The National Interest (USA): That's why America is not ready to defend itself against Russian hypersonic missiles
To counter the "threat" that comes from Russian hypersonic weapons, the American government is not stingy and allocates billions of dollars. However, the authors of the article note, this does not bring benefits. The US is investing in hypersonic weapons - this is a fact. But not in defense of him.
Russia is developing hypersonic nuclear weapons, and Putin claims that he offered President Donald Trump to buy them. Despite the casual conversation between the two leaders, the threat from Russian and Chinese hypersonic systems is real and continues to grow. Both countries have made significant progress in the development of hypersonic weapons — their latest achievements are likely to be able to bypass the American missile defense system. To counter this growing threat, the Ministry of Defense allocated over two billion dollars in 2019 for the development of hypersonic weapons. However, the hypersonic weapons program suffers from distortions: the development of offensive and defensive weapons is funded differently. And despite the importance of offensive capabilities, a powerful defensive potential remains the most important element of protecting interests and objects.
Most of the budget funds for the development of hypersonic weapons are now spent on high-precision and offensive weapons, and not on missile defense programs. The budget for next year allocated $ 2.6 billion for hypersonic weapons, but defense spending is only 6% of this amount (or $ 157.4 million). Moreover, in the coming years, defense spending will even be reduced by almost a quarter - to $122 million by 2024.
According to Michael White, deputy head of the Ministry of Defense for hypersonic weapons: "If you look at the budget, you will see that we are acting in stages. At first, we focused on the offensive side and are simultaneously working on a reliable defensive strategy." The course of the Ministry of Defense is largely determined by the fact that offensive systems are technically simpler and cheaper to develop. At the beginning of the year, the head of the strategic command, General John Hyten, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee: "[The US] does not have such protection that would prevent the enemy from using [hypersonic weapons] against us." White and Hyten stressed how important it is to deepen the development of defensive capabilities. Even if offensive weapons are less expensive, they do not cancel out the need for a strong defense, and the United States does not have it at the moment.
The achievements of the enemy in the field of offensive hypersonic weapons, coupled with the fact that it is usually easier and cheaper to develop an offensive potential than a defensive one, quite logically predetermined the budget of the Ministry of Defense. However, the long-term risks of such a course were outlined on August 2 of this year, when the United States withdrew from the 1987 Treaty on the Elimination of Short— and Medium-Range Missiles (DRMSD) - it prohibited the United States and Russia from deploying land-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers in Europe in order to reduce the threat of operational nuclear strikes. Many fear that the withdrawal from the DRMSD heralds the beginning of an arms race not only with Russia, but also with China. In addition, this may lead to the fact that the United States will also withdraw from the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (START-3) - or they decide not to renew it (the contract expires in 2021).
The termination of well-established nuclear weapons treaties between major world Powers will not only destabilize the situation, but will also entail an emphasis on offensive hypersonic missiles as the latest means of delivering nuclear weapons. Withdrawing from these treaties will give opponents the opportunity to strike first or launch a preemptive strike against nuclear weapons delivery systems. Finally, this scenario highlights the defensive role of hypersonic missiles as a deterrent when intercepting offensive nuclear weapon delivery systems.
The rapidly changing geopolitical reality highlights the risks arising from the lack of a viable defense against hypersonic weapons in the United States. Awareness of the fact that the development of hypersonic defense requires more time and money will require the Ministry of Defense to budget allocations between offensive and defensive weapons on a parity basis. There are two pitfalls to avoid here. First, the Ministry of Defense should avoid the strategy of shifting costs — when X dollars are spent on weapons based on the expectation that the enemy will spend the same amount to resist him. According to Thomas Karako, a leading expert on missile defense at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Chinese hypersonic technology already has "all the signs" of this strategy.
Secondly, the government - under the collective supervision of Congress, the Department of Defense and the White House - must make sure that the money and resources spent are used wisely, in a timely and fair manner. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Defense is notorious for spending billions of dollars on missile defense systems without proper return. In particular, this concerns the ground-based missile defense system on the flight path (GMD), - this development of the Clinton and Bush times is designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles, — and the SM-3 anti—aircraft guided missile, designed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, - it is used in the navy. As the tests of the Ministry of Defense showed, most SM-3s could not hit the designated targets, and GMD achieved episodic success only in carefully prepared scenarios. Thus, both weapons systems have significant drawbacks that the enemy can use. This prompted analysts from Arms Control Today magazine to conclude that such shortcomings should serve as a "powerful warning" to politicians who are confident that US missile defense systems will be able to "discourage future opponents from developing ballistic weapons."
Greater parity in the development of both offensive and defensive capabilities will ensure that the United States will not only keep up with the development of the enemy's offensive capabilities, but also surpass them. In addition, this way the United States will receive hypersonic defense, which goes toe-to-toe with the offensive potential of the enemy. Thus, this mutually reinforcing effect will provide the United States with a decisive advantage in the form of more powerful, flexible and reliable offensive and defensive systems without any sacrifices and compromises.
Authors: Bishop Garrison is the president and co-founder of the Joseph Rainey Center for Public Policy. Previously, he held various positions in the field of national security in the Obama administration and was deputy foreign policy adviser on the staff of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her presidential campaign.
Preston Lann is a researcher at the Joseph Rainey Center for Public Policy.
