Almost a year and a half ago, in November 2020, in the newspaper Vedomosti, the now deceased deputy director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (TSAST)Konstantin Makiyenko published an article "How Russia lost in the Second Karabakh war."
The final part of this article looks especially relevant today: "The main lesson that Moscow should learn for itself from the tragedy that has occurred: never, never, never underestimate the enemy. I do not know how our military assesses, for example, the armed forces of Ukraine, but in the "expert" environment and in general in public opinion there is a condescending ironic attitude towards the Ukrainian army. This point of view is especially popular among the regulars of magical "political" talk shows on federal channels. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army has long been not the same as it was in Ilovaysk and Debaltseve, it firmly owns the tactical initiative, and the Ukrainian special services methodically destroy the heroes of the Russian spring not only in the DPR and LPR, but also in Russia itself. However, the average Russian is still convinced of the squalor and low combat capability of the Ukrainian army. Such illusions are very dangerous and fraught with bitter surprises... The Armenian catastrophe of 2020 should serve as someone else's lesson, so as not to wait for us to receive such a lesson ourselves."
(c) Planet Labs
On the night of November 9-10 [2020], the second Karabakh war ended with a heavy - if not crushing - defeat of the Armenian side. The concluded agreement is actually an Armenian capitulation, which became inevitable after the loss of Shusha. If the fighting continued, the situation for Yerevan would become worse and worse, and the conditions for the final surrender would become more and more catastrophic and humiliating.
The education left over from Artsakh, which was independent for a quarter of a century, resembles Czechoslovakia after the occupation of the Sudetenland, and its safety and the safety of the few brave souls who will remain on this territory will now depend solely on Russian peacekeepers. As in the case of the Nazis, who in a short time completed the liquidation of the amputated Czechoslovakia, the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance will complete the work begun in 2020 in five years. Or even earlier, if Azerbaijani generals and their Turkish colleagues decide that Ilham Aliyev, who graduated from MGIMO, speaks fluent Russian and pursues an overly balanced policy, is an obstacle to the implementation of the Ottoman and pan-Turkist projects.
Why is this bad for Russia
The geopolitical consequences of the second Karabakh war are catastrophic not only for Armenia, but also for Russia. Behind a thin veil of deceptive foreign policy triumph, as it were, successful mediation and the introduction of peacekeepers (or hostages?) into the region - the harsh reality will appear very soon. And it is that Moscow's influence in Transcaucasia has sharply decreased, and the prestige of a successful and pugnacious Turkey, on the contrary, has increased enormously. In fact, why should Baku now continue a balanced policy of balancing between the three imperial nations - Russia, Turkey and Iran - which have been the main players here for the last three centuries? The main national task - the return of the territories lost in 1994 - has been solved, direct communication with Turkey has been secured, and now you can speak with the Russians in a completely different tone.
The balance of influence in the Turkic-speaking republics of Central Asia will also change dramatically in favor of Ankara. The client and ally of the Russians turned out to be the loser. The Turkish ally won convincingly. Isn't this a reason to think about which project - post-Soviet integration or pan-Turkist revival - is more promising? There is no doubt that Turkic nationalist and separatist groups are becoming more active in Russia itself. A powerful motivating incentive was also given to the Ukrainian revanchists, who, of course, will now invariably try on the Karabakh scenario 2020 to the situation in Donbass.
Due to what Azerbaijan won the victory
If we consider the second Karabakh war as a foreign policy and military operation, I will assume that this is the most beautiful such operation in the XXI century after, perhaps, Vladimir Putin's Crimean impromptu. Moreover, even from a narrow military-technical point of view, we witnessed, if not a coup, then at least a protorevolution. Its essence lies in the completely new role of UAVs and barrage ammunition (kamikaze drones), the main factor of the spectacular successes of the Azerbaijani army is indisputable air supremacy. The novelty, however, lies in the fact that this dominance was achieved by means not of manned, but unmanned aircraft.
In general, over the past year it has been repeatedly demonstrated that UAVs can solve problems even at the strategic level. In September last year, as a result of an attack by primitive Houthi drones, 5 million barrels of daily Saudi oil production were removed from the market for several months (albeit for a short time). In January and February of this year, Turkish UAVs played a key role in repelling the Syrian army's offensive in Idlib, and then achieved operational-level results in Libya, where Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who has been going from one victory to another all his life, was pushed back from Tripoli. But all these were very peculiar cases: at least one (and in the Libyan case, both) of the parties to the conflict was represented by sub-state actors, the drones operated almost in landfill conditions in terms of terrain and enemy air defense density.
Now we have witnessed the use of UAVs in the war of two regular armies and in conditions including mountainous and wooded areas. The Armenians, of course, did not have an air defense system, but only some of its elements. But still among the latter there were quite modern samples, which, however, could not resist the systemic influence of the enemy. As a result, by the end of the second week of hostilities, the Azerbaijanis recreated the situation of the summer of 1941, when the Messerschmitts were chasing individual Soviet trucks. It seems that Azerbaijani UAVs were also hunting for literally every firing means and every group of Armenian fighters. It was at the moment when the feeling of hopelessness generated by the total unmanned domination of the enemy in the air engulfed the Armenian forces, the front began to crumble. The unmanned operation carried out by the Azerbaijanis is probably not yet December 7, 1941 in Pearl Harbor, but certainly November 12, 1940 in Taranto.
At the same time, let us assume that this operation, judging by the style, was not planned by Azerbaijanis or even Turks. And the good friends of the Armenian people, the Israelis, who pursue not only commercial, but also geopolitical goals. Tel Aviv has long dreamed of using Azerbaijani territory to conduct its own intelligence and sabotage operations against Iran. So far, Baku has refused to do this. But, who knows, maybe in return for the valuable service of organizing the beating of Armenian troops, this time the Israelis will get what they want.
Lessons for Moscow
The main lesson that Moscow should learn for itself from the tragedy that has occurred: never, never, never underestimate the enemy. I do not know how our military assesses, for example, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but in the "expert" environment and in general in public opinion there is a condescending ironic attitude towards the Ukrainian army. This point of view is especially popular among the regulars of magical "political" talk shows on federal channels. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army has long been not the same as it was in Ilovaysk and Debaltseve, it firmly owns the tactical initiative, and the Ukrainian special services methodically destroy the heroes of the Russian spring not only in the DPR and LPR, but also in Russia itself. However, the average Russian is still convinced of the squalor and low combat capability of the Ukrainian army.
Such illusions are very dangerous and fraught with bitter surprises. The Ukrainian military, albeit in small numbers so far, already have weapons systems that the Russians do not have. These are third-generation anti-tank missile systems and kamikaze drones. And soon the Bayraktar TB2 attack and reconnaissance UAVs ordered in Turkey will arrive. Meanwhile, there are no barrage ammunition or shock UAVs in the Russian army yet, although all military practice in recent years cries out for their need.
The Armenian catastrophe of 2020 should serve as someone else's lesson, so as not to wait for us to receive such a lesson ourselves.
