A week before the announcement by Russian President Vladimir Putin of the start of a "special operation" in Ukraine, the American online publication Vox under the heading "Russia has 150,000 troops near Ukraine. What does that mean? A military analyst explains Russia's massive troop buildup near Ukraine's borders" ("Russia has 150,000 troops near Ukraine. What does it mean? A military analyst explains the massive buildup of Russian troops near the borders of Ukraine") published an interview Scott Boston, a senior military analyst at the RAND Corporation specializing in Russian military potential, who not only predicted the inevitability of the start of hostilities by the Russian side in Ukraine, but also rather shrewdly pointed out the possible course of hostilities and the inevitable problems for the Russian Armed Forces. Some of Boston's predictions have already come true. It is particularly worth noting the opinion of Boston that the constant large-scale escalation of hostilities in Ukraine with the corresponding "media" picture can create prerequisites for Western military intervention in the conflict.
A column of Russian troops in one of the settlements of Ukraine, 02.03.2022 (c) Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
President Joe Biden again said that Russia could invade Ukraine in a matter of days. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken addressed the United Nations Security Council on Thursday, outlining the possible course Russia could take when it launches an invasion.
Skepticism is always justified. But Russia does have 150,000 troops stationed at various points along the Ukrainian border, which is an undeniable threat that makes war possible. However, it is difficult to fully understand what this massive real-time military buildup actually looks like.
Vox talked toScott Boston, senior military analyst at the RAND Corporation, who specializes in Russian military capabilities. Boston focused on the military side of the issue, so he could not fully assess the diplomatic or political dynamics taking place between Russia, Ukraine, the United States and Europe. But what he saw over the course of several weeks created a feeling "that over time it will grow into something."
In historical retrospect, at least compared to the Soviet era during the Cold War, Russia's forces are small, Boston believes, but they are, "in fact, invading forces."
The increase in numbers means for Boston that the troops are ready to invade if such an order is given. And right now there is no convincing evidence of de-escalation on the ground. "We are really at the stage where the next things we will see may really be Russia's actions to actually go on the offensive," says Boston. "In military terms, they won't need to do much else to prepare."
At the same time, the presence of invasion forces does not mean that Russia will use them, Boston believes. But if this happens, it may take time for the world to fully realize the extent of the destruction, since one of the ways in which Russia can use armed forces is to suppress communications. "It may take some time before we see videos from mobile phones or people start receiving text SMS messages or phone calls from areas where the Russians have penetrated," Boston said. And since Russia's capabilities far exceed those of Ukraine, depending on the scenario, this could be a catastrophe: an incalculable and incomprehensible tragedy that the world will find difficult to comprehend.
"It's hard for me to express anything other than a sense of anxiety or confusion," says Boston. "I am engaged in the study of the military organization of the Russian state and the conduct of military operations on land. The fact that my two main subject areas have suddenly become in demand causes me deep concern."
"I would," he added, "prefer to become invisible again now."
The conversation with Scott Boston below has been edited and refered in order to save the audience time and bring more clarity.
Jen Kirby: Russia has deployed tens of thousands of troops on the Ukrainian border. The hysteria last week suggested the inevitability of a Russian invasion. Then Moscow started talking about a "partial withdrawal" of troops, to which the West was skeptical, perhaps for a good reason. Where are we now?
Scott Boston: We are not at the end of the road yet, but we have reached the point where the US intelligence community and many Russian military experts specializing in Russia - in particular, in Washington, but not only in it alone - we have all been watching this for several months in a row. And now there almost comes a moment when there is a certain sense of the inevitable, that everything that we have observed has grown into something over time.
The declassified information published in the Washington Post at the beginning of December last year stated that Russia intends to increase the number of its group to more than 100 thousand people, consolidated into battalion tactical groups of ground forces - and here we are. And the president [Joe Biden] said that Russia has 150,000 troops there. This number of 150 thousand people is the most recent data.
Now we are at a stage when - despite the fact that the grouping of Russian troops is largely deployed, it is possible that in the very areas from which they can launch an offensive - there is no longer a period of time during which we can count on any warning. There is no longer a time period when we have the right to expect that we will see any further movements of military formations moving across Russia, for example, as part of military echelons.
At the moment, this is, in fact, the time of notification of an upcoming attack. But if Russia really decides to do something, it could happen any day, that's how I would put it.
Jen Kirby: When you say "attack alerts", what do you mean by that?
Scott Boston: We are really at the stage where the next thing we can really see could be Russia's actions to actually go on the offensive.
In military terms, they won't need to do much else to prepare. They don't literally stand on the border, but they wouldn't stand there either. This does not give them the necessary flexibility in choosing places to cross the border. It is in their interest to create some uncertainty about what they are going to do.
However, this uncertainty stems from the fact that they have a lot of options for possible actions. They can threaten Ukraine from Crimea, as well as along the entire Black Sea coast in the south of the country and especially in the southwest. They have a common border with Ukraine, and in some cases, they are already within the Ukrainian borders - I'm talking, of course, about the Donbass, as well as about the Crimea. They hang from the north, from Belarus, in several directions.
If you ask the question, then only in terms of "What will happen and from what directions?", but not in the sense of "Will it happen or not?"
Jen Kirby: In fact, if Russia wants to start a war, it doesn't need anything else. And from the point of view of forces, and from the point of view of means - now everything seems to be ready.
Scott Boston: Very likely, yes.
In part, it depends on how they plan to do it and in what sequence. If they wanted to do something less, they would have done it long ago. If they wanted to start with air and missile strikes and offensive actions in the information space, for example, by attacking objects of the state administration system of Ukraine and priority military targets, if they wanted to do this before moving to the ground phase of the operation, they would have done it.
There is at least one point - I think this is an important point - that I have heard about from many analysts, and that does not get out of my head. Many have noticed that this time - unlike, say, 2014 [when Russia annexed Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine] - we do not see the information preparation of the Russian population for war.
What does that mean? Well, it is quite possible that, as the US intelligence community has repeatedly pointed out, Russia may try to conduct an operation under a false flag, which may activate public opinion in Russia. They can count on being able to do this quickly and thus potentially achieve both surprise and operational flexibility. If they had spent the last month pumping up the population like "let's do this, let's do that", then there would be no question of surprise. In addition, they would not be able to effectively roll back if they decided not to attack.
Jen Kirby: It makes sense. But what I don't quite understand is what we mean when we talk about the 150 thousand Russian servicemen who are on the border. I have an image of Russian soldiers hanging around in tent camps, but I guess that's not quite true. Can you draw a picture of what this build-up of forces and means looks like?
Scott Boston:From what we have seen, the buildup of the grouping occurred primarily due to formations being transferred from remote areas to the border zone, and only then were permanent readiness formations deployed near the border put forward.
Some of these formations were already deployed in the border area in April last year as part of the previous build-up of the grouping of Russian troops. We saw that they were in one of the garrisons in Yelnya [a Russian city], a few hundred kilometers from the Ukrainian border, not far from the border with Belarus. They were there. We followed them a little bit using data from civil spacecraft remote sensing of the Earth. They were there until recently, but about two weeks ago we saw that Yelnya was suddenly empty. That is, these very different formations that were in that garrison suddenly took off and relocated to the border zone. In part, the new locations were tent cities. This is not necessarily an operational formation; it's just more convenient in the field, because it's closer.
If you have formed a group - and you want it to be ready to go on the offensive - they need to be hidden, dispersed, disguised so that they are harder to detect.
Almost all associations have by now allocated most of the forces and funds that can be expected to be expected. Probably something else is on the way, but now the best Russian formations are beginning to appear, such as formations and units of the Airborne Troops, the 1st Guards Tank Army - they have famous names.
Jen Kirby: 1st Guards Tank Army, did you say?
Scott Boston:This association was formed after the invasion of Ukraine, in 2015-2016.
My colleague recently asked: "How long have the Russians been building up the grouping of troops (forces) on the border with Ukraine?" And I answered him: "For about eight years now" - half seriously, half in jest. But in general, Russia is systematically building up troops on the border. Two combined-arms armies, three divisions in their composition, and by now there are already four. The grouping in the Crimea has been strengthened. A significant part of the Russian troops on the perimeter of Ukraine are formations and units stationed there on a permanent basis; since the invasion of Crimea and the beginning of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, they have been strengthening almost annually.
Jen Kirby:This is said to be "the largest buildup of troops in Europe since the end of World War II." What exactly does this mean?
Scott Boston:The main difference is that this is a fully deployed grouping. In retrospect, all the armies of European states are their own pale shadows of the Cold War era. The group of wax (forces), which the Soviet Union, which was at the head of the Warsaw Pact Organization, had for conducting military operations in the 1980s, was larger than the one that Russia is now deployed along the border with Ukraine.
However, the command "To the cars!" did not sound, the initial areas for the offensive were not occupied, despite the fact that the combat vehicles were fueled and had full ammunition and, in fact, threatened to go on the offensive. There were some terrible moments, such as the incident during the exercise "Able Archer" in 1983, when mutual misunderstanding could very sadly end.
In fact, this is an invasion group. I'm not saying that this invasion will take place for sure. But this is what they have prepared for.
Let me clarify this point. It seems to me that the Russian armed forces and other troops that can act to support them have been ordered to prepare for a large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Regardless of whether they receive such an order or receive an order providing for a more modest course of action, smaller in scale or more fleeting, while maintaining the ability to threaten a larger operation, we do not know what they are going to do in this case.
Jen Kirby:May I ask - well, why? As far as I understand, the Ukrainian army would not actually be able to restrain the Russians. And Russia seems to have concentrated enough forces and means to completely crush Ukraine, although it could potentially do it with much less resources or personnel. I'm just trying to understand why they have increased their grouping to such an unprecedented level?
Scott Boston:The answer to this question has a number of aspects that are worth highlighting.
As I have already mentioned, the armies of all states in Europe are numerically smaller than they were before. The size of the Russian army is 20 percent of the size of the Soviet Army. This has its consequences, because - despite the fact that, in my opinion, there are good reasons to believe that they have a significant advantage over the armed forces of Ukraine in a non-nuclear armed conflict of high intensity - they, the Russians, have a limited human resource. They have a numerical advantage in the overall ratio of forces and means, but they have a relatively small number of armed forces to try to occupy a huge territory with a population of at least 40 million people.
We are assured that the population of Ukraine will rise up and resist. I do not know how many there will be - it is difficult to say in advance. The Russians largely control the issue of the number of the controlled population, because it is up to them to decide which territory they want to seize. But in the long run, it can still be a really difficult task. A lot can go wrong for Russia.
Another point: Russia has moved troops almost from the Pacific coast. Thousands of kilometers of military transportation, mainly by rail. They have deployed combat aircraft, and now we see combat helicopters. They are grouping all these forces. Much of this does not go unnoticed. Those of us who monitor the activities of the Russian military, as it were, are wondering: "Why are we seeing all this?"
I think that's part of the message. I think they do all this with the idea in mind: "Holy shit, if they just give in, and we don't really have to kill everyone to achieve this, then it will be much easier for us." If, according to their calculations, they have a chance that this will work, Russia may expect to receive a double benefit. This could put a lot of pressure on Ukraine, which [Ukrainian President Vladimir] Zelensky, for some reason, generally ignored. If that doesn't work, then they can always attack. Russia should understand that there are many risks inherent in such an operation.
Jen Kirby: What do you mean by that?
Scott Boston:It's one thing when [the US and its NATO allies] say, "Well, we intend to stay away from this case in Ukraine." It's one thing when everyone says very academically: "Oh, well, Ukraine is obviously not part of NATO, so it won't affect us [in terms of sending troops]." Another thing is when bombs cover a village and kill a bunch of innocent civilians, or refugees approach the Polish border, or there are large-scale civilian casualties. At some point, the question will arise: are we really going to continue to sit and watch Ukraine burn and do nothing at the same time?
It will not be very pleasant to impose sanctions. Let's say we impose destructive sanctions. The Russians, of course, will reason like this: "Well, we are doing this for very good reasons, in our opinion; and since we believe that your sanctions are completely unjustified, we will take retaliatory measures against you."
And here is one of the most disturbing moments. An exercise of Russia's strategic nuclear forces is likely to take place in the coming weeks. This is part of the Russian approach: how can we, Russia, be guaranteed to keep NATO from interfering?
And among other things, so as to remind everyone of the available tools in their nuclear arsenal. I don't even want to look at it closely. I don't even want to think about it-the fact that they're going to wave it everywhere.
Jen Kirby: All this is really terrible. You seem to be saying that once a war starts, any idea that escalation can be controlled is unrealistic. But it can be extremely difficult to realize this until the moment when all this happens.
Scott Boston: Uncertainty is present at many levels. We just don't know a lot in terms of the information that will come from Ukraine. Disabling internal communications in Ukraine is a completely predictable thing that Russia may resort to as part of a military campaign. It may take some time before we see videos from mobile phones or people start receiving text SMS messages or phone calls from areas where the Russians have penetrated.
Let's say we start figuring out what's going to happen. This will not be a pure war. I would say that Russia, at best, has the potential of high-precision guided weapons of the early 1990s compared to the West. In this sense, perhaps 10 to 20 percent of their aviation weapons are highly accurate. Most of their firepower is traditional barrel artillery using unguided ammunition. And the satellite navigation system makes these munitions a little more accurate. They have some other tools, such as unmanned aerial vehicles [unarmed aerial vehicles; essentially drones], which should help them be a little faster and more accurate with solving fire tasks with their outdated rocket and barrel artillery. But, in essence, it is a weapon of indiscriminate action. Fighting can start in the midst of the civilian population. Where people live. It's scary.
Scale is another point that we are not fully aware of. We haven't had this kind of high-intensity military action for a very long time, especially between two opposing sides with relatively modern weapons - and certainly not in Europe. Perhaps we have a lot to learn or a lot to relearn, because, in my opinion, people believe that they understand what war looks like - in many cases under the influence of conflicts in which [the United States] participated. But this time everything will be different, and we don't know how it will look "different".
Personally, it's very difficult for me to stay detached from it because I'm just thinking about what it's like to be there. I don't particularly envy the Russian soldiers who will have to do this job. But at the same time, imagine yourself as a Ukrainian soldier or a civilian and try to think about how you are going to defend your home when faced with an enemy who potentially has a huge advantage in long-range weapons, in aviation, has such capabilities in the information field that will "take out" your communication system. I have listed those areas in which Russia has a huge military advantage.
This, apparently, will have the consequence of an asymmetric outcome of the war. And it's not that Russian tankers will be much better than Ukrainian tankers. But close combat in modern warfare is just a steel blizzard of high-explosive fragmentation shells. It's a really aggressive environment for anyone who might end up there. Russia will try to overcome the effect of this factor mainly by increasing the distance of fire damage, and I think they have the tools to largely ensure the solution of this problem. But then, in the confrontation with armed representatives of the population or military personnel who have not laid down their weapons, the Russians may suffer significant losses.
Jen Kirby: It's really hard to stay detached because it just sounds so awful.
Scott Boston:What really worries me is that no one, neither side will benefit from this war.
Jen Kirby: Russia is conducting these military exercises - in the Black Sea and in Belarus. Is it just saber rattling? Or a dress rehearsal? Maybe these teachings are not related to each other; however, in general, for what purpose do they conduct these teachings?
Scott Boston: It is not unusual for them to conduct exercises. Since Sergei Shoigu took over as defense minister in 2013, Russia has returned to what they call sudden combat readiness checks. That is, without advance notice, they withdraw troops into the field and work out the tasks to be performed in wartime. This partly reflects their increased attention to the issue of readiness.
And, as it turns out, a sudden readiness check is, of course, a great excuse to prepare the personnel for something else. In this case, obviously, there is no confidence in the fact that military formations are being transferred from the eastern regions of the country to Belarus as part of a sudden readiness check. Probably, it would be possible to find a place somewhere between Vladivostok and Minsk, on the territory of Russia, to conduct such a check, if they are really driven by the interests of combat training.
So an exercise is being conducted in the Black Sea, through which they can potentially threaten the coast to the east or west of the Crimean Peninsula, especially to the west of it. You probably noticed that they are redirecting additional surface warships from other fleets to the Black Sea. We are talking about several landing ships from other fleets: the Baltic, for example, and so on up to…
Jen Kirby: ... The Arctic?
Scott Boston: That's right. They are probably enjoying the weather at the crossing [in the Mediterranean Sea] after the December Arctic. At the same time, to travel such a long way and only for the sake of learning? I do not know how much one can expect that they will just go back at the end of it.
Jen Kirby:So, my general conclusion from our conversation is that there is very little evidence that Russia has reduced the level of escalation. At least based on your analysis.
Scott Boston:I would very much like to make a mistake, but I really can't point to anything that seems convincing to me. I would really like the level of tension to decrease. For all the above reasons.
It is very difficult to imagine that they will go to all this trouble and get something in return that, in their opinion, does not really mean anything.
Jen Kirby:Well, then, let's say this question: can we get stuck in this terrible confrontation, where Russia threatens war, indefinitely?
Scott Boston:I do not know how pessimistic or optimistic I may seem... But not for years exactly; a few months at most. And then, it seems to be a fair time gap.
Partly for the following reason: at some point it will simply become more problematic to continue to keep the troops where they are now. You bring them food and fuel to ensure their stay in the field. This is a heavier burden; obviously, keeping troops in the field is somewhat more expensive than in permanent locations. But the costs will not come out immediately, but over time.
In addition, much fewer troops have been deployed in a significant part of Russia for decades, and maybe longer. Many destinations in Russia remained undisguised due to the fact that so many were brought to the borders of Ukraine. And then, at some point, the number of military personnel of the spring draft will decrease, and conscripts serve only 12 months. They are not in combat units, but I cannot imagine that along the perimeter of the Russian-Ukrainian border, in Crimea and Belarus, there were no units and units of combat and logistics support without military personnel serving on active duty. I do not know what kind of reason they will come up with to extend their stay in active military service.
If I had to guess what would happen next, I probably shouldn't do it, but I would assume that there would be an artificial creation of an excuse for an invasion or some kind of provocation. When that happens, we'll probably figure out what it is. But I do not know what it will look like. In short, some kind of provocation to justify the use of armed forces. And then the question arises: how large-scale will this application be? How fleeting? Are they trying to deliver some kind of knockout blow that will force the Ukrainian government to quickly surrender? Or will they reach Kiev to isolate it and thereby directly put an end to the regime? It is extremely difficult to imagine any of this.
Jen Kirby:Yes, it's really hard.
Scott Boston: At one time I studied the Russian army. In retrospect, one of the remarkable things that characterizes the use of military force by the Russians is that they were not maximalists. They don't subscribe to a large-scale, long-term occupation. They don't want to tie their hands like that. Also, they usually don't like to show you in advance what they are going to do.
There are a lot of things in this, though, that don't quite work. But in general, it is still difficult to get rid of the feeling that, in my opinion, they have gathered their military to the borders of Ukraine in order to use them in some way; quite likely, in some significant way.
Jen Kirby: Taking this opportunity, I can't help but ask about rasputitsa.
Scott Boston:It will never be superfluous if the earth is frozen, and not muddy. Rasputitsa [obviously, "time without roads"; takes place in the spring from the melting of snow and in the autumn from the rains, and makes everything around swampy] is another thing. Rasputitsa stopped the German army in October 1941: it turned out to be technically unprepared for the invasion of a country where there were practically no paved roads.
The Soviets, and now the Russians, on the contrary, understand the condition of roads and soil. The Russian military, since they mainly operate Soviet-style equipment, are extremely well equipped in terms of highly mobile vehicles with wide tracks that provide them with low ground pressure at high thrust-to-weight ratio. They have an understanding of how to operate in this area.
But rasputitsa is still a thing! A stuck car is quite a thing! That's why we have repair and evacuation vehicles. I don't want to exaggerate the impact of this factor on the campaign, but, of course, it was a problem and remains so in this region. Some areas through which they will pass, invading Ukraine from Belarus, so in general - swamps! They will, of course, be much more passable if the ground freezes over than otherwise.
But if Ukraine can do nothing to stop them, in order to avoid the need for maneuvering by forces and means in conditions of possible impact of enemy aircraft in open terrain, then only rasputitsa will help.
Jen Kirby: What do you expect in the future? We have already heard about February 20 as the date of a possible invasion, because this is the end of the Olympics and the end of the aforementioned exercise in Belarus. But, if not tied to dates, what do you expect in the coming days? Or weeks, if we have them?
Scott Boston:I think we are at the "from day to day" stage. It's hard to predict what will happen next. It is unclear to me what [of their next steps] will be reflected in social networks or will be obvious from the data of the specific reconnaissance of civilian spacecraft.
Again, it's hard to imagine that this situation is being peacefully de-escalated, and it's really unfortunate. But it is Russia in this situation that chooses the time and place for the deployment of military operations.
They can hide a lot, and, in truth, they do it well. Perhaps we were lulled into a false sense of security by watching how it all happened until recently. But as soon as they really go into action, apparently, there will be a lot of points that we don't see right now.
Interviewed by Jen Kirby