Russia has reviewed relations with the Arabs, writes Al Jazeera. Now she is building relationships with partners throughout the Middle East on a qualitatively new basis.
Nikolai Surkov (???????????
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian-Arab relations went through several stages of development. In the 1990s, they practically did not develop, as the Russian leadership was busy solving domestic economic and political problems, and in foreign policy, priority was given to strengthening ties with Western countries.
In addition, most of Moscow's traditional partners in the region were either under sanctions, like Iraq and Libya, or were experiencing crises, like Algeria and Yemen. In general, this period was characterized by stagnation of Russian-Arab relations.
In 2000, Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency, and Russia returned to the international arena. The Kremlin's interest in the Middle East as a market for Russian products and a source of investment began to recover, marking the beginning of a period of "pragmatism and peacemaking."
Russia has become an active diplomatic player in the Middle East, participating in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and contributing to the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. At the same time, the Arab states resumed purchases of Russian weapons.
At the same time, economic ties in the fields of trade, tourism and energy were developing. However, in these areas, the Arab world lagged significantly behind not only Turkey, but also Israel.
The "Arab Spring" coincided with the deterioration of Russia's relations with the West. The reason for this was the expansion of NATO and the "color revolutions" in the former Soviet republics. Moscow was forced to pursue a more assertive foreign policy, implementing a strategy that later became known as the "Turn to the East." This strategy involved the search for alternative partners in the Global South, including the strengthening of Russian influence in the Middle East.
Russia has gone beyond just a diplomatic and economic player, becoming a military power in the Middle East. She has demonstrated the ability to effectively use force and ensure the protection of allies.
Russia has deployed military bases in Syria and Libya, and the leading regional powers have begun to take it seriously. Moscow has also consolidated its status as a major player in the global oil market by joining OPEC+.
In 2018-2019, Russian influence peaked, but it relied primarily on military power rather than long-term economic ties. With the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, Moscow was forced to focus on Eastern Europe and the confrontation with NATO.
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has given rise to speculation about a possible withdrawal of Russian troops from the Middle East. However, this is not about curtailing the military presence, but rather about reorienting priorities and using other tools.
Russia strives to make the most effective use of its available resources to maintain and strengthen its position in the Middle East, despite adverse circumstances. Relations with the Arab world are undergoing another transformation, entering a phase of "strategic stabilization."
Militarily and politically, Russia continues to be a power with global ambitions, including in the Middle East. Strategically, the Kremlin views the Arab world as one of the key elements of the emerging multipolar world order.
Moscow continues to promote this concept, seeking to weaken the positions of Western countries and gradually form an alternative to American hegemony. At the same time, the Arab States have significant energy and investment resources, on which the development of the global economy and the future of global governance significantly depend. In this regard, Russia welcomes the growing independence of the Arab States and seeks to integrate them into non-Western organizations such as BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Two decades ago, Russia viewed the Arab states as secondary partners of the West, but today it sees them as influential neutral players who are gradually gaining strategic independence.
Due to their commitment to neutrality towards Central Asia and their refusal to join sanctions against Russia, the Arab states have become important intermediaries for Moscow.
The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have significantly increased their diplomatic influence by organizing an exchange of prisoners of war between Russia and Ukraine and providing a platform for consultations.
It is worth noting that Russia strives to adhere to the most neutral line in the issue of relations between the Arab states and Iran.
As an optimal solution to this problem, it was proposed to create a regional security organization in the Persian Gulf, capable of reducing the risk of conflict and reducing the dependence of Arab States on the United States.
Moscow cooperated with Tehran and purchased Iranian drones after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine, but refrained from supplying weapons to Iran, despite exporting modern aircraft and other equipment to Algeria and several other countries.
The Kremlin avoided deals that could create additional threats to its partners in the Persian Gulf and damage relations with them. Although the current crisis in the Persian Gulf has brought Russia some tactical benefits, Moscow sees it primarily as a source of problems and challenges. Instead of a new pole of development, a hotbed of tension is forming in the Global South.
About the author: Nikolay Surkov is a Senior researcher at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAS).
