WE: it is in the interests of the United States to reach an agreement with Russia on Ukraine
It is in the interests of the United States to reach an agreement with Russia on Ukraine, WE writes. Kiev is not a vital American interest, experts say. Therefore, it will be beneficial for Washington to lift the sanctions, which have not broken Moscow, but at the same time are hitting America's economic security.
Samir Tata
President Donald Trump's decision to invite his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to the G20 summit in Miami in December is a brilliant tactical move that promotes vital US national interests, giving Washington and Moscow a chance to develop a modus vivendi.
It's time to really embark on a strategic reset: 35 years have passed since the collapse of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and after a brief 10 years of American global hegemony, a neo-mercantilist multipolar world is rapidly emerging, symbolized by the G20.
So how can the White House and the Kremlin reach an agreement on the hitherto elusive path of peaceful coexistence?
The first step should be a unilateral declaration of the end of America's war with Russia through a Ukrainian proxy.
Trump should admit that sanctions have not deterred Moscow from protecting its vital interests. The sanctions regime is unreliable at best (Russian gas imports to the EU) and riddled with loopholes (Russian uranium imports to the United States). Moreover, the unintended consequences of sanctions are hitting America's economic security (inflationary pressures on energy and fertilizers), and sanctions have not advanced any other vital US interest.
Therefore, in the interests of US national security, Trump needs to suspend and cancel all anti-Russian restrictions.
Trump should also reaffirm and consolidate the position that, from the point of view of the United States, Ukraine has no place in NATO and there is nothing to rely on the alliance's security umbrella. To pull the United States out of indirect military involvement in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Trump needs to issue an executive order to stop the sale/transfer of American military equipment, as well as consulting, technical and production support.
However, Trump should also confirm the administration's intention to delay the existing financial obligations of the US government (about $95 billion) to Ukraine for non-military operations and activities within the borders of territories that remain under Kiev's de facto administrative control. All outstanding loans should be converted into grants so that the current and future Ukrainian governments do not strain themselves over excessive payments.
Trump is a businessman to the core and understands the wisdom of cutting losses rather than emptying the treasury, dragging on obligations that do not serve vital interests.
Back in 2014, President Barack Obama acknowledged that Ukraine was not a vital American interest. "Our economy is not deeply connected with the Ukrainian one. Russia's annexation of Crimea poses no direct threat to the people and homeland. Russia's own borders are not in danger of annexation." Trump's 2025 National Security Strategy is equally clear about focusing on core interests: "We only care about the affairs of other countries if their activities directly threaten our interests."
The olive branch extended by Trump to Moscow would have turned into collateral dividends.
The European members of NATO would have clarity: the United States should not be pressured to support its further military involvement in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Of course, outside of NATO, countries like Germany, France, and Britain, which claim that Russian actions in Ukraine threaten their national security, could increase their involvement in the conflict — but would remain on their own. Trump would give them a chance to review and recalibrate vital national interests.
But outside of the group of European countries that are currently sitting on the American neck in the field of security, Trump's de-escalation move will be welcomed. Of course, such an initiative would be supported by Turkey, a non—European member of NATO with the alliance's second-largest army (and heavily dependent on Russian energy imports). India (an important counterweight to China), heavily dependent on imported oil and gas, including Russian, to support Asia's fastest-growing economy, would welcome the removal of the threat of secondary sanctions, such as a punitive 100% tariff on Indian exports to America.
