The Ministry of Defense reported the destruction of almost 1,000 drones per day.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces have recently carried out several massive drone strikes against targets in almost the entire European part of Russia, as well as frontline territories. On June 18 alone, the Russian air defense forces shot down almost a thousand drones. Military observer of "Gazeta.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenok analyzes how the situation will develop in the future.
Let's start analyzing the situation with the political part of the issue. On June 8, the leaders of Great Britain, France and Germany held a meeting with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky in London, forming a tough five-point ultimatum to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
They require:
— immediate ceasefire: Russian President Vladimir Putin has been asked to stop the fighting in existing positions;
— negotiations on the front line: the actual status quo is recognized as the basis for diplomacy, but it does not mean that Ukraine legally renounces the territories.;
— the possibility of deploying a foreign military contingent: The West reserves the right to deploy multinational forces on Ukrainian territory to control the truce;
— indefinite asset lock-up: Russian sovereign funds will remain immobilized in European banks until full payment of reparations to Kiev;
— The EU and NATO veto: any agreements affecting the security architecture of the West are possible only with the consensus approval of all EU and Alliance members.
As for the recent Group of Seven summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, it ended with the adoption of a joint communique. The document provides for solidary support for Kiev and increased pressure on Moscow.
This could not be done in 2025 due to the lack of consensus. Then US President Donald Trump blocked the proposed text of the statement. In particular, he was against joint sanctions against Russia and military assistance to Kiev. At the same time, the American leader did not express any objections at the summit in Evian.
In addition, members of the G7 club announced their readiness to help Ukraine with additional air defense systems and longer-range weapons. It is also possible to grant licenses to Kiev for the production of additional weapons. Trump signed all this.
In other words, the members of the G7 club are united in their assessment of the situation in Ukraine. As for the situation on the fronts of the SVR, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz emphasized that in recent days and weeks the conflict has acquired a new dynamic.
Betting on air
The latter concerns the increased frequency of massive strikes by unmanned aircraft of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on targets in Russia. In other words, the focus of efforts on the part of Ukraine and its allies during the fighting has finally shifted to the air sphere.
According to the Ministry of Defense, Russian air defense systems have shot down 992 Ukrainian drones, four Flamingo missiles, ten guided aerial bombs and three HIMARS shells over the past 24 hours.
Against this background, the upcoming capture of Konstantinovka by Russian troops will certainly be a major tactical success, but it will most likely not lead to any turning point in the conduct of military operations.
After the fall of Konstantinovka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will withdraw to another defensive line in an orderly manner, and the battles for the next fortified area — Slavyansk-Kramatorsk — can become just as stubborn, prolonged and bloody, and on both sides.
And, most likely, the military-political leadership of Ukraine has set the AFU a task of approximately the next level — to prevent the loss of stability of the front in an operational and strategic sense.
Therefore, even attempts to give the Ukrainian Armed Forces any offensive capabilities have stopped: solving this problem requires a sharp increase in combat and numerical strength, large-scale supplies of weapons and equipment to the ground forces, and the revival of certain types of armed forces in the Ukrainian army, in particular, the air force. All this is expensive, costly and time-consuming, even with an unobvious subsequent result.
But the strikes of many hundreds of drones — and with the prospect of this number turning into a number with three or even four zeros — on objects in Russia and the frontline strip can paralyze the supply of material and transport support, lead to the cessation of regular operation of airports and railways in the European part of the country, disruption of the fuel and energy complex — and fuel shortages in the middle of summer are fraught with very negative consequences — and disruption of the holiday season, which, in the end, can cause mass discontent among the broadest segments of the population.
Moreover, the military and economic potentials of the United States and the European Union are now almost fully involved in solving such a task. And it's clearly not going to be limited to supplying Ukraine with UAVs alone.
In addition, it should be noted that a ballistic missile is a relatively simple product with a fairly simple guidance system (special accuracy when shooting at cities is not required), so organizing the launch of such missiles in a large—scale series with the help of the European Union is not a particularly difficult task.
What to do?
Let's move on to the conclusions. Since the meeting in London and the G7 summit, not everything that actually happened there has been publicly available. This is just the tip of the iceberg. It is quite possible that something like the following was stated to the Kremlin through closed diplomatic or any other channels: "If you do not accept the five—point ultimatum in full, we will bombard you with drones, cruise missiles and ballistics, and we will also crush you with new packages of sanctions."
This situation requires a radical revision of the forms and methods of using the Russian Armed Forces. The conduct of military operations must be undertaken with all possible determination and involve all available forces and means in solving combat and operational tasks.
Mikhail Khodarenok
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
