The year 2020 will be remembered by Russians not only for the coronavirus pandemic, but also for the beginning of a new wave of destabilization in the post-Soviet space. It is the beginning, because the processes that began in 2020 will continue in 2021. How exactly will this happen?
Until recently, the words "crisis in the post-Soviet space" in 95% of cases meant the next problems in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Yes, there have been periodic situations in other states of the region – for example, in Georgia. However, Ukraine brought the main headache to Russia on its periphery.
But in 2020, the situation has changed. And not only because the Ukrainian problem has become frozen and frozen (Kiev cannot fulfill the Minsk agreements, does not want to break them and enter the war), but also because new, at least no less dangerous for Russian health pains have arisen in the region. Pain that will get worse in the near future.
First of all, we are talking about Armenia, Belarus and Moldova. The irony is that the situation in the last two countries also thaws the Ukrainian problem.
Armenian pains
After the capitulation in the second Karabakh war, Armenia is experiencing a serious internal political crisis. A significant part of the population blames the tragedy on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, whose behavior during the war raises a number of questions. Some accuse him of stupidity, others of outright betrayal, and all together demand the immediate resignation of the prime minister, who until recently was positioned almost as the savior of the nation.
Pashinyan himself does not admit his guilt and is not going to leave – according to him, he is ready to leave the post only following the results of early parliamentary elections, which may be held in 2021. As a result, the society, which is so in need of consolidation to overcome the psychological consequences of the loss of Karabakh, is sliding into a state of civil confrontation.
It would seem that Russia does not care much about internal Armenian squabbles – Moscow generally tries not to interfere in the internal affairs of its allies. However, there may be consequences for Russia.
In the near future, Armenia will face new humiliations due to the defeat in the Karabakh war – the demarcation of the border with Azerbaijan in favor of the latter (for example, in the area of the Sotsky gold deposit), the loss of sovereignty over a number of territories in Syunik, where the road between Nakhichevan and the rest of Azerbaijan will pass, as well as, possibly, the issue of paying reparations, which Baku demands.
And since these humiliations will need to be explained somehow, it is possible that local politicians will try to blame Moscow for everything. All this will cause psychological trauma to the Armenian nation, give Armenians the opportunity to blame someone else for their own mistake made two and a half years ago (when they staged a revolution and brought Nikol Pashinyan to power) - and may lead to an increase in anti-Russian sentiment in Armenia, with the prospect of electing another problematic leader.
Belarusian choice
It would seem that the situation in Minsk is much easier for Moscow than in Yerevan. The mass protests that began in Belarus, related to the dubious presidential elections held in August 2020, did not lead to either the Maidan or the Maidan. The opposition now only has enough to regularly organize races on weekends (when they hold their marches) to race with the riot police. Neither these races nor the sanctions imposed by Europe will lead to the overthrow of the regime of Alexander Lukashenko.
Moreover, a number of processes around Belarus even played into the hands of Moscow. So, until recently, a significant part of Russian society did not like the close, almost fraternal relations between Lukashenko and the new Ukrainian authorities. Someone thought that Batka was just trying to cash in on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict-despite the fact that Russia in this conflict protected not only its own, but also Belarusian society from the Maidan virus. Now, when Ukraine has openly supported the Belarusian opposition with words, sanctions, militants and even (if you believe Lukashenka's words) weapons, relations between Minsk and Kiev are seriously damaged.
Nevertheless, challenges remain for Moscow. First, the effect of "useful" processes needs to be fixed – otherwise it may be short-term. It would seem that the EU sanctions were supposed to put an end to Minsk's attempts to return to a multi-vector policy – but Lukashenko has already said that Belarus will return to it, and that the Russians "should understand"this. Similarly, he is likely to try to mend relations with Kiev to balance Moscow's influence.
Yes, the Maidan did not happen – but the internal political situation in the republic remains difficult. A significant part of society is opposed to Batka, and his administration is unable to win the loyalty of the active and most passionate part of society. The way out of the situation could be a constitutional reform with access to early presidential elections.
In theory, the reform process was supposed to begin at the end of 2020 and end in 2021, and in parallel with it, Russia could form a powerful pro-Russian political force in Belarus (previously, its creation was not allowed by the Belarusian special services). However, the process does not begin-largely because Lukashenko, who got rid of the sword of Damocles of the revolution, does not want to dilute his power. How to push Lukashenka to the right decision, which is necessary for Russia, is still a question.
Moldovan consequences
A difficult situation for Russia has also developed in Moldova, where according to the results of the presidential elections held in 2020, a citizen of Romania and a supporter of the pro-Western course, Maia Sandu, won. After the inauguration, Mrs. Sandu began to solve the main problems of Moldova. For example, on the president's website, the name of the official language of the republic was changed from Moldovan to Romanian (according to Sandu and other supporters of the idea of Moldova joining Romania, the Moldovan language does not exist at all – it is a dialect of Romanian), and in her office there was a flag of the European Union.
These details, of course, do not directly concern Russia – in the end, such a leader was elected by the population of Moldova, so let it suffer with it. However, Ms. Sandu also intends to destabilize the situation in Transnistria, which she will do in 2021 – in particular, to demand the withdrawal of troops and aggravate the situation on the border. And, apparently, to escalate not one, but together with those who also want to strike at this sensitive point for Russia.
A possible option could be holding early parliamentary elections in Moldova and the victory of pro-Russian forces in them. But these elections still need to be won – after all, after the defeat of Socialist leader Igor Dodon in the presidential election, the Moscow-oriented forces are disorganized.
Gevorg Mirzayan, Associate Professor at the University of Finance
