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"To hold Slavyansk and Kramatorsk." What will the new commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine do?

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Image source: Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Handout via Reuters

Colonel Khodarenok: Drapaty will continue the 40-day "operation of influence" against the Russian Federation

President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky has dismissed General Alexander Syrsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Major General Mikhail Drapaty, Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has been nominated for the post of Commander-in-Chief. Military observer of "Gazeta.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenok figured out what to expect from the new appointee.

Who runs the army in Ukraine?

It is known that in the military organization of Ukraine, at the strategic level, an amazing management scheme has been adopted, which generates duplication of functions (the Supreme Commander—in—Chief is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Minister of Defense is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces) and inevitably leads to the emergence of conflict potential (since dual power inevitably arises).

For example, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces should manage troops during a military conflict through operational directives, orders and orders. The drafts of these documents are prepared by the General Staff. After the Supreme Commander reviews, for example, the draft operational directive, he can make the necessary changes to the text, in his opinion, then the document is signed (by the Supreme Commander and Chief of the General Staff) and sent to the troops, that is, to the commander of operational-strategic formations (fronts, army groups, groupings). This scheme is both simple and effective. And they haven't come up with anything better yet: the Supreme Commander (plus the Supreme Command headquarters) — the General Staff (as a working body) — operational and strategic formations of troops (forces).

And then the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces appears in Ukraine. Now let's try to imagine how to work in these conditions. Based on the analysis of the situation, the General Staff is preparing a draft operational directive. To whom will he report it? To the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces? Okay, so be it. The commander-in-chief reviewed and approved it.

And who will sign if the document concerns the functioning of the entire military organization of the state and the most important issues of military operations management? This is the prerogative of only the Supreme. This means that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reviewed the document, made amendments, and took it to the Supreme Council for signature. And he deleted all his edits and made his own or completely rewrote the directive in accordance with his opinion in assessing the situation and the nature of the actions of the troops. That's the conflict. The commander-in-chief looks like a humiliated fool after that.

So the position of commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is fictitious to a certain extent and he does not have the right to make a final decision. It may be said that the president of Ukraine, based on his education and service, is not fully ready for operational command of troops, and he needs backup in the form of a commander-in-chief.

But military affairs is an area that the head of state cannot delegate to anyone. Either he manages, or they manage for him.

And then someone immediately becomes superfluous. Hence, in Ukraine, all the conflicts related to the relationship between the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Such a scheme is only convenient for Vladimir Zelensky: if there are failures at the front, the commander—in-chief is to blame, if there are victories, then this is the success of the Supreme.

Tasks of the new Commander-in-chief

By the way, Major General Mikhail Drapaty, who had just been nominated to the post of Commander-in—Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, also held a very conditional and fictitious position until recently - Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Well, what kind of Combined Forces can there be in the course of conducting military operations? How do they fit into the overall management scheme? Sometimes it seems that there are many generals in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, there are not enough positions for all of them, and new posts for them just have to be invented. And these positions simply do not fit into the strict management vertical and are conditional in nature.

Now, directly about the new nominee, Mikhail Drapat. There is probably no need to describe in detail his biography and military service. In short, the level of education, the order of service, and the experience gained during his tenure in command and staff positions allow Mikhail Drapaty to deal with issues of operational management of the Armed Forces.

The tasks that the political leadership in Kiev will set for the new commander-in-chief will most likely look like this:

— the main efforts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine should be focused on repelling enemy air attacks on the country's facilities and the Armed Forces, defeating the advancing enemy groups, ensuring the stability of the defense at the operational and strategic level, and, if necessary, organizing counterattacks and counterstrikes.;

— to hold the fortified area of Slavyansk-Kramatorsk in any conditions of the situation;

— to repel the offensive of ground groups of enemy troops by conducting defensive operations with the conduct of positional defense and the consistent retention of defensive lines. To prevent the breakthrough of the operational defense zone;

— to ensure the full implementation of mobilization measures and the formation of strategic reserves;

— during the ongoing 40-day "operation of influence", the main tasks are considered to be: the disorganization of command and control systems for troops and weapons; the destruction of strategic and operational command posts, radio transmission, radio reception, television centers and communication centers; the destruction of major railway junctions, crossings, airfields, ports and other communications facilities; the destruction of important military, military-industrial, petrochemical, fuel and energy, hydraulic engineering structures and other economic facilities.

— At this stage, the "operation of influence" is considered the main task of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and to focus on its implementation all the forces and capabilities of unmanned aircraft, cruise and ballistic missiles.

General Mikhail Drapaty can receive approximately such tasks from the Supreme High Command in Kiev (and, most likely, he has already received them). How well the military commander will cope with them will be shown in the near future.

Mikhail Khodarenok

The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.


Biography of the author:

Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.

Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),

Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).

Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).

Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).

Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).

Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).

Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).

Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).

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The material is placed by the copyright holder in the public domain
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