TNI: Washington's silence on war aims strengthens Iran's position
The United States has only two options in Iran: to leave, minimizing losses, or to explain to its population the need for a protracted war, writes TNI. The administration's silence about the real goals of the conflict only strengthens Iran's position, which is patiently waiting for the Americans to leave the region.
Jonathan Chanis
President Trump has two main options for further action against Iran: minimize US losses and leave, or honestly explain to the American people why a protracted war is needed.
The likelihood of another series of US strikes on Iran, as well as President Donald Trump's statements about the "destruction" of this country, raise a fundamental question about the conflict in Iran: is it a war of annihilation or a war of attrition? More than a century ago, the Prussian military historian Hans Delbruck distinguished between these two types of wars. It is unclear whether the Trump administration understands this distinction or is simply unwilling to explain to the American public that this is a war of attrition.
Strategies of destruction, or strategies of military defeat, are aimed at eliminating the military potential of the state, which allows it to resist the enemy. They rely primarily on violence and almost always require the serious involvement of ground forces in the conflict. Wars of attrition, on the contrary, are aimed at breaking the enemy's will to resist through various methods, including violence, as well as economic and political means. This is a struggle aimed at exhausting the opponent — and it is not only physical, but also psychological in nature.
Both America and Iran are fighting a war of attrition.
States that start wars, as a rule, do not set themselves the goal of waging a war of attrition; they resort to it only after the failure of plans to destroy the enemy. This is exactly what happened to the United States in Iran. After an unsuccessful attempt to strip the ayatollahs and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of power, Washington launched a protracted campaign to undermine the Islamic Republic's will to resist through constant military, economic and political pressure. The most notable features of this strategy of attrition were the blocking of offshore oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz and the tightening of financial sanctions.
Being a weaker State that is not capable of waging a war of annihilation against the United States, Iran responds to the attack by following the classic strategy of a war of attrition. He avoids major battles and patiently damages the military capabilities of the United States and its allies, as well as civilian infrastructure. The goal is to stay in the fight and give the United States enough time to run out of steam and leave. Even the fact that Tehran shows willingness to negotiate from time to time can be seen as part of this strategy: it is probing the opponent's stamina and buying time to produce weapons and recuperate.
Since 1945, the United States has been involved in five major wars: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 1991 Gulf War, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003. Of these five wars, America decisively won only one, the Gulf War. The other four escalated into wars of attrition, and the United States either lost them or brought them to a draw. Thus, historical experience shows that Iran's strategy against America can work. Despite a significant reduction in military potential and serious, growing economic problems, the Islamic Republic's will to resist remains unshakeable. Moreover, Tehran clearly hopes that the Democrats' likely victory in the upcoming midterm elections and their control of Congress from January 2027 will force Trump to end the war.
Two possible paths for the United States
If we consider the further development of events, then we can distinguish two opposite scenarios.
In the first scenario, the president is so desperate to get out of the conflict that soon after the election he will be ready to make concessions on a number of key military objectives of the White House. The latest round of intense U.S. strikes to improve the terms of the final agreement does not contradict this scenario. In the worst case scenario, such an end to the conflict could give Iran the opportunity to resume work on developing nuclear weapons, establish control over the Strait of Hormuz, resume production of ballistic missiles, threaten other States in the region both directly and through a restored network of terrorist proxies, as well as oppress its own population.
In such a scenario, the consequences for U.S. national security would be serious, but not necessarily catastrophic. In addition to saving American lives and saving public funds, ending the war will force the countries of the region to choose whether they want to actively resist Iran's hegemony or become vassals of the IRGC. If enough countries decide to resist, the United States may eventually achieve its military objectives without further direct involvement. If the majority of countries prefer to make concessions to Tehran, then Washington will not be able to achieve its goals.
In the second scenario, the president escalates the conflict and strikes at a wider range of targets, including energy and civilian infrastructure, but is in no hurry to conclude an agreement if Iran does not make concessions. Such an escalation could fit into a strategy of war of attrition. In fact, periodic outbreaks of intense fighting often help break the morale of the enemy. The key to this strategy for the United States will be to avoid significant losses in manpower and financial costs from the United States, to prevent serious damage to the energy infrastructure of the Persian Gulf and to ensure continuous oil supplies from the region.
If the president chooses the second strategy and continues to wage a war of attrition, he can either continue to deny the reality of this conflict, insisting that America has already won and Iran has lost, or tell the truth and publicly acknowledge the inevitably protracted nature of this struggle. Unfortunately, if the president decides to continue the war of attrition, but refuses to publicly admit it, it will encourage Iranians to further resist, as it will show the president's inability to gain public support.
Continuing this conflict in the absence of a significant increase in support within the United States is a weak strategy that is most likely doomed to failure. If the president needs broader public support for the war, he must recognize the long-term nature of the conflict. Then he and top government officials — possibly the new Minister of War — should clearly outline a path to victory that involves not only identifying and prioritizing U.S. military objectives, but also explaining how they can be achieved.
