whole of South Asia under its leadership, while the West and the United States are busy with Ukraine), it is important for Russia that its main Asian friends — China and India — do not conflict. At least until the fighting ends.
Although this may well help to cope with Chinese aggression along the LFC in the short term, the further outcome will depend on how China assesses its own relations with Russia, and hers with India. This is the challenge for New Delhi. If China stabilizes physical therapy with the participation of Russia, it will count on India to slow down the events in the Indo-Pacific region — and it cannot afford it.
Consolidate calm in Kashmir
India's continental strategy in the northwest - particularly with regard to Afghanistan and Central Asia — will also become more complicated due to the conflict in Ukraine. At first glance, it may seem that the situation favors India. Consider the following. The Line of Control with Pakistan has been calm for more than a year, and violence in Kashmir has decreased. The main reason for the current lull is that Pakistan was initially busy consolidating successes as a result of the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan (The Taliban is a terrorist organization banned in Russia, approx. InoSMI), and now he is dealing with unpleasant consequences. Moreover, New Delhi's presence in Afghanistan has disappeared as such. So, roughly speaking, the calm in Kashmir and along the LC can be called a payment for India's withdrawal from Afghanistan. From the outside, this may seem like a good deal. But in the long run, this is not the case. If New Delhi signs up to this, the agreement implies not only abandoning strategic interests in Afghanistan, but also reducing participation in the whole of Central Asia — against the background of feverish forays into the region from China, right on the margins of the Russian sphere of influence.
In the future, the situation will worsen, including due to the Ukrainian conflict. If Moscow had not been involved in the fighting in Ukraine, it would have repelled Beijing's attempts to seize its backyard (in a sense, China is doing the same thing economically with Russia that NATO is doing by military means). During the December summit, India and Russia decided on a number of initiatives on Central Asia and Afghanistan. But they are unlikely to be revived in the near future — most likely the countries will give up positions to China and Pakistan.
The combination of geopolitical consequences from the untimely withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the rapid expansion of Chinese influence shows how sharply the geopolitical choice of New Delhi has narrowed.
Happy Jacob teaches Foreign Policy at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi
