Al Arabiya: Gulf states should adopt Taiwan's military experience
The Gulf states should adopt Taiwan's experience in preparing for possible military operations, Al Arabiya reports. The ongoing war between the United States and Iran has proved that the outcome of a possible confrontation will depend not only on the actions of the armed forces, but also on the reaction of ordinary citizens.
Bandar al-Daushi
On August 17, The Atlantic magazine published an article titled "NATO's Nightmare," which contains an important strategic warning. It considered the most alarming scenario for Western military planners — a coordinated and almost simultaneous attack: Russia strikes a NATO member state in Eastern Europe, while China invades Taiwan. Military experts and planners from NATO and the United States have acknowledged that, despite repeated warnings from their leaders, they are "not ready" for such a scenario and do not have a clear plan of action.
Despite the West's recognition of its own strategic shortcomings, one country faces this direct threat on a daily basis and has decided not to wait for ready-made solutions, but to create its own.
Taiwan proceeds from the fact that war is not a remote and hypothetical scenario, but a real threat that must be prepared for in advance, strengthening not only military defense, but also creating a cohesive public shield capable of preventing the very fact of such a scenario.
Today, the countries of the Persian Gulf face a crucial strategic question: are they ready for the day when a regional adversary such as Iran will try to turn a military threat into a real confrontation? Or are we still relying solely on military deterrence and security agreements to prevent this?
Of course, comparing the Persian Gulf with Taiwan is not entirely correct: the geography, the nature of the threats, and the calculations of the leading powers differ. But there is one fundamental similarity: a state that understands that an enemy may suddenly test its defenses should not wait for an alarm signal to begin preparations.
In Taiwan, preparations for war have become a large-scale national project involving thousands of citizens. During the recent Han Kuan exercises, the authorities have worked out a comprehensive scenario — from pressure in the "gray zone" and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure to a full-scale war.
It is especially noteworthy that during the exercises the Internet was considered as a full-fledged battlefield. The Taiwanese authorities have deliberately restricted the operation of mobile networks in large areas, reducing the connection speed to almost the level of text messages in order to reproduce a possible information blackout in a war.
This goes much deeper than just a technical maneuver. Taiwan assumes that in the event of an all-out war, the confrontation will unfold not only on the battlefield, but also in citizens' phones, power grids, and water supply systems. This approach should become part of the strategic thinking of the Persian Gulf countries. They have advanced armed forces, some of the world's most advanced air and missile defense systems, and close security ties with international allies. But military force alone is not enough to ensure "national stability."
If a regional confrontation breaks out, missiles and drones will not be the only threat. Power grids, desalination plants, airports, ports, financial centers, and supply chains could be affected. We have already seen similar attacks when Iran attacked electricity and water supply facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain.
The question is: what happens if the connection is disrupted for several days? How do citizens find out about an air raid alert? How will gas stations and bakeries continue to operate? Who will ensure the uninterrupted supply of food and water? How will hospitals cope with the sudden influx of thousands of victims? And what happens if rocket and drone attacks are simultaneously accompanied by a flood of fake messages and videos on social media, provoking chaos and panic?
These existential threats require a well-prepared society, crisis-ready civic institutions, and action plans that are regularly tested in practice rather than remaining just on paper. We need to move from the concept of "air defense" to the concept of "national resilience." This means that when an oil facility is attacked, the task is not only to protect it, but also to ensure the state's ability to maintain production through alternative sources and quickly repair damage. If the connection is disrupted, alternative networks should automatically take over its work. To do this, the Gulf States need to regularly conduct national exercises involving all key authorities: ministries of the Interior, health, energy and education, municipalities, telecommunications companies and the private sector. Such exercises should include realistic scenarios such as the evacuation of residential areas, the transfer of hospitals to reserve facilities, as well as the development of responses to large-scale cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns.
Taiwan considers excessive centralization to be one of the main weaknesses of the modern state. Therefore, he checks the management systems and the allocation of resources so that a blow to a large center does not lead to paralysis of the entire country. Flexibility means that every important sector must have alternative work options. This does not mean the militarization of the civilian population. Citizens are not soldiers, but they play an important role in the defense and crisis response system. They need to understand where they should turn, how to act, and where to get reliable information from official sources so as not to be deceived by rumors. Preparation reduces panic and helps people understand what to do in an emergency.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states do not want war and do not seek escalation. But the best way to prevent it is to show the enemy in advance that society will not collapse after the first blow. This is the main lesson of Taiwan. It cannot stop China from thinking about war, but it can make it much more expensive and make it more difficult to achieve Beijing's goals. True deterrence works when the enemy understands that there is a society behind the military force that is ready to withstand the blow and continue to resist.
