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The West is trying to corner the Russian Navy

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Image source: Серьга Вадим/ТАСС

Ships of the Russian Navy have lost the opportunity to enter foreign ports on a long voyage and replenish fuel and supplies there. How and why did this happen, what impact does it have on the Navy's combat capability and what needs to be done to make Russian ships independent of foreign ports?

In the first days of March 2022, it became known that in connection with the events in Ukraine, the government of Cyprus is breaking the agreement with Russia, according to which Russian warships could enter the port of Limassol for refueling and resupply. Over the past week, five Russian ships have been refused in response to a request to enter the port. A few years ago, the same decision was made by the Spanish authorities.

It should be noted that the number of ports available to our fleet has significantly decreased since the beginning of the operation in Ukraine, and all this against the background of Turkey's closure of the straits. This situation poses to the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Navy the question of reviving a full-fledged floating rear capable of performing tasks in the far and ocean zone. The state of the fleet's "floating rear" largely determines not just the capabilities of the Navy, but the country's capabilities for "long-range force projection".

Tankers and transports

The fact that the ship cannot go to combat service without fuel and ammunition is obvious, but few people understand how much. So, for example, for the Japanese navy during the Second World War, the campaign to Hawaii was almost an extremely difficult task, largely due to the need to provide supplies at sea. Squadron tankers in the Pacific War proved to be extremely valuable auxiliary ships. Yes, the "first fiddle" was for aircraft carriers, but the operational capabilities of aircraft carrier groups were largely determined by fuel restrictions and the number and characteristics of tankers.

No matter what the ship is, it doesn't take long without a tanker. For a long time, the transfer of fuel at sea to a warship from a supply vessel was possible only "on the stop" and required a lot of time. In addition, due to the different speeds of the supply vessels had to operate separately from the warships and meet them at the designated rendezvous point.

Such an organization of fuel supply significantly hampered the performance of combat services.

One example of such difficulties is the confrontation between the Soviet Navy and the US Navy in the Mediterranean Sea in 1973. Then the Soviet Navy, keeping American ships in the sights of their missiles, seriously hampered the actions of a powerful group of the US Navy, whose task was to assist Israel in the war with the Arabs. The Soviet Navy provided the Soviet leadership with freedom of action.

But then it turned out that it was impossible to solve complex problems with slow-moving tankers – there was not enough time to go for fuel, and the tankers themselves were too small. The Americans, who by that time no longer had such problems, even deliberately maneuvered at high speeds to force our ships to produce fuel quickly.

In the USSR at that time, however, a series of marine tankers of the integrated supply project 1559-B was already being built, capable of transferring various types of fuel, water and even a small amount of dry cargo. These tankers had significant fuel reserves, a fuel transfer system on the move, which allowed them to refuel warships in motion, in a traverse way. This alone was enough to significantly facilitate the execution of combat missions by the fleet. Photos of tankers such as "Boris Chilikin" or "Boris Butoma", giving fuel to warships on the move, have become one of the symbols of the USSR Navy. The issue of ammunition transfer, however, was solved the old-fashioned way – transport with a crane, approach, drift and time.

The West had gone much further by the early eighties. In the US Navy, high-speed universal supply transports (BOOTS) appeared. It was, as a rule, a huge tanker, with a high speed of 20 knots or more, having compartments for dry cargo, containers, ammunition, and so on. And most importantly – not only the fuel transfer system on the move, but also the transfer of goods on the move.

In the future, such ships received a flight deck, and sometimes a hangar - now, as a last resort, they could transfer cargo to a combat ship by helicopter, on an external suspension. And in those cases when these ships had a hangar, they could deliver the helicopters themselves. BOOTs took over the supply of warships with everything from food and shells to artillery to drinking water and all types of fuel. And all this was transmitted on the move without wasting time and turning the ship's group into a stationary target.

In the USSR, the advantages of such ships were quickly understood, but for a number of reasons, only one was built. The first and only integrated supply ship in the USSR Navy (KKS) of project 1833 – Berezina was handed over to the fleet at the end of 1977 and decommissioned in 2000.

After the collapse of the USSR, the fleet was not up to such ships. In the West, the class continued to develop. Today, all self–respecting fleets in the world have boots, for which there is at least a small chance that they will have to operate far from their native shores - from German and Canadian to Japanese and American.

The fact that our fleet also needs such ships does not raise any questions, and the situation that has now developed with the access of our fleet to foreign ports is clear evidence of this. But there is one problem on the way for Russia to acquire such necessary ships.

Our special way

In the late 2000s, the command system of the Russian Armed Forces underwent major changes. Among other things, this was expressed in the fact that the entire command of troops and forces in the theaters of military operations went under military districts, and the Northern Fleet de facto became a military district itself. All those areas of activity for which the Navy Commander-in-Chief was once responsible turned out to be divided between other structures of the Ministry of Defense. For the floating rear began to be responsible, for example, the Department of the rear of the Ministry of Defense, whose officers did not have the most detailed idea about the operational and tactical requirements for supply ships.

In the end, the order of new tankers for the Navy turned out to be a "child without an eye" – the rear management itself could not and did not want to develop tactical and technical tasks. The commander-in-chief would like to, but could not because of the reduced powers. Those tankers that were eventually ordered for the fleet turned out to be small, expensive, and "non-import-substituted".

As a result, the fleet needs complex supply ships needed for global operations. Moreover, the structure of ship order management for the auxiliary fleet is such that one fleet cannot solve this problem, at least in the traditional way. But maybe try an unconventional one?

There is a way out

To get your own floater, you need to present the case as if it is not a floater. The Navy is able to order complex supply ships under the guise of combat. The navy orders warships for itself independently, and can get exactly what is needed. Yes, it sounds unusual, but either that or nothing.

It is necessary to issue a tactical and technical task for a large integrated supply ship (CCS) capable of carrying and transferring fuel, water, ammunition, weapons, personnel, carrying helicopters to make up for the losses of the warring group, boats and special forces, if necessary, to provide a change of crews of ships and submarines at sea.

To match the status of combat, he can be given weapons: for example, a cannon and a pair of anti-aircraft guns, plus means to protect against torpedoes. But it should be based on a complex supply ship, which will simply be called differently: for example, "combat support ship", or in some other similar way.

Can Russia build such ships quickly? Yes, it is easy, fast and inexpensive. The Baltic Plant, the Zvezda shipbuilding complex, and the Gulf plant in Kerch will cope with such an order. It will not be possible to delay the solution of the issue forever – when there is no opportunity to enter the port to replenish fuel and supplies, and there will not be, you need to carry everything with you. And for this we need the appropriate ships.


Alexander Timokhin

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