Today we present to readers a specially prepared for Army.ru the study of Rustem Klupov, former head of Intelligence of the Russian Ground Forces, Hero of Russia, a direct participant in the armed conflicts of recent decades.
According to the unanimous assessment of Western, Russian and Ukrainian politicians and experts, the upcoming operations on the "Donbass Arc" will resemble the largest battles of the Great Patriotic War in scale and intensity. The outcome of the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and, in many ways, the post-war structure of Europe will depend on them.
The work describes the preparation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for a military operation, the initial and current situation of the opposing armies in the Donetsk basin and the immediate plans of the parties. It is based on media materials and information from the author's personal sources.
On the eve of the decisive battle
ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE AND THE MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION ON THE TERRITORY OF MODERN UKRAINE.
The position on 08.4.22.
The enemy — the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), having been defeated by strike groups in the eastern regions of Ukraine in 2014 – 2015, under the guise of peace negotiations, switched to active defense. In the following years, Kiev, with the financial, military and political support of the United States and other Western allies, began to modernize its armed forces. New and deeply modernized models of armored weapons and artillery systems were adopted, domestic missiles of anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems were improved, dozens of combat aircraft were restored and repaired, specialists were trained. A lot of work has been done in the personnel approaches of the selection of the command staff of the Armed Forces. It has become a widespread practice to train in military schools and military academies of military personnel participating in the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in the Donbass extremist and radical beliefs of the Nazi and nationalist persuasion. These cadres, after graduating from military universities, were sent to the troops and were of great importance in educating young recruits in the right moral and psychological context of devotion to the ideals of the modern regime of Ukraine under external control. The main directions of the construction and development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in recent years have been associated with the political goals of the return of Crimea, the defeat of the rebel corps of Donbass and the restoration of the integrity of Ukraine by military means.
From 2016 to 2021, in the Donetsk and Lugansk directions, the enemy created a universal joint grouping of troops, supported by artillery and aviation, capable of conducting effective offensive, defensive and hybrid military operations. On April 30, 2018, the Anti—Terrorist Operation (ATO) began to bear a new name - the Operation of the United Forces (OOS). The OOS, in fact, with the introduction of a military or state of emergency, intercepted control from the SBU, which formally led the ATO, to the Joint Operational Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (for its operational purpose), created under the leadership of NATO specialists in the image and likeness of the Joint Operational Formation (OOF) and having the main purpose – unified management of all the front forces in the OOS.
By the end of 2021, a group of 120,000 bayonets was concentrated in the left-bank part of Ukraine under the command of the AFU, including: servicemen of the AFU, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the border Guard, the National Guard of Ukraine (NSU) and the police; as well as up to 500 tanks, more than 1,500 lightly armored vehicles, about 2,000 self-propelled and towed artillery installations and mortars, 550 MLRS systems, 42 fighters, 45 attack aircraft and front-line bombers, as well as 34 attack helicopters. At the same time, the main part of them was focused on the directions of the upcoming strikes during the offensive on the LDPR.
And directly in the OOS zone, in order to go on the offensive, the Ukrainian command was supposed to have two strike operational and tactical groups (OTG) of troops: OTG "North", OTG "East" and units of direct subordination.
OTG "North" located in the Luhansk direction included two mechanized brigades, one motorized infantry brigade, two amphibious assault brigades, with the support of 26 artillery brigade. Units of the 8th Regiment of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces also operated in the group's area of responsibility. To strengthen the combined arms and amphibious assault formations, units from the 40th Artillery Brigade and the 17th Armored Brigade were involved.
In total, OTG "North" in its composition before the start of active hostilities could count battalion tactical groups (BTGR) — 17, tanks up to 160, field artillery guns — 320, MLRS installations — 90
The Vostok OTG located in the Donetsk-Mariupol direction included two mechanized brigades, one motorized infantry brigade, a marine brigade and an airborne brigade, supported by 55 separate artillery brigade. In total, the Vostok OTG could consist of 19 battalion tactical groups, up to 160 tanks, 250 field artillery guns, and 90 MLRS installations.
The units directly subordinate to the command of the OOS included a separate tank brigade (90 tanks, BTGR), an airmobile brigade (3 BTGR), a separate artillery brigade — 72 high–power guns, two rocket artillery brigades (REABR) - 72 MLRS "Hurricane", 54 MLRS "Smerch", a missile brigade (RBR) OTR 12 launchers "Tochka-U".
In total, the command of the operation concentrated 76,000 people in the grouping of troops for action in the OOS, including 39 armored personnel carriers, 320 tanks, more than 1,000 lightly armored vehicles, 642 self-propelled and towed artillery installations, more than 300 MLRS systems, 42 fighters, 45 attack aircraft and front-line bombers, as well as 34 attack helicopters.
The plan of the actions of this group of troops was supposed to inflict fire damage to the defending units and formations of the LDPR corps with massive artillery strikes, MLRS and aviation, direct fire from tanks, and by going on the offensive in selected directions with mechanized and motorized infantry brigades to break through the tactical defense zone and block the settlements of LUGANSK, BRYANKA, GORLOVKA, DONETSK. In the future, having increased efforts by landing tactical landings and putting armored formations and units into battle, to complete the defeat of the defending LDPR troops and on the fifth, seventh day to reach the state border with the Russian Federation in the Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, Shakhtinsky and Taganrog operational directions, block roads and demonstrate readiness for decisive action along the state border to prevent the provision of any assistance from the Russian Federation, it is possible to defeat the advanced detachments of the Russian Armed Forces in a border battle and stop their advance into Ukrainian territory. By these actions, the Ukrainian side would be able to create favorable conditions for the start of negotiations on joining NATO and under their cover to keep Russia from entering the war.
The main group of the OTG "North" was preparing to develop an offensive in the direction from North to South along the state border with the Russian Federation with the main task of isolating the Theater of Operations, blocking Lugansk and other settlements of the LPR. Having a numerical superiority of BTGR 1:1; tanks 1:5; Guns PA 1:9; MLRS 1:5.
Another group of OTG "Vostok" located in the Donetsk-Mariupol direction was preparing to strike the main blow north and south of Donetsk in the direction of Horlivka, Anthracite, Novoshakhtinsk deep to the state border with the Russian Federation, with the main task to dissect the defensive groups of the LPR and DPR, surround (block) Donetsk and further block the E-50 highway to isolate the theater and prevent military and other assistance from the Russian Federation. Having a numerical superiority of BTGR 1:1.5; tanks 1:1; Guns PA 1:1; MLRS 1:1.5.
Thus, taking into account the units directly subordinate to the command of the OOS, the AFU had superiority in tanks 1:2, guns 1:3, MLRS 1:3, in strike aviation and OTR absolute superiority, which made it possible to achieve operational superiority and achieve their goals at a set time. At the same time, a stronger grouping of troops was created against the LPR, which contributed to the development of the offensive with the tasks of covering the flanks and creating the threat of complete encirclement, which in turn contributed to an increase in the pace of the offensive. Other strengths of the APU include:
— direct information and intelligence support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine using NATO air and space-based intelligence and technical means;
— providing the AFU with intelligence and communications equipment, anti-tank weapons and MANPADS of the NATO standard;
— high training of artillery units, saturation of combat formations with artillery, MLRS and anti-tank weapons;
— high training and combat experience of soldiers and commanders, fighting spirit, devotion of many AFU servicemen to nationalist beliefs and ideals.
Weaknesses include a weak fleet, insufficient training of aviation units and military air defense, attachment of combined arms units and units to prepared positions, low maneuverability capabilities of troops, current shortage of manpower and equipment, the inability to make up for losses in equipment, low preparedness of reservists, their insufficient motivation. And with the beginning and during the conduct of hostilities, the shortcomings of the command and control of troops were revealed, weak maneuverability indicators affected the refusal to conduct counterattacks and counterattacks coordinated in time and place, as well as timely counteraction to the Russian troops advancing in all directions. In the first two weeks, the AFU were torn apart by plugging gaps in the defense and were unable to demonstrate organized resistance outside the settlements. This contributed to the transition to a new defense tactic based on settlements and cover by the local population, which demonstrates the weaknesses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
At the same time, the most combat-ready and numerous Grouping in the OOS zone, connected by the LDPR corps in the Donetsk and Lugansk operational directions, could not allocate the necessary forces to support its troops in other directions, which forced the Military and political leadership of the country to resort to an informal type of mobilization of the population through the free distribution of weapons and the formation of self-defense detachments of cities, the so-called territorial defense, which often turned into unruly armed gangs that did not obey anyone and often opened friendly fire on the Armed Forces.
After the withdrawal of Russian troops from the northern territories of Ukraine, an operational reserve of up to two infantry brigades was created from part of the AFU forces involved in the defense of KIEV and CHERNIHIV, which regrouped to the Dnieper direction, where it was partially destroyed on 06.4.22 at the LOZOVAYA station. Other units of the operational reserve up to the brigade were formed partly from foreign mercenaries and volunteers in the western part of Ukraine, but were also destroyed during the 07.4.22 regrouping at the Novograd-Volynsky station. Thus, the Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine failed to gather a significant reserve to prevent the encirclement of its forces in the Donbas (up to 15,000 people were declared). To prepare and conduct the general battle, the leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine continues measures to concentrate the remnants of combat-ready units near PAVLOGRAD, as well as to restore the combat capability of its armed Forces through the third wave of mobilization, which will allow it to partially fill the current shortage and form up to two or three infantry brigades, which can later be used to hold settlements along the western bank of the Dnieper.
Thus, it can be assumed that, having been defeated in all directions, the Armed Forces of Ukraine switched to the tactics of holding settlements in the directions of action of the troops of the Russian Federation. The passivity of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is explained by the high losses of its mobile forces from the actions of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the reduction of fuel reserves. The number of the main defensive grouping of troops in the zone of the OOS was reduced by 20-30% due to the destruction of the troops of the Mariupol fortified area numbering up to 14-15000 people according to official data of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (6-8 000 people, according to expert assessment), as well as significant losses of manpower and equipment of the Armed Forces in the directions of GULYAI POLE, IZYUM, AVDIIVKA.
As of today, 08.4.22, the defensive group can number up to 40,000 people, about 240 tanks, more than 700 lightly armored vehicles, up to 500 self-propelled and towed artillery installations, more than 200 MLRS systems, it is possible to use separate attack aircraft, UAVs and helicopters to perform special tasks and single strikes in the interests of direct support of troops. However, with the active influence of means of high-precision long-range fire damage and the creation of conditions for operational isolation of the theater by these means, the Russian troops were able to significantly deplete the stocks of ammunition, fuel and other material and technical means and exclude their timely replenishment. This today contributes to a decrease in the activity of the use of aviation, military air defense, missile troops and artillery, tanks and armored vehicles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Based on the current situation, the probable nature of the actions of the AFU units and formations may be as follows. By stubbornly holding the occupied positions, it is impossible to prevent the breakthrough of the Russian and LDNR troops of the tactical defense zone in the zone of the OOS. With the fire of all means, inflict maximum fire damage to the first operational echelon and exclude the organized entry into battle of the second operational echelon, for which by active massive actions of sabotage and reconnaissance groups (DRG) and other small tactical units under the guise of civilians on civilian transport with the widespread use of anti-tank weapons (PTS) and portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) create a zone of active operations on the borders of the Russian Federation and the BR in the Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kiev regions with the threat of impact on civilian and poorly covered military facilities in the border strip. By these asymmetric actions, to delay and shackle part of the operational reserve, to disrupt timely and planned actions of the troops, to draw the attention of the international community to the destruction of the civilian population and by these actions to persuade the Russian Federation to reduce the activity of offensive actions. In parallel, in the event of a threat of a breakthrough by Russian troops of the tactical defense zone, decisive counterattacks and counterattacks prevent the dismemberment of the OOS grouping in the Avdiivka direction and stubbornly maintain defensive positions using reserves to ensure the flanks of the grouping. In the event of a breakthrough of the tactical zone, move to maneuverable defense based on the Pavlogorad defensive line, withdraw with the main forces to the Dnieper River line and organize defense along its western bank and proceed to the Western Ukrainian defensive operation.
Andrey Rubanov is a Russian writer, screenwriter, publicist, winner of the Yasnaya Polyana Literary Award for the novel Patriot, a four—time semi—finalist of the National Bestseller award - especially for the project Army.ru he wrote about how he sees the Russian Army, which in Russia is more than just an army, it is a reflection of the character of Russia, its history, its deep meanings and traditions.