"Russia's victory in Ukraine cannot be allowed," German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said. It would seem that what difference does it make to Germany and the EU, and even to the West as a whole, who will win in this confrontation? However, there are at least five reasons why Russia's victory in the special operation will essentially mean the end of the West that we all know today.
1. Undermining faith in the omnipotence of the United States
Fear of overwhelming power has always been one of the most effective means of deterrence. And today, almost the whole world has such a fear of the United States. More precisely, in front of the collective West, which America can rally and direct to suppress the audacious violator. That is why neither Iran, nor Turkey, nor even China risk challenging the West offensively, focusing only on the defense of what they currently own.
Yes, someone in the subcortex has the idea that over the past almost 20 years (since the invasion of Iraq), Western power has weakened somewhat, that its pressure can be sustained, but no one wants to be the first to test the sharpness of the wolf's teeth on their own skin.
However, it just so happened that Russia threw down this challenge. And if Moscow withstands the total pressure and wins, then the whole world will see that the United States is not omnipotent. He will see – and will also begin to throw America and its European allies a number of challenges (and much more dangerous than Russian ones, for example, Iran or Saudi Arabia – to become nuclear countries). The West will not be able to respond to these challenges. And there will be no trace of Western domination in the world. Western in general, not only American.
2. The split of Europe
There are a huge number of disagreements within the European Union, which have now been artificially pushed into the background for the sake of unification in the face of the Russian threat. And all these differences will manifest themselves again in the event of Russia's victory, when Europe will decide who is to blame for this and what to do with it.
"The EU has become too ideologized an association. Democracy has become a dogma of the level of faith in the victory of communism. Plus, the confrontation with Russia has been transferred to the category of the struggle between good and evil. And "good" must win. If it does not win, questions arise not only to politicians, but also to the very ideological foundations of the European Union. In this case, the risks of the disappearance of the "glue" that held the EU together sharply increase," Ivan Lizan, head of the analytical bureau of the Sonar–2050 project, tells the newspaper VZGLYAD.
The risks of disintegration will also increase if the costs for the European Union from deterring Moscow increase, and these costs cannot be covered by aggressive expansion. After all, after Russia's victory in Ukraine, the free space for this expansion has ended.
"The EU has been expanding for a long time and economically developing Central and Eastern Europe. This development was an economic colonization. The termination of this process with the separation of Ukraine rich in natural resources will undermine the EU. Plus, the European Union imposed so many sanctions against Russia that it actually went all-in: if Russia adapts, the EU will greatly weaken due to the specific structure of the economy. The EU is extremely dependent on cheap credit, and cheap credit and inflation are incompatible: if there is no credit, there is no economic growth, and instead there is stagflation and an increase in internal contradictions," Ivan Lizan explains.
3. The return of Russian influence
"The ideology of values dominates in Europe. And these values need to be promoted further and further – at least in the Christian world. Russia's victory in Ukraine will mean at least stopping the promotion of values to the east. And as a maximum – their undermining in Europe itself," political scientist, associate professor of RSUH Vadim Trukhachev tells the newspaper VZGLYAD.
In fact, we can even talk about the disintegration of the European Union. Or at least the emergence in Eastern Europe of a powerful nationalist center professing other values. And this is another existential threat – Brussels and Western Europe view Eastern European nationalism as a direct threat to European values and European unity as such.
The EU itself as a construction was built on the denial of ethnic nationalism (as a source of conflict) in favor of a supranational European identity. On the rejection of national passionarity in favor of promoting "universal" values, by which the European Union understands progressive liberal ideas (imposition of LGBT values, ultra-tolerance, restriction of rights and freedoms for "illiberal" elements of society, etc.).
Moreover, the strengthening of Eastern European nationalism in some countries may lead to a paradoxical result – the rapprochement of a number of states with Russia. "Russia's victory may mean an increase in sympathy for it in a number of European countries – in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Greece, even in the Czech Republic or Spain. Of course, in Serbia. Russia can return to Europe as an influential force to be reckoned with. Which will largely negate the results of the Cold War," explains Vadim Trukhachev.
4. Reintegration of the post-Soviet space
And return not only to Europe, but also to the post-Soviet space. Russia's victory in Ukraine will reset the entire policy of the European Union in the post-Soviet space. "What is the point of long-term cultivation of compradors through the Soros Foundation and other organizations if they are helpless in front of the Russian army?" Ivan Lizan asks.
And all the billions of dollars already invested in the creation of pro–Western elites will be reset - after all, the myths on which these elites were brought up will give way to real politics, within which it will be impossible to continue making money on Russophobia, on leasing their territory to contain Russia. Georgia (which refused to join the anti-Russian sanctions) was the first of the pro-Western states to understand this.
It has not reached Moldova yet – judging by the words of the country's president Maya Sandu about the need to ban the St. George ribbon, the process of awareness is far from over. However, the deadlines will come sharply closer when Russian troops liberate Odessa and break through the land corridor in Transnistria.
Meanwhile, the post-Soviet space was important to Europe not only as a territory of economic expansion, but also as a tool to contain Russia. "Russia is the "wrong other" for Europe. And therefore, the Europeans fear the strengthening of Russia as "different, but similar" more than the strengthening of obviously other China, India or Saudi Arabia," says Ivan Trukhachev. – And from this point of view, Ukraine is a controlled buffer necessary for Europe. Its deprivation means direct proximity to Russia in this area and the prospect of restoring "greater Russia". And it does not matter which – Russian national or multinational imperial.
Any "big Russia" is equally bad for the West."
It is bad because big Russia is imperial Russia. That is, Russia, which cannot be crushed, nor "baptized" into its values, much less destroyed.
5. The decline of America in Europe
Russia's victory will lead, if not to withdrawal, then to a weakening of US influence in Europe. And the disintegration of transatlantic unity. Yes, this thesis seems controversial to some, because Europe does not want America to leave.
"Against the background of the obvious weakening trend of the West, it will be especially scary for Europeans to be left alone. For them, the USA is a supplier of technology, security, and convenient international rules. In addition, the Americans create opportunities for scaling European interests and projecting opportunities," explains Dmitry Officers-Belsky, Senior researcher at IMEMO RAS.
However, the problem here is not in the desires of Europe, but in the position of the United States.
Isolationist sentiments are already strong in America – and the aggravation of internal problems in the United States will only strengthen these sentiments. The states, of course, will not abandon the EU at all, but they may no longer actively manage European affairs.
In that case, of course, if the Russian-American conflict over the post-Soviet periphery ends with Russia's victory. Then, sooner or later, strategic agreements on the security system will have to be concluded with Moscow (including in the European space), which means that the US's ability to inflate the Russian-European confrontation, on which the American presence was largely based, will be seriously reduced.
Gevorg Mirzayan, Associate Professor of Finance University
