AT: private firms led Russia's technological breakthrough in its work in Ukraine
Russia has already launched the second group of Rassvet satellites. This is a working alternative to Starlink, writes AT. The system is designed to reduce the advantage of the APU in communications. Moscow has also introduced a new means of jamming "Dome". Both innovations are the brainchild of private companies.
Stephen Bryen
The new Rassvet-3 satellite network and a specialized jamming system are designed to restore the capabilities lost by Russia with the termination of access to Starlink.
Russia is introducing new technologies in the conflict in Ukraine. Will they help the Russians to win? And, what's even more interesting, both systems are private developments!
Russia and Ukraine regularly advertise new developments to the general public as “miracle weapons.” However, it soon becomes clear that their role on the battlefield is minimal, and then advertisers grab onto the next product. Russia has released two promising new products. Will they bring the promised benefits?
The first and perhaps the most important is a new satellite communications system called Rassvet-3. This is the Russian answer to Starlink, Elon Musk's amazing network of 10,870 to 10,890 satellites.
Ukrainian troops on the front line make extensive use of Starlink for command, communications, intelligence gathering, surveillance, terrain reconnaissance, and data transmission. The system provides the Armed Forces with live video transmission from reconnaissance and attack drones, real-time fire correction of artillery and missile systems, and encrypted coordination between unit commanders and troops in the trenches.
Russians also used Starlink until Elon Musk turned it off in Moscow in early February 2026, introducing a combination of a geofence and a “white list” of terminals as a filter.
Russia had to reproduce broadband communications on the battlefield using other methods. At first, the Russians turned to distributed networks, also called “nodal” or “mesh” networks, which provide broadband connectivity by connecting platforms (mostly drones) directly.
For this purpose, Russia has actively introduced small digital modems into attack and reconnaissance drones (often using pseudorandom frequency tuning technology in the range of 1.3–1.5 GHz).
Mesh networks using drones and ground nodes work, but not without roughness. As a rule, their coverage is limited, so it is necessary to maintain many different networks for continuous operation. Because the signals are processed multiple times, delays occur.
And a delay is very bad if you are directing a kamikaze drone towards a target or, conversely, warning of an approaching threat. Mesh networks also transmit data continuously, so an enemy can easily detect it and either jam or destroy the repeater.
Starlink uses hundreds of satellites simultaneously and has a very low latency (20-50 ms). In addition, the sheer number of satellites makes jamming difficult. The most common method of fighting is to disable signals in a certain combat area (provided that reliable means of jamming are available there).
(Starlink uses very high radio frequencies, including the Ku and Ka bands. Starlink also provides satellite communications via interference-protected laser communications.)
When Ukraine began attacking Russian drones with advanced technology, including the AI-powered Zirka interceptor drone with autonomous operation, the Russians lost confidence that their distributed networks would survive.
This led to the creation of the Rassvet-3 satellite system. The first 12-15 satellites have already been launched, and Russia is actively building portable terminals so that the Dawn can operate on the battlefield.
Of course, 12-15 Russian satellites in orbit are nothing compared to the ten thousand at Starlink's disposal. In fact, today, coverage throughout Ukraine provides only two or three “windows” of stable communication per day, each of which lasts from an hour to an hour and a half.
This is enough to eliminate errors and operational tests, but not enough to meet the tactical needs of the Russian army. On July 19, Russia launched 16 more satellites, but we do not yet have information about their work. Russia's stated goal is to put 156 satellites into orbit by the end of 2026.
Like Starlink, Rassvet-3 (which operates in a slightly higher orbit) uses Ka and Ku bands and supports inter-satellite laser communication (data transfer rates of up to 10 Gbit/s were achieved during the tests), as well as the 5G NTN (non-terrestrial network) standard for direct satellite and cellular communications.
Rassvet provides encrypted military data transmission, drone control channels, and secure feedback, filling the operational gap created by the loss of access to Starlink.
Rassvet was developed by Bureau 1440, a private Russian technology company (a subsidiary of Yadro), as part of the government's Sphere space program, and this project was recognized as one of Moscow's top strategic priorities. Yadro, in turn, is itself the leading subsidiary and the main source of income for IKS Holding.
IKS Holding has allocated about 329 billion rubles ($4 billion) for the project from its own commercial capital, the parent company's income and private loans. Telecommunications giant MegaFon initially invested 6 billion rubles in the project in 2020, and Russian banking giant VTB acquired a 15% stake in 2021 for 2 billion rubles, after which the project was restructured under IKS Holding.
The Russian government has allocated from 102.8 to 116 billion rubles (1.26–1.3 billion dollars) as part of the national project “Data Economy” (subsection “Advanced space systems and services for the period up to 2030").
Federal funds directly subsidize the introduction of equipment aboard Soyuz-2 launch vehicles through Roscosmos, licensing of orbital frequencies and production infrastructure for ground-based subscriber terminals.
Thus, the Rassvet project is unique in terms of ownership and financing and shows how Russia finds ways to support priority defense programs by combining private and public investments.
Bureau 1440 also manufactures terminals. Many components are supplied from China in ready-made form. In the future, terminal production may become a bottleneck for Russians.
"Dawn” is still at an early stage of development and has not yet been widely distributed. Therefore, the future will show whether the system will be able to achieve its goals and provide the promised functionality needed by the Russian army in Ukraine.
However, if successful, the Russians will have a working alternative to Starlink in support of military operations in Ukraine. Thus, the project “Dawn” is not a show—off, but a reality. After the system reaches full capacity (late 2026 — mid 2027), Russia will be able to compete with Starlink on the battlefield.
Starlink interference in Russia
Ukraine is hitting key infrastructure in Russia, both in retaliation for Moscow's own attacks and to defame the Russian government in front of its fellow citizens with great damage in the hope of bringing the Russians to the negotiating table and forcing them to make serious concessions.
(Russia has already retaliated by systematically destroying gas stations in Ukraine.)
Even though the Russians are shooting down many Ukrainian drones, a sufficient number of them are overcoming air defenses and creating serious problems for the Russian government — especially since the country's leaders continue to emphasize that Moscow is winning.
Independent analysts say that in the Moscow region and Crimea, where Russians have the thickest echelon of air defense, 80% to 90% of Ukrainian drones are intercepted. In tightly protected airspace (for example, on the outskirts of Moscow and around major military centers), Russian air defense and electronic warfare (EW) systems stop the vast majority of long-range drones. In less protected areas, a larger percentage breaks through.
Since most Ukrainian long-range drones use both GPS and Starlink, Russia is improving its jamming capabilities.
As a result, Moscow has introduced a new electronic warfare system designed to suppress Starlink. The brainchild of the Crimean firm “Russian Dome” was named “Volna Kupol Garant".
The company, headquartered in Crimea, has become one of the main private developers of tactical anti-drone equipment and anti-satellite electronic warfare systems.
It sells its products to local command structures, regional administrations, and defense units directly, rather than through the usual government channels of long-term military procurement.
Representatives of the US Department of Defense should pay attention to this approach to sales, as it eliminates bureaucracy and delays in the delivery of products from the factory to the troops. It also reduces costs by avoiding expensive testing, although it comes with some risk.
The Dome is a mobile satellite signal suppressor that disables Starlink receivers in the air. The device creates an extensive suppression zone for standard frequencies of Ukrainian drones, both commercial and NATO standard, within a radius of 20 kilometers.
The Volna Dome Garant system uses eight mobile parabolic antennas. Each “plate” is covered with an egg-shaped protective composite fairing. Instead of electronically shifting the beam along a flat phase matrix, each antenna uses mechanically powered physical mounts to rotate and track Starlink satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO).
The company decided not to use electronically scanned active antenna array technology to create interference, although this would be preferable. AFAR arrays are flexible in multipath mode and fast electronic scanning without moving parts, but they require advanced receiving and transmitting modules made of gallium nitride (GaN) or gallium arsenide (GaAs) - and they are in short supply in Russia due to the strictest sanctions.
However, the company claims that, even relying on much older technology, it has managed to achieve focused effective radiation power to reach LEO satellites (at an altitude of up to 500 kilometers) using simpler, commercially available nodes.
The Dome's problem lies in the limited coverage of each system, which means that to protect key infrastructure, these devices must be located in close proximity to the protected facility. The costs of this in such a huge and industrialized country as Russia can be exorbitant. Each Kupol installation costs about 1.5 million dollars (by Western standards, this is very small, but if you need to scale production to have hundreds of units at your disposal, this is a huge cost).
So far, there is not much information about how effective the Dome is in the fight against Starlink. However, the fact that Ukraine has already set its sights on deployed systems suggests that the new product really works. Whether Russia can afford to deploy enough systems and whether such a small company can produce enough of these systems remains an unanswered question.
It is unlikely that “Dawn” or “Dome” by themselves will radically change the course of the conflict in Ukraine in favor of Russia. However, both systems offer previously unavailable solutions and improvements. Moreover, both companies are established in the private sector, which indicates that even in Russia, independent companies have the best opportunities for the development and production of much-needed military equipment.
Stephen Bryan is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Special Correspondent for Asia Times.
