Another spy scandal has affected an employee of a leading Russian airline. An Aeroflot representative in the UK has been arrested on suspicion of high treason. How could this treason have been committed, what information did the accused allegedly have access to – and who should be held accountable along with him?
The Lefortovo court arrested Dmitry Fedotkin, a representative of Aeroflot in the UK, for two months on charges of high treason. Fedotkin does not admit his guilt, is going to file a complaint against the arrest, but is still under 15-day quarantine in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center.
All information on the case is classified, which is stipulated by the law and the special procedure for investigating and considering cases of high treason (article 275 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation). Sources of Russian news agencies claim that Fedotkin collaborated with the British intelligence services and passed them information about the socio-political situation in Russia. At the same time, he did not have access to information containing state secrets. The British foreign office traditionally does not comment on anything related to intelligence activities, and Aeroflot does not exactly disown Fedotkin, but officially claims that it does not know anything about this matter.
Fedotkin is young, he graduated from the Moscow state technical University of civil aviation and has been working for Aeroflot for 16 years. In English, his position is called country manager. The plot of the accusation and the event of the crime are classified, which immediately gave many reasons for speculation and conspiracy. For example, some liberal telegram channels immediately linked Fedotkin's detention to the recent reshuffle of the Russian government. Recall that the new Minister of transport recently became the former head of Aeroflot Vitaly Savelyev.
What can be secret information about the "socio-political situation" in Russia? For example, information about possible changes in power structures – resignations and appointments of key figures in public administration. Leaks on the preparation of important political decisions. Forecasts with reference to the corresponding closed Analytics on the development of public sentiment. It can be assumed that the suspect could have learned something similar from some of his personal acquaintances in the Russian government structures.
In the case of Fedotkin, it is again striking to emphasize the fact that, by the nature of his work, He did not have access to materials containing state secrets.
This fact serves as the basis for the support group to challenge the arrest and prosecution of Roscosmos employee and former journalist Ivan Safronov. This view is naive, but it works in certain circles. If this is the way to approach article 275 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation, then only those who deal with secret papers on a daily basis and gave the corresponding subscription can be charged under it. There is even a systematic group of Moscow lawyers who claim that the very wording of the article contains an extended interpretation of" secrecy " and is therefore bad.
At the same time, the article describes the event of a crime as the transfer to a foreign state or its representatives of information that causes damage to national security, and not only those that are officially marked with a red "secret"stamp. In addition, secret and dangerous information may be obtained from third parties. Accidentally or deliberately. It is not necessary to have direct access to secret information in order to find out something fateful in a private conversation with a secret carrier after the third glass.
Another point: not all information that is dangerous to state interests and security is officially secret. It may simply not have time to "put a stamp" on it bureaucratically, or its value becomes clear after a while. This is a complex detail. Of course, you can say that you can not judge a person after the fact, but the instinct of self-preservation must work here. People are usually very talkative, and often talkative all of a sudden. Better keep quiet. But this is only theoretical reasoning, without specific reference to the Fedotkin case.
The second circumstance that catches your eye: Fedotkin is accused of transmitting information about the socio-political situation in the Russian Federation. That is, not about Aeroflot, not about commercial projects or about a special device of some exclusive aviation device, but about how our politics and society are developing. Of course, we can assume that the British needed to know the political assessments of the regional Manager of Aeroflot. We don't know anything about Fedotkin's identity yet. Maybe he's an extra-class political analyst. On the other hand, people in espionage often put a price on themselves in front of curators, passing off open or garbage information as secret.
In the last five years, American and British intelligence agencies have experienced great difficulties in obtaining information from and to the Russian Federation. Therefore, they are ready to rush to any garbage, even if it is not verified through other channels, which was previously a prerequisite for classifying the degree of reliability of information. A separate line in this situation is Russian foreign employees, since communication with the Agency in Moscow is reduced to a minimum. And it doesn't matter who, as long as the agent is there. And what is the quality of the information provided by them-is the tenth question. On bezrybye and an employee of Aeroflot with a technical education and zero political experience is quite a source of information about the socio-political situation in Russia.
But the simplest explanation, most likely, lies in the area of personal connections of the person involved. By the nature of his job, he didn't have access to classified information directly, but only God knows who he might have crossed paths with because of his position. Who he was friends with. He may have relatives, friends of relatives – this string can be unwound infinitely long, but its two ends, a foreign agent and a secret carrier, necessarily find each other.
The main thing in this story is intent, which is also implied by the Criminal code. "Chatterbox-a godsend for a spy" - this is just for those who are related, friendly, out of braggadocio or under a large glass shares something important with others. People are vain, sometimes they just want to boast that they know something. This is reprehensible, but, alas, not criminally punishable.
There is, of course, an article about the disclosure of state secrets, but it is necessary to catch the hand (or, more precisely, the language) to prove the crime. This can only be achieved through operational development. Specifically, recordings of conversations.
But our courts do not accept audio materials obtained without the consent of the defendant as evidence. That is, "wiretapping" outside the framework of a criminal case is never considered by the court as evidence.
As a result, 99% of cases of disclosure of state secrets relate to written publications, since they can prove the crime. But the intent to commit a crime called "high treason" refers exclusively to the person involved who contacted representatives of another state, and not to the person from whom he initially received the information he was looking for.
Here, of course, there is a contradiction in the issue of fair distribution of responsibility. Someone blurted something out, and the next thing they knew, they were in a beautiful building near Vauxhall bridge on the banks of the Thames. And life isn't fair at all: only the person who passed on the information will be sitting, not the one who blurted it out. Stupidity is as much a source of human misery and misery as evil will. Only the legal responsibility is quite different.
Evgeny Krutikov
