May 2 marks the 40th anniversary of the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the 1982 Falklands War by the British nuclear submarine Conqueror. For almost 40 years, the cruiser General Belgrano was considered the largest warship lost in combat operations at sea after the Second World War. The events of the last month have made the story of the death of this ship relevant again.
The original was taken from a colleague of taskforce82 in Ten myths and misconceptions about the sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano
On the second of May 1982, the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano (ex. USS Phoenix). This event became one of the central events in the history of the Anglo-Argentine military conflict over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), and at the same time it was overgrown with myths and just factual errors in descriptions. In the material below I will try to put everything in its place.
1. The sinking by the British of the cruiser General Belgrano outside the 200-mile war zone declared by them was illegal.
The main accusation put forward by the Argentine propaganda and vividly picked up by the whole progressive and anti-British-minded part of humanity.
Firstly, there is a substitution of the concepts of a blockade and a military zone. If the establishment of a naval blockade (regulated by the London Declaration on the Law of Naval Warfare of February 26, 1909) requires the mandatory declaration of its geographical boundaries, then the legal norms governing relations between States on issues related to the conduct of hostilities do not imply the establishment of a clear geographical framework of a local armed conflict. Moreover, the practice of establishing so-called "war zones", on the contrary, contradicts the norms of international law.
Secondly, the place of the sinking of the cruiser is located within the "South Atlantic military zone" declared by Buenos Aires, which was 200 nautical miles from the mainland coast of Argentina and the coast of the Malvinas Islands, where the commanders of Argentine ships, starting from April 30, 1982, had orders to attack any British military or merchant vessels indefinitely. It was extremely presumptuous to believe that the enemy would not act symmetrically with them in these circumstances.
Thirdly, and this is most significant, in the note of the British government transmitted to Argentina on April 23, 1982, it was quite unambiguously stated that the geographical scope of the armed struggle for the Falkland Islands is not limited to the boundaries of the 200-mile restricted zone established by Great Britain around the archipelago.
Another thing is that for some reason the Argentines decided for themselves that the British would not attack outside the 200-mile zone, and their submarines take positions inside it, which is why the underwater threat was underestimated during the operational deployment of Flota de Mar on April 30 - May 1, 1982. But this does not concern the legal side of the issue in any way.
It is significant that the officers of the Argentine Navy, including the commander of the surface fleet, Rear Admiral Aliara and the commander of the cruiser, Captain 1st rank Bonso, subsequently spoke of the sinking of the cruiser as a bitter but legitimate act of war.
2. The sinking of the "General Belgrano" deprived the parties to the conflict of the opportunity to sit down at the negotiating table with the mediation of the President of Peru Belaunde Terry
Another textbook accusation from the Argentine side. The fact that a day earlier the Argentine submarine "San Luis" tried to send a British frigate with two and a half hundred people on board to the bottom, completely not caring about the fate of the peace initiatives of the President of Peru, does not affect the course of reasoning in any way. From this point of view, the submarine "Konkeror" only demonstrated the military-technical and professional superiority of the British Navy. And this, on the contrary, should have become a reason for the Argentine military-political leadership to seriously think about the futility of continuing the military conflict. But instead, President Galtieri said that Argentina had lost 400 people and was ready to lose another 4,000 or even 40,000 to defend the Malvinas.
According to the British side, information about Belaunde Terry's peace initiatives reached London only in the afternoon of May 2, i.e. after the decision was made to sink the cruiser.
"The decision to sink the Belgrano," writes M. Thatcher in his memoirs - it was taken solely for military, not political reasons: the statement that we tried to disrupt the peace initiative on the part of Peru, did not stand up to any criticism. Those of us who made the decision at Chequers knew nothing about Peru's proposals, which were very similar to the Hague plan rejected by the Argentines earlier."
If we look at the issue more broadly, the statements about Argentina's desire for a peaceful settlement of the conflict are generally quite demagogic. The Falklands War began with the entry of Argentine troops into the islands, and in the future, the willingness of the Buenos Aires junta to sit down at the negotiating table was born only under pressure from the British armed forces and at the same time was delayed each time, lagging behind the state of military affairs. During April, Argentina insisted on the full and unconditional transfer of sovereignty over the disputed archipelago to it and the immediate withdrawal of the British expeditionary forces from the South Atlantic, ignoring the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution No. 502. Only after May 1, when Great Britain sharply intensified military operations, striking Argentine defensive positions in the Falklands, Buenos Aires backed down, expressing readiness to withdraw troops and replace them with UN observers, but at the same time the Argentines sought guarantees for the transfer of the islands to them with a peaceful settlement of the dispute. Such conditions, perhaps, could have arranged London a month earlier, but were already completely unacceptable at the current moment. After the landing of British troops on May 21 in San Carlos Bay, Argentina agreed to return everything to the pre-war status quo. And again, if at the beginning of May such an initiative could have stopped the military conflict, now in the light of the losses incurred and the material resources expended, Great Britain needed more, namely to ensure the inviolability of its overseas territory in the future, which could only be achieved through a crushing military defeat of Argentina, so that in the future there would not even be a thought about the possibility of revenge.
3. The ship group of the cruiser "Belgrano" was discovered by the British through the use of data obtained from an American reconnaissance satellite
According to the Argentine version, the provision by the United States of data from space reconnaissance systems, as a result of which the British "knew about all the movements of Argentine ships," most significantly affected the outcome of the Malvinas War. However, after four decades, there is still no direct evidence that the United States provided such assistance to the UK, and the failure of the British nuclear submarines to find the Argentine aircraft carrier on May 1-2, 1982 indicates that the British were unable to track the movements of Argentine ships in real time. Even if the British received satellite information from their senior NATO partner, the technologies for using it for operational and tactical purposes were still at the stage of formation. Data from reconnaissance satellites in those days were intended mainly for strategic assessments and general planning of operations.
In fact, the British, who had access to Argentine military ciphers, received the largest amount of intelligence information from radio interception data. Since the Argentines conducted an intensive and detailed radio exchange, it is not surprising that their opponent knew a lot about them. Thanks to this, moving to the designated combat patrol area near the southwestern border of the 200-mile restricted zone, Commander of the submarine "Conqueror" Commander Reford-Brown received fairly clear instructions where to look for the enemy and in which area the Belgrano group (GT 79.3) has the task of heading. As he later recalled, the intelligence coming from the headquarters of the commander of the British submarine forces in Northwood was quite impressive, it seemed that everyone there knew: the composition of the enemy's ship group, planned movements, the code names of the areas of its combat maneuvering.
Another source of intelligence, which, according to some reports, played a fatal role in the fate of the cruiser, was Chilean intelligence. Chileans, as you know, are long-time enemies of the Argentines, in 1978 a war almost broke out between them. After the outbreak of the Falklands conflict, the military intelligence services of Chile and Great Britain established cooperation, and a radar was even specially installed on the Chilean half of the island of Tierra del Fuego to track the flights of Argentine aircraft from the Rio Grande air base. It is logical to assume that the movements of Argentine ships in the Tierra del Fuego area were also under the supervision of Chilean intelligence, and the British could receive this information.
The SUBMARINE "Conqueror" returns to Faslane, July 1982.
4. The plan of the Argentine command provided for a double coverage of the British carrier group with a coordinated strike on it from the northwest and southwest; the ship group of the cruiser Belgrano (GT 79.3) was to attack from the southwest.
A popular version on both sides of the Atlantic. In the UK, the government of M. Thatcher and the military involved in the decision to sink the cruiser thus justified themselves to the pacifist-minded public; in Argentina, the sailors and historians close to them tried to glorify the death of the cruiser.
In fact, as follows from the testimony of Rear Admiral Aliara, commander of the 79th operational unit, the investigative commission of General Rattenbach, according to the operation plan, the strike on the British aircraft carrier group was to be carried out only from the northwest direction, successively by carrier-based aircraft of the aircraft carrier "May 25" and anti-ship missiles of three corvettes of the Drummond type. Division of the fleet into three groups, shock (GT 79.1), providing (GT 79.2) and distracting (GT 79.3), had as its main goal to ensure that the British also split up their forces, and defeat them in parts. The Belgrano naval group performed a demonstrative and distracting task in the failed naval battle on May 1-2, 1982, simulating a combat deployment for an attack from the southwest direction.
Accordingly, there was and was not planned any double coverage of the aka "Lombardo forks", as told by the ex-commander of TG 317.8 Admiral Woodward, the authoritative naval historian David Brown, and on the Argentine side - the head of the Navy General Staff Admiral Molina Pico and the former commander of the cruiser Captain 1st rank Bonso.
5. The commanders and crews of the Argentine ships in this episode showed blatant unprofessionalism: the destroyers "did not even bother to turn on the sonar", the ships were moving in a leisurely 12-knot course with an uncomplicated anti-submarine zigzag.
The statement comes from British submariners, who probably studied the ship composition of the Argentine fleet according to Jane's handbook and therefore had a vague idea of the real combat properties of enemy ships. Meanwhile, if GT 79.3 represented a certain force in surface and anti-aircraft combat, given the presence of the Exocet missile defense system on destroyers and the Sea Cat air defense system, coupled with powerful anti-aircraft artillery on the cruiser, then its capabilities were extremely low in anti-submarine terms. The Argentine ships had worn-out running gear that did not allow them to develop high speed, outdated sonar equipment (the actual range of the AN/SQS-30 GAS standing on destroyers did not exceed 25 kab.) and anti-submarine weapons (old GB, Mk.44 torpedoes), and its only helicopter "Alouette" did not carry any means Therefore, they were unable not only to sink a nuclear submarine with a maximum speed of 28 knots and a diving depth of up to 500 m, capable of hitting a target with guided Tigerfish torpedoes at distances of several nautical miles, but even to disrupt its attack. In these conditions, it remained most of all to rely on the secrecy of movement, so the ships of the Argentines went low-noise, with the hydro and radars turned off ... and luck, which was not on their side.
By the way, in fact, the Argentine naval group did not use an anti-submarine zigzag. Against a nuclear submarine, when the ship's group was moving at a speed of 12-14 knots, it practically made no sense. The British simply misjudged the parameters of the target's movement.
But the reproach to the captain of the 1st rank Bonso that he "did everything in his power to destroy the cruiser" is to a certain extent deserved. Firstly, there is a clear disregard for the underwater threat. Bonso believed that the main danger was posed by British carrier-based aircraft, so for a long time he kept calculations of anti-aircraft guns at combat posts, while he did not take any active anti-submarine protection measures. Secondly, after going beyond the range of the "Sea Harriers" at ten o'clock in the morning on May 2, the combat readiness of the ships was lowered to the level of "3X". This also meant that most of the water-tight doors, hatches and necks were open, which fatally affected the unsinkability and fire protection of the ship.
6. The commanders of the escorting "General Belgrano" destroyers "Ippolito Bouchard" and "Piedrabuena" showed cowardice by abandoning the torpedoed cruiser, instead of immediately starting to rescue its crew.
Since the death of the cruisers "Abukir", "Cressy" and "Hog", the sailors have known that immediately going to the aid of a ship hit from under the water is not always the right, although undoubtedly a very noble decision. And the commanders of the Bouchard and the Piedrabuena also had orders: if one of the ships of the group was torpedoed, the rest should leave immediately. So this accusation is hardly justified.
Of course, it can be argued here that the guard ships were obliged to stay to rescue the crew of the cruiser they were escorting. But due to the unclear completion of the tasks by the squadron commander, captains of the 2nd rank Barsena and Grassi did not consider that they were escorting the Belgrano, believing their ships, which are carriers of the Exocet RCC, to be equivalent to the cruiser combat units. The accidental or imaginary "hit of an unexploded torpedo" into the Ippolito Bouchard was an additional strong confirmation of the enemy's intention to destroy the Argentine ship group entirely. All this, however, does not absolve them of responsibility for the fact that those who escaped from the cruiser had to spend a whole day, and some almost two, on rafts in a cold stormy sea.
Destroyer "Piedrabuena"
7. The sinking of the cruiser "General Belgrano" was meaningless from a military point of view, since at that moment it did not pose a threat to the British naval forces
This, in particular, is extremely convincingly written by the authoritative Argentine historian Ruben Moro.
Indeed, on May 1-2, 1982, the Belgrano ship group did not enter the boundaries of the British 200-mile restricted zone and, as already mentioned above, it was not tasked to attack British forces. However, she fulfilled her demonstrative task convincingly enough to make the British believe in the intention of double coverage. Although this did not lead to the fragmentation of their forces, which Aliara hoped for, Admiral Woodward was alarmed by the presence of a threat in the south and sought to eliminate it at all costs. As he writes about it himself: "I just couldn't ignore the fact that his group would strike us with Exocet cruise missiles… At the very least, it will be a double blow - a simple double coverage from the southwest and northwest… There was only one way out. I must urgently pull out one "claw" from the ticks covering us." The same concern was felt at the FCP in Northwood. Therefore, Admirals Woodward and Fieldhouse, each in his place, did everything in their power to ensure that the commander of the submarine "Conqueror" received permission to attack.
There was another weighty circumstance of a more general nature. The conquest of dominance at sea, according to British views, implies not only the physical destruction of enemy combat units, but also the exertion of moral pressure on the enemy in order to deprive him of the will to resist. The cruiser General Belgrano, along with the aircraft carrier May 25, was one of two Argentine high value units, "especially important combat units", the loss of which turns into a drop in the morale of the fleet. From the point of view of solving the problem of gaining dominance at sea, it was necessary to sink the cruiser regardless of whether it created a tactical threat at the moment in question or not.
8. The torpedoes used against the Argentine cruiser were even older than it: they were adopted by the British Navy in 1927.
I still wouldn't exaggerate so much. Torpedo Mk.VIII/Mk.8 had five modifications: Mk.VIII, Mk.VIII*, Mk.VIII**, Mk.VIII*** and Mk.8 mod.4. The latter, with the use of which the cruiser General Belgrano was sunk, was adopted by the British Navy after the Second World War, by 1982 it was still a fairly outdated weapon, but nevertheless had a number of design differences from the Mk.VIII model of the 1927 model.
What else is remarkable. These torpedoes were characterized by much greater reliability than the new electric remote-controlled Mk.24 "Tigerfish", with which unsuccessful launches regularly happened. And carried a larger torpex charge in the warhead.
As to which of the arguments was decisive when choosing in favor of the old straight-line torpedoes, it turns out interesting. The Konkerora combat magazine explicitly states that firing the more powerful Mk.8 mod.4 was considered preferable, "due to the presence of thick armor and anti-torpedo bules in the Belgrano." But here the reader, obviously, must object that the first rule of the submarine commander is to set the depth of the torpedo stroke in such a way that it falls below the armor belt. Unless, of course, it has not been forgotten since the warships began to be built without armor. Perhaps Commander Reford-Brown wrote down so as not to trust the paper of his prejudice against the latest British precision weapons, and the main argument in favor of the Mk torpedo.8 was its reliability.
9. The pirate flag raised by the submarine "Conqueror" when returning from the campaign meant recognition of the illegality of the sinking of the Argentine cruiser outside the borders of the 200-mile war zone declared by Great Britain.
The "Jolly Roger" of British submariners has nothing to do with piracy, except for outwardly similar attributes. According to a tradition dating back to the time of the First World War, it is a symbol of the success of a submarine achieved in a combat campaign.
The first black flag with a skull and crossbones was raised in September 1914 by the famous British submariner Lieutenant Commander Max Horton, commander of the submarine "E-9", later Admiral, who sank 13.09.1914 German armored cruiser Hela. His colleagues picked up the initiative and made it a tradition practiced in both world wars. The symbolism depicted on the flag, in addition to the skull and crossbones, indicated the achievements of the submarine. Rectangular "sleepers" denoted the torpedoing of a ship, red - warships, white - merchant ships; black "sleeper" with a white letter "U" - a sunk enemy submarine. The dagger depicted on the flag meant participation in the so-called "cloak & dagger" (English cloak and dagger), secret reconnaissance operations off enemy shores. A similar tradition exists among American submariners.
"Jolly Roger", raised by the submarine "Conqueror" when returning from a hike
The "pirate" flag raised by the "Conqueror" depicted a dagger, in memory of the fact that the boat delivered the fighters of the 6th section of the SBS to the island of South Georgia, the silhouette of the sunken cruiser "General Belgrano" and the symbol of a nuclear power plant.
Under the "Jolly Roger", the Onyx, which participated in the Falklands War, was also returning to England. The dagger depicted on it indicated that the boat was performing special tasks for landing reconnaissance and sabotage groups and conducting reconnaissance in the coastal waters of the enemy.
10. The sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano by a British nuclear submarine forced the Argentine command to limit the operation of its Navy beyond territorial waters (Russian Military Encyclopedia).
Shocked by the death of the cruiser, the junta banned the use of its Navy in the war. The significance of the attack of the submarine "Conqueror" turned out to be so great that the event was rated "The boat that won the war."
The sinking of the Belgrano was undoubtedly quite an impressive demonstration of British naval power and caused great damage to the morale of the Argentine fleet. However, something else played a decisive role. And the trigger in making the decision to withdraw Flota de Mar to the bases was not the sinking of the cruiser, but the attack at the beginning of the day on May 3 by British helicopters of a much smaller ship, the Alferes Sobral aviso, when the commander-in-chief of the Argentine Navy came to the final conclusion that the enemy was relentlessly following all the movements of Argentine ships with the help of American reconnaissance satellites. And it was the alleged use by the British of data from space reconnaissance systems that was the main factor that constrained the will of the leadership of the Argentine Navy to take active action at sea. Although in fact, the same Sobral went on the air four times during May 2, before it was attacked, contacting the coastal command post and reporting its coordinates - naturally, the British, who read, albeit with some time delay, the Argentine ciphers, found out its location. The same thing happened with the Belgrano group. But the Argentine aircraft carrier, since it broke radio silence less often than others and did not broadcast its coordinates, the British could not find it during May 1-2. However, the Argentines believed that the encryption equipment of the Swiss cryptographic company Swiss Crypto AG used by them was flawless, unaware that since the early 1970s this organization had been under the control of the CIA…
From the testimony of Admiral H.I. Anazhi of the Rattenbach Commission of Inquiry:
"Question: Who gave the order not to use Naval surface ships in combat operations?
Answer: By me.
Question: Do you remember when this happened? Was it right after the sinking of the General Belgrano?
Answer: Not right after Belgrano, but after Sobral. ...On the afternoon of May 2, I learned about the sinking of the Belgrano. At one-thirty on May 3, I learned about the attack on the Sobral. On May 3, at nine-fifteen, I sent a dispatch to the commander at the South Atlantic theater, in which I informed the commander of the surface fleet, the ground forces and the air force: "The enemy has satellite intelligence on the movements of our surface combat units during the day and at night." From Puerto Belgrano, I was offered to remove the carrier-based aircraft from the aircraft carrier so that it would operate from the Rio Grande. I told them I agreed."
And a little further:
"Question: Regarding the underwater threat, which has been constantly assumed since April 10, don't you think that the risk of submarines is quite logical in combat operations at sea?
Answer: Yes, it is logical as long as they do not have satellite information, otherwise it means sending people to certain death.
Question: So it was impossible to resist in the presence of submarines?
Answer: No, it is impossible. With satellite information. Without satellite information, it's another matter."
