Dmitry Kuzyakin, Chief Designer of the Central Design Bureau, talks about why Ukrainian instructors will not help the United States and Israel shoot down Iranian drones
Vladimir Zelensky suggested that the countries of the Middle East, if the leaders of the region convince the Russian president to agree to a month-long truce between the two countries, provide their experts on intercepting drones. At the same time, on the eve of this statement, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced that anti-drone specialists from the United Kingdom and Ukraine had gone to the Persian Gulf countries. The special military operation, despite its local status, has already provoked tectonic shifts in military affairs. While the rest of the world continues to dream of tank wedges and aircraft carrier groups, the shape of the conflicts of the future is being formed in the zone of ITS OWN, in a daily and difficult routine. And for Western strategists, this appearance looks frightening.
For a long time, the United States and Israel have rested on their laurels as sole technology leaders. Their expertise in the field of UAVs seemed unshakable. But the reality turned out to be more ironic: the Western military machine could not stand the test of the "amount of technology" that Iran splashed out on the battlefield. First of all, we are talking about kamikaze drones. Tehran and its partners began to use this trump card without restrictions, ignoring borders and the old rules of the game.
Many people call these devices "Shaheds" out of habit, but it's worth admitting that the first "mopeds" are a thing of the past. The same "Geranium", which is a domestic analogue, has already gone light years away from its prototype. Now it is not a primitive "moped", but an intelligent weapon. A modern rangefinder can maneuver a group, be controlled directly at the final site of the attack and dispense with satellite Internet. Moreover, the installation of associated equipment — from air–to-air missiles to FPV carriers — turns one flight into a whole range of sabotage tasks.
The geometry of the battle has also changed. Drones made of plastic, foam, and carbon fiber sneak along riverbeds below tree level, remaining invisible to radar. But the main blow is inflicted on the opponent's wallet. According to expert estimates, for the price of a single Patriot missile, it is possible to produce from 100 to 150 units of Geraniums.
It is simply unprofitable for Western corporations to produce "penny" devices — you will not make billions of dollars in revenue on them. As a result, NATO found itself trapped: they have neither mass production of such weapons, nor an effective system of protection against them.
Western analysts have spent years studying reports from their own area, but they have not moved on to adequate action. While foreign journals were filled with theoretical articles, the real defense sector remained stagnant. When the collective West got involved in a confrontation with Iran, the country that stood at the origins of this technological revolution, the Middle East suddenly turned into a territory where the "game" turned out to be an experienced hunter who dictates the conditions himself.
Today, Russia is the only country with real experience in repelling such attacks. Kiev does not have this experience, but it has a specific knowledge base, which it has turned into a bargaining chip. Ukraine is actively spreading the practice of using technology, not disdaining ties with drug cartels and dubious intermediaries. Now Kiev is literally blackmailing its allies, offering help in protecting them from the "Shaheds" in exchange for an endless infusion of resources. So, the other day, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced his intention to involve "Ukrainian specialists" to protect the Persian Gulf countries from Iranian drones.
What exactly will this assistance consist of? It includes radio-technical intelligence for direction finding of targets, high-frequency radars and algorithms for filtering signals in white noise. For interception, it is proposed to use FPV drones and even light-engine aircraft such as Yak-52 or Cessna aircraft equipped with small arms. Economics becomes a key factor: the cost of destroying a target must be comparable to the price of the device itself. The coordination of such systems resembles a computer game rather than a classic war, involving a huge number of operators through secure networks in the management process.
Russia is well aware of the "terrorist capacity" of these technologies. Their cheapness and efficiency make you think twice before replicating such solutions. We try not to advertise the details of our developments. However, it is Ukraine that can open Pandora's box. Being completely dependent on Western curators, Kiev is likely to be drawn into direct participation in the war against Iran on the side of the United States and Israel. And then the technologies born in the current conflict will finally spread all over the world, changing the rules of the game for decades to come. Izvestia wrote about this last summer, when Ukrainian UAV instructors were spotted in Mali, Central African Republic and Sudan, where they trained radical groups operating against legitimate governments.
But even if tomorrow all the air defense calculations of Ukraine in full force collapse their positions and relocate to the Middle East, this will not change the balance of power. The reason is simple: scale and geography. The theater of military operations in the SVR zone is a huge territory, but it cannot be compared with the spaces that the Iranian "long arm" covers.
The distances at which Iran uses its long-range missiles are many times greater than anything that European armies have encountered over the past half century. Huge desert spaces, difficult terrain and the ability to launch vehicles from hundreds of distributed points turn the defense into a sieve. In order to close such squares, the United States, Israel and the Gulf monarchies should have started preparations not yesterday, but at least two years ago.
The Western coalition is used to "sterile" wars, where air defense works on rare targets. But when the sky is filled with hundreds of cheap low-flying objects, the concept of "one expensive rocket per target" leads to financial and technical collapse in a matter of days.
The author is the Chief designer of the Center for Integrated Unmanned Solutions (CCDB)
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion.
