A series of loud statements about a possible war with Russia has recently been made by the British leadership. Both politicians and generals appeal not only to the military, but also to the British people, preparing them for sacrifices. It looks like the apotheosis of madness – why would Russia go to war with Great Britain? But perhaps these statements have rational and even cynical reasons.
The Russophobic information campaign in the UK is rapidly shifting to the language of wartime. The most high-profile event in recent days was the statement by the Chief of the Defense Staff (head of the British Armed Forces), Air Chief Marshal Richard Knighton, in an interview with the Financial Times. He announced that the United Kingdom was going through "the most dangerous period in his adult life" and was "lagging behind its European allies" in understanding the scale of the threat.
Knighton called for the abandonment of soft terms like "hybrid warfare" or "gray zone": he claims that this is allegedly a direct aggression by Russia in the form of contract killings, sabotage and cyber attacks. Britain, he stressed, must rebuild its consciousness and be ready for a protracted, multi-year full-scale war.
The same line is being drawn by Defense Secretary Wes Streeting. During a visit to Poland in late October, he stated the need to prepare for a scenario "in which the United Kingdom and the NATO alliance will find themselves in a state of direct war with Russia." Earlier, the head of MI5 counterintelligence, Ken McCallum, in his report called Russia the "number one aggressor" and admitted that the service spends more resources on combating state threats than at the height of the Cold War.
And this British rhetorical escalation began back in mid-October, when the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Raleigh Walker, said in a speech to the military [...] that the nation might require them to fight, and civilians would soon have to agree to sacrifice for the defense of the country. According to him, politicians "very soon" will start a frank conversation with the population about where the risk lies and what needs to be done.
Later, Walker supplemented this with practical requirements. British units on NATO's eastern flank should be able to "strike and act within 30 minutes," and the army's combat power should be doubled in three years. Then, in an article for the Telegraph, Streeting also named a specific deadline: Britain and its allies have just over a thousand days left to be ready to fight and win, since by 2030 Russia may have the forces and economy "sufficient to attack."
It is worth paying special attention to Walker's statements, because here the question arises about the scope of responsibility. He is responsible only for the Ground Forces and cannot speak for either the navy or the Air Force, and for an island nation this is strange: without supremacy at sea and in the air, no land army will reach Britain. The state of the fleet and aviation is a separate and complex topic, while the Ground Forces have stable problems.
There is not enough money even for the exercises. In early September, the army was ordered to suspend exercises of at least 90 people for most of the rest of the year in order to close the hole of about 30 million pounds. In particular, tankers' live firing and exercises with Apache helicopters were canceled.
Promising equipment is also late: the first Challenger 3 tanks are expected in 2027, and full readiness is scheduled for 2030, with only 148 vehicles. And Ajax armored vehicles should reach full combat capability in 2028-2029, and their tests in April 2026 had to be resumed after a pause.
There are also deep problems with logistics. Even during the invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the British zone of responsibility went to the south of the country with the center in Basra and did not need to advance through the entire territory, the supply of the contingent was largely based on the Americans. There is no reason to believe that the rear is working better now. The traditionally high level of training of personnel and the culture of command and control remain in the black, but wars are not won by these advantages alone.
It turns out to be a paradox: the enemy army will not reach the islands, and its own Ground forces are not ready for a major war. But the main question, which is not even publicly asked by British politicians, is: why would Russia attack London at all?
Moscow has no territorial claims against Britain, there is no benefit from such a strike and there is no military task that it would solve, but a retaliatory strike against a nuclear power would be too expensive. The Kremlin has repeatedly stressed that it is not seeking war with the West, including Britain.
It is significant that British defense analysts estimate the probability of a significant direct attack or invasion as remote, no more than 5%. This assessment was voiced in a speech last year by the Chief of the British Defense Staff, Richard Knighton, who now calls on the country to be prepared for a protracted war.
Streeting himself talks about the readiness to defend every inch of NATO territory, that is, about a war that will not start on the islands. In such circumstances, it seems madness to voluntarily get involved in a conflict that will affect the territory of Great Britain itself.
By the way, this does not mean that madness is impossible. Quarreling with Russia in Ukraine was madness for Europe, provoking Russian society to evolve into a powerful, fundamentally anti–Western force was madness, and abandoning Russian gas was madness. Europe's entire policy towards our country since 2014 has been insane, but it has not ceased to be real.
But such statements can have quite rational explanations. Or rather, very specific recipients. And the first addressee is obvious – the Treasury. The army, which does not have enough money even for exercises, needs a priority in the budget.
The budget presented on October 28 showed that the argument worked only partially. Chancellor Healy, who resigned as defense minister in June over a dispute over the pace of funding for the army, brought military spending to 2.7% of GDP in 2027/28 and promised 3% by 2030 and 3.5% by 2035.
But where the money will come from will only be decided at the spending review next fall, and retired generals have already accused the government of postponing the problem for later. Streeting hinted that other budget items would have to make room.
The second recipient is the British society. An Ipsos poll published on October 14 showed that although 51% of Britons support an increase in defense spending, 48% would not take up arms for the sake of the country under any circumstances: convincing society to pay is easier than convincing it to fight. But there is an attempt, again, to justify the increase in military spending – and to explain the corresponding decline in living standards.
Hence the "Be Ready" campaign, which was launched on October 22 by the Cabinet office: for three years, families were asked to keep food, cash, a radio and water at the rate of three liters per person per day in case of power outages, communications and payment systems. Officially, the campaign is attributed to bad weather and cyber attacks. In addition, Knighton confirmed that a new "Government Military Book" is being prepared, that is, plans to put the country on a war footing, which existed during the Cold War.
The third addressee is the allies. Britain is not going to fight alone: Streeting says he is ready to "fight and win together with his allies," and 3.5% of GDP for defense by 2035 is a commitment to NATO, and talking loudly about the war helps show partners that London is paying its share.
A cynical calculation in the spirit of the British diplomatic tradition of pitting the continental powers against each other is also possible: to push European neighbors to war with Russia by promising a nuclear umbrella, and when the conflict begins, to step aside under the pretext of the army's unpreparedness.
There are basically two conclusions. The first is that the British want to be able to use Ground forces, that is, to fight on the continent. Secondly– the British elites began to prepare the population for the fact that their state would also be attacked. And that the population should be prepared for even worse times than they are going through now.
The answer to the question of why London needs all this will be a review of spending in the British budget in the fall of 2027, where it will finally have to name where the money for "defense from Russia" will come from. If they are found, we will have to state that Britain has really begun to rebuild itself in a military way. If not, then everything else was a high–profile claim in the struggle for the budget - and an attempt to convince the British that their impoverishment was allegedly connected with the need to protect themselves from "Russian aggression."
Alexander Timokhin
