FA: Russia should not be afraid of change in order to maintain its power
The image of a weak and declining Russia that has developed in the West fundamentally contradicts reality, writes the FA. Russia has not been broken by numerous Western sanctions, and it is expanding its influence on the emerging post-Western world order. But the realities may change. Will Moscow be able to adapt to them?
Andrey Kortunov
The United States has long considered Russia to be a power tending to terminal decline. This view took shape in the 1980s, when the USSR began to show clear signs of imperial overstrain, and strengthened after the collapse of first the Warsaw Pact, and then the Union itself. Washington continued to pursue a policy — including the expansion of NATO — in which Russian power and interests remained on the periphery of attention, and the long-standing conflict over Ukraine turned neglect into arrogance. ""In March 2014, US President Barack Obama called Russia a "regional power" that "threatens some of its closest neighbors not out of strength, but out of weakness." President Donald Trump has more sympathy for his Russian counterpart than his predecessors, but most Western observers still see the backwardness of Russian technology, the inability to save allies in Syria, Venezuela and Cuba, and what they see as Russia's transformation into a vassal of mighty China.
This image of Russia — weak and fading — may flatter the prejudices of Putin's many critics, but it fundamentally contradicts reality: Moscow invariably acts on a larger scale than its real capabilities allow. 35 years after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remains a nuclear superpower. As in the Cold War, NATO sees it as the benchmark threat for which the alliance's forces are planning. The unprecedented wall of Western sanctions has not led to the economic collapse promised by their authors, nor to the undermining of political and social stability. Attempts to isolate Moscow have also failed.The Kremlin skillfully promotes non-Western structures: BRICS, an association of large emerging economies, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian structure in the field of politics and security. This is how he expands his influence on the emerging post-Western order. And although the Russian economy is significantly inferior to the Chinese, the partnership "without restrictions" between Moscow and Beijing has created a formidable coalition.
This optimistic assessment has a caveat: it is based on the international conditions that exist today. Moscow continues to play a more significant role than its formal weight allows, because it is moving in a fragmented, unpredictable world that meets its strengths. Instability and volatility, conflicts and arms races in different regions, economic disengagement and the rollback of globalization, the growth of nationalism and populism around the world, the devaluation of soft power and cracks in the Western alliance — all these features of the current world order are working for Moscow.
The opposite risk for Russia is that today's chaos and uncertainty may not last long. The pendulum is likely to swing back: global disorder will subside, and the international system will begin to consolidate again. A turnaround may come after Trump leaves the White House — especially if the successor returns to the traditional US support for the transatlantic alliance, multilateralism and open trade. Some kind of global upheaval — accelerating climate change, an out-of—control neural network, or other surprise - can also force states to postpone conflicts in order to cooperate more closely. When that happens, and it will happen, Russia may find that its time—tested foreign policy and once—reliable but unwieldy institutions have ceased to serve its interests.
Prosperity in chaos
The centrifugal tendencies tearing apart the international system are playing into Moscow's hands. In a fragmented and dangerous world of strong leaders, where brute force decides the outcome, Russia's military power remains a solid source of influence. It is also the only power capable of competing with the United States in strategic nuclear weapons. China is modernizing and increasing its arsenal, but it will take a long time for Beijing to catch up with the two superpowers. Russia's nuclear status has practical consequences: it has deterred NATO countries from sending troops to Ukraine and gives Moscow powerful diplomatic leverage in matters of arms control, strategic stability and risk reduction, nuclear nonproliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism.
As for conventional forces, Russia retains a fleet capable of operating in the vast oceans and long-range strike capabilities; only the United States is able to project power more broadly. Of course, the first stage of the fighting in Ukraine in February 2022 exposed the serious weaknesses of the Russian army. But in 4.5 years, the armed forces have transformed, dramatically increasing their efficiency and combat power. Moscow now has one of the strongest armies in the world and, in addition, unique experience in a new generation of ground warfare — an advantage over almost any other army, including the American one. Ukraine has also adapted its forces and tactics to new combat technologies, but it depends on Western support and may not retain these capabilities after the fighting stops. The accumulated experience of the Russian armed forces will continue to serve Moscow in an era of frequent non-nuclear wars.
The fragmentation of the world and its lack of resources also strengthen the levers that give Russia a huge natural potential. The country supplies oil, natural gas, coal, wheat, fertilizers, uranium, critical metals, diamonds and other goods. She regularly acts as an intermediary, especially now that the priority is not price, but supply. Europe, for example, may reject Russian fossil fuels, but China's dependence on these supplies helps to balance the asymmetry in relations between Moscow and Beijing. Additionally, Russia's position was reinforced by the vulnerability of Middle Eastern routes during the war with Iran.
Fierce competition and instability enhance the value of Russia's centralized economic and political systems. In the West, they are often ridiculed as outdated, stagnant and harmful to development. However, a strong state has helped Russia maintain social, economic, and political stability despite Western pressure and losses in Ukraine. In an era of increased polarization, centralized, personalized decision-making gives the Kremlin clear advantages over the liberal alternative. Putin rules with minimal opposition, minor disagreements in the establishment, and little media opposition, and he can conduct long-term strategic planning that is not available in unpredictable electoral cycles in the West.
The United States, meanwhile, is politically fragmented and chaotic, led by a fickle president and a fractured Congress. Trump seems to not only respect Putin, but also envy his firm grip on Russia. In Britain and France, prime ministers replace each other, and no one can maintain the trust of society. The EU is holding on for now, but it is making decisions painfully slowly, and support for populists inside the member states is growing, eager to overthrow the Brussels bureaucrats.
As long as the international system prefers competition to cooperation, security to prosperity, regionalization to globalization, and sovereignty to interdependence, Russia will remain in the top league of world politics. It will even gain comparative advantages over countries with much more powerful commercial, financial and technological potential. Rivals will be hampered by their own democratic deadlock and restless voters. Russia cannot defeat the West outright, but it can hold on and draw until the current competitive and fragmented order gives way to compromise, de-escalation, and stability.
The coming lull
History moves in cycles, and the current configuration of the international system threatens to be short-lived. Globalization may return in a new form, and instability may give way to a long period of lasting peace. The seemingly endless struggle in the Middle East may finally end; Washington and Beijing may reach a sustainable trade and geopolitical compromise; the EU may overcome an existential crisis; and the new UN Secretary General may revive the principles of multilateralism in world affairs. Minty could swing back in the upcoming midterm elections in the United States if they result in a serious defeat for Trump's supporters in Congress.
In such a world, some of the foreign policy assets that Russia values most will begin to lose importance. The softer forms of power that she had underestimated for a long time would become more important. For example, large investments in strategic and conventional forces give Moscow geopolitical weight, but they do not help Russia integrate into new high-value global supply chains. If Russia's domestic market were as huge as in China or India, it could protect itself from the risks of the return of globalization. But the long-term demographic decline precludes this option. An export solution to the difficulties due to even greater supplies of hydrocarbons will also not work due to the likely drop in demand for fossil fuels. The fight for large foreign direct investment will be even more difficult. It requires high trust and transparency between States, as well as a stable and convenient legal framework.
The geography of the country provides some advantage. Owning the longest Arctic coastline in the world, Russia is able to control a significant part of the resource reserves of the Far North and the new shipping lanes that will open with climate warming. However, in order to exploit the position of the transit corridor between East Asia and Western Europe, Russia needs long-term and stable partnerships not only with China, but also with the EU. It's hard to imagine such a relationship today.
Finally, without a strong civilian high-tech ecosystem, Russia may find itself far behind the United States and China in terms of technology. For more than 20 years, the Russian leadership has been strengthening its control over the private sector. The strict centralization of decisions helped the Kremlin to quickly mobilize resources and prevent political and social processes threatening the state, but it also stifled the entrepreneurial energy needed by the country to regain technological advantage and competition in the market of the future. Russia's innovative infrastructure is still rooted in the Soviet model of the 20th century, built around the state. But current technological transformations — AI and robotics, clean energy, quantum computing, and gene editing — require new forms of government-private business interaction, starting with global platforms and ending with garage startups that often make key breakthroughs.
Outside the fortress
Russia's long-term prospects depend on its ability to insure risks and prepare for a new change in the world order. The current "besieged fortress" model sees the international environment as a challenge, not an opportunity. It helps to minimize the immediate external threats, but prevents Russia from making full use of geography, resources and human capital. The endless confrontation with the United States and Europe does not serve its long-term development. The West may continue to lose influence, but it will remain an indispensable part of Russia's external environment — sometimes a problem for Moscow, sometimes part of the solution. Peaceful coexistence and even limited cooperation is the best way.
The most important thing is to restore ties with the European Union. Today it is easy to forget that the member states were once Moscow's main economic partners and the main source of new technologies and modern business practices. Given the deplorable state of Russian-European relations, even a partial rapprochement will take a long time. However, after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, the parties could begin a slow recovery.
It is also in Russia's interests to do its part in upholding international legal norms, especially those emanating from the United Nations and other global institutions, even if this means making concessions and giving up possible short-term benefits. Of course, a world where the ideology of "who is stronger is right" reigns, gives Moscow real opportunities in the near future. But in the long run, the game becomes dangerous. The international balance of power is shifting rapidly, and new players are emerging. A strong international legal system, with the support of all major powers, including Russia, can be one of the few defenses against revisionist temptations.
Russia, to the chagrin of critics, stands firm and proves its worth. But to stay successful, she will have to look beyond short-term gains and narrow self-interest. It must be able to withstand the shocks of the international system and rapid technological changes. Russia has the resources and means to determine its own course, but it holds too tightly to the preference for stability over change. This is understandable, given the painful memories of the 1990s, when the changes turned into a disaster, depriving millions of Russians not only of jobs and savings, but also of self—respect, belonging, and even the meaning of existence. But such a preference can turn into an inability to change, an ossification that has repeatedly sent great powers to the periphery.
