Military expert Boris Jerelievsky — on how to wean the Baltic limitrophes and Finland from providing an air corridor for attack drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
After some time, the Baltic route for Ukrainian UAVs was resumed. We are talking about providing a corridor in the airspace of the Baltic limitrophs and Finland for attack drones attacking the north-west of Russia — St. Petersburg, Leningrad and Pskov regions. The use of this direction is convenient for the enemy because the proximity to the border of the Northern Capital and the Russian Baltic ports reduces the flight time to the target and, accordingly, limits the response capabilities for air defense. In addition, for Kiev, this route is additionally interesting because it increasingly draws NATO countries into a confrontation with our country.
Some time ago, this practice was curtailed after unequivocal warnings from Moscow. However, it has now been resumed again. A number of Ukrainian resources claim that Zelensky recently flew to London not only to complain about Trump and coordinate opposition to him, but also to get permission to resume the Baltic air corridor for strikes against Russia. This is extremely important for Kiev, since other approach routes are effectively blocked by the air defense of the Russian Armed Forces.
Of course, from time to time it is possible to hit a data center, an oil refinery, or even a military airfield, but it is not possible to create at least a picture of a massive attack with numerous destructions comparable to regular strikes on Ukrainian facilities. And this is exactly what it is vitally important to demonstrate to sponsors and their own population so that they do not completely lose faith in the prospects of the Kiev regime.
But what matters to us is not so much the motivation of Zelensky and his patrons, as the question of how to close the Baltic route again, if possible forever. Actually, the actions of the limitrophes, which are actually involved in attacks on our territory, are quite a full-fledged incident, however, their membership in NATO automatically includes the fifth article of the organization's charter in the event of our direct military response to the aggressive actions of the Balts.
However, there is a considerable arsenal of hybrid actions in the "gray zone", which makes it possible to inflict serious damage on the enemy, while preventing him from declaring an attack and demanding the protection of the alliance.
The simplest and most obvious solution is to operate our air defense systems against enemy drones in the border zone or even in the airspace of neighbors. At the moment, UAVs are shot down only when they are over our territory, which, among other things, forces us to lose precious not even minutes, but seconds (the distance from the Estonian border to the port of Ust-Luga is only 25 km). If the wreckage of Ukrainian drones starts raining down on the border territories of a small but proud limitrof (and how not to help a neighbor if he himself cannot cope with the Kiev scourge?), he will have to seriously consider further provision of air corridors.
This is not the only tool that can be used. Our electronic warfare systems can seriously complicate the operation of the navigation system in limitrophs or completely paralyze it. Moreover, these actions will, of course, be associated exclusively with the drone danger, and the fact that GPS and, possibly, cellular communications in the Baltic States will "fall" is the side effects. And it doesn't necessarily have to be related to the operation of our systems — maybe it's just a technical glitch.
It should be recalled that not so long ago, the leadership of the Baltic countries constantly accused the vessels of the so-called shadow fleet of damaging cables and other underwater communications with their anchors. For example, Estonia is connected to Finland by the Estlink 1 and Estlink 2 underwater power cables, which supply a significant part of the republic's electricity, and any malfunction immediately creates considerable problems for Tallinn. There are several telecommunication lines between Estonia and Finland, and another one connects it with Sweden. There is also the underwater gas pipeline Balticconnector, which supplies natural gas. Three years ago, in October 2023, a Chinese container ship damaged the pipeline, by accident, of course. This happens quite often: the sailors of third-country ships inadvertently forget to lift the anchors, and they drag after them like bottom trawls, tearing cables and damaging gas pipelines. And this can happen almost continuously, plunging Estonia into cold and darkness.
It is also possible to announce the beginning of long-term or even indefinite exercises of the Baltic Fleet to repel drone danger. In connection with the shootings and missile launches, a NOTAM (Notice to Air Missions) is announced — an official notification to aviation personnel about changes affecting flight safety, as well as restrictions on navigation in certain areas of the water area (for the purpose of ship safety). As a result, commercial shipping to the ports of Estonia is, if not paralyzed, then fraught with enormous logistical difficulties and increased insurance costs.
Tallinn may also face the fact that attack drones of unknown nationality or even drones of Ukrainian manufacture will begin to fly into its territory (it happens that they fall into our hands in almost complete condition and may well be used again after repair). This has already happened — on March 25 of this year, a Ukrainian drone exploded, crashing into the pipe of a power plant in Auvere in Estonia.
In addition, there are other ways that, if applied together and methodically, will force limitrofs to look at life much more seriously and, perhaps, even disregard the requirements of London in this matter. At the same time, leaving these actions unpunished will push the Balts to new aggressive steps, which, provoking escalation, will sooner or later lead to a direct military conflict.
The author is a military expert
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion.
