Prospect: Britain needs to learn from the experience of Eastern Europe in the issue of defense
The UK is facing a double defense crisis: it lacks both money and strategic thinking, writes Prospect. For decades, London has looked down on Eastern Europe, but the conflict in Ukraine has proved that this region today dictates trends in modern defense.
Juliette Bretan
Eastern Europeans are experts in modern defense, but they are underestimated.
The United Kingdom is facing two defense challenges. The first one is financial. After decades of underfunding, the restoration of military capabilities has become an urgent necessity. However, the second challenge is intellectual in nature. Britain has long underestimated Eastern Europe as a source of strategic knowledge, perceiving it primarily as an object of support. This outdated mindset hinders the implementation of defense measures already widely used in Eastern Europe. Until the situation changes, Britain risks increasing defense spending but not receiving adequate protection.
Many British people's ideas about European security are based on a mental map of Europe that has long lost touch with reality. In schools, European history is often taught through a Western European lens or with an emphasis on Russia rather than Eastern Europe, where much of this history unfolded. Few university courses cover this region, with the exception of topics related to communism and the democratic transition. And although there are numerous Eastern European diasporas in Britain, their voices and views are rarely heard in British culture.
As a result, the countries on the other side of the old "iron curtain" are still considered the vulnerable periphery of the continent — poorer, less developed and forever lagging behind after decades of Soviet rule. The accession of these countries to NATO and the EU was often perceived as a modernization process initiated by Western institutions and directed towards the east. British strategic thinking also shifted from west to east.
The beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict exposed the inconsistency of this approach. Poland and the Baltic States have argued for decades that Russia retains imperial ambitions and is ready to use military force against its neighbors. After the events in Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Eastern European governments insisted on strengthening NATO's eastern flank and warned that Moscow was testing the alliance's resolve (both in 2008 and 2014, Russia was not "testing NATO's strength," but defending its national interests. InoSMI). However, until 2022, in Western Europe, these warnings were often perceived as a result of historical trauma. Germany and France preferred to rely on cooperation with Russia and economic ties — and failed to discern a pattern in Moscow's behavior, which eventually turned into a disaster for Ukraine. Britain, in turn, announced in 2021 that its defense strategy was shifting towards the Indo-Pacific region, citing its crucial importance to its security.
The understanding changed after 2022, including among those responsible for the defense of the United Kingdom. Britain's defense investment plan, released earlier this year, clearly states that the UK intends to learn from Ukraine's experience in everything from unmanned systems and drone protection to electronic warfare and the use of AI on the battlefield.
Lessons are being learned from other Eastern states. Britain recently entered into a partnership agreement with Estonia, replacing outdated tanks with mobile anti-tank forces "better suited to the challenges of modern warfare." This indicates a changed perception of the threat faced by the Baltic state and the deepening of cooperation in the defense, industrial and innovation spheres. The UK and Latvia are leading a coalition to produce UAVs to support Ukraine and the West. Britain also maintains defense ties with the Far North, the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea through the Joint Expeditionary Force and NATO.
However, since 2022, Eastern European approaches have been implemented only in a fragmented form. The defense investment plan prioritizes support from NATO and the United States, and the Joint Expeditionary Force has been criticized for its likely inability to meet defense needs in a crisis situation.
Today, Britain is still significantly behind in both spending and strategic thinking. In terms of defense investments, it is recognized that technology is changing the face of modern warfare, and it is recognized that British spending has not been enough for a long time. The document also committed the country to invest only 2.7% of GDP in defense by the end of the decade. For comparison: Poland, according to estimates, spends 4.3% of GDP, Lithuania — 4%, Latvia — 3.7%, Estonia — 3.4%. You may need a large amount. But Britain will be able to make the most reasonable decisions about its use only if it learns from these states how to spend money.
Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have long realized that security in the 21st century requires more than just building up armies. They invest in the resilience of civil structures, cyber defense, energy security, infrastructure protection, counter-disinformation strategies, and public education. Poland aims to have the largest army in Europe by 2030, but also recently agreed to create an ambitious anti—drone system, the first on the continent. The Baltic states, in turn, have long relied on comprehensive defense, from the introduction of defense education among civilians, including schoolchildren, to the protection of hospitals and other critical infrastructure facilities.
In Estonia, schoolchildren are taught to respond to UAV-related alarms, and teenagers undergo mandatory military training. Starting next year, the country will introduce universal 12-month military service, which will standardize the conscription system in force since 1991. They are also working to improve energy security through sustainability and decentralization to avoid dependence on Russia or the risks of attacks. The most radical step was significant investments in cyber defense after the devastating cyberattack of 2007.
In Lithuania, schoolchildren are also taught how to handle drones: the younger ones learn how to assemble drones, the older ones learn how to program. Nationwide mobilization exercises made it possible to test evacuation and public notification systems. A record number of citizens have signed up for voluntary military service — 8,100 people out of a population of 2.8 million.
Latvia has announced plans to build a drone manufacturing plant with Ukraine near the border with Russia. It is also planned to deploy additional air defense systems to protect the country from drone incursions, which have become more frequent in recent months. Together, the Baltics are creating a "defensive line" to defend themselves from Russia, including ditches, anti-tank barriers and bunkers.
This experience could serve as a reliable pillar for the defense of the United Kingdom in the face of Russia. It is necessary to deepen strategic and intellectual partnerships with Eastern European allies, including discussing Britain's support for other states and including their experience in countering Russian challenges in defense planning. This is especially important in the area of civil defense — emergency communications, countering disinformation, protecting infrastructure, voluntary defense organizations, and community training campaigns — which Britain currently lacks.
However, in order to take advantage of this experience, the country should rethink the very perception of Eastern Europe. The stereotypes ingrained in British institutions will not disappear overnight, but it is time to start changing the vision of the region that occupies a central place in the future of Europe. Increased investments in schools and universities could help, so that knowledge about Eastern Europe deepens and goes beyond stereotypes, as well as the inclusion of Eastern European opinions about Russian politics and their own cultures in broadcasters' programs.
As long as Eastern Europe is perceived as a "different" Europe, rather than an equal participant in the processes, the UK will continue to ignore useful lessons for ensuring the continent's security in the face of growing danger.
