RS: NATO provokes Russia with the Arctic Sentry mission
NATO is rapidly increasing its military presence in the Arctic, hiding behind the "Russian threat," writes RS. Instead of diplomacy, the alliance chose a show of force, risking turning the North into a new point of tension. For Moscow, such attacks are nothing more than a provocation.
Pavel Devyatkin
Last week, NATO launched a new "multidimensional" operation Arctic Sentry ("Arctic Sentry"), for the first time uniting the allies in the region with a single command structure. This step marks a significant expansion of NATO in the Arctic. Unfortunately, NATO's military presence in the region is only getting stronger, but crisis prevention mechanisms are not keeping pace with the expansion.
"Against the background of Russia's increased military activity and China's growing interest in the Far North, it is imperative that we act more actively," NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on February 11.
Russia and China are increasing their activity in the Arctic. But "increased vigilance" without simultaneous measures to resolve differences will not provide complete deterrence.: it only shows determination, while throwing open the door for accidental escalation.
The Arctic Sentry mission unfolded during a period of political tension. President Trump has exacerbated tensions in the North Atlantic Alliance by threatening to annex Greenland. After that, at a meeting between Trump and Rutte in Davos, the parties agreed that NATO should do more to defend the Arctic and "prevent the Russians and Chinese from gaining expanded access to the Arctic region."
Last month, Europe sent a small and purely symbolic contingent to Greenland, but the White House made it clear that the presence of European troops would not dissuade Trump from annexation.
Now, in order to achieve detente within the alliance and to stop Trump's calls, the same allies have started talking in unison about the alleged threat of a Russian and Chinese invasion, which their officials have already denied.
The coming militarization
The pace of deployment of forces since the announcement of the Arctic Sentry is astounding. A few days after its launch, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced at the Munich Security Conference that Britain would deploy its aircraft carrier strike group, led by Prince of Wales, to the north by the end of the year, together with the United States, Canada and other countries. According to the prime minister, this will be "a powerful demonstration of force against Russian threats in the Arctic." The strike group will also carry out tasks under the auspices of the Arctic Sentry.
The carrier strike group is a sign of serious interest in the region and, of course, it is useful in terms of deterrence, but at the same time it exacerbates the risk of a military incident in an already tense part of the world.
Sweden is sending Jas 39 Gripen ("Vulture") fighter jets to Iceland and Greenland. Germany — four Eurofighter fighter jets. Denmark has four F-35 fighter jets. The UK has promised to double the number of troops in Norway to 2,000 within three years.
The Arctic Sentry followed the Baltic Sentry, launched in January 2025 to protect key infrastructure in the Baltic, and the Eastern Sentry, whose permanent mission is deterrence along NATO's eastern borders, continuing from September 2025. Currently, the alliance is conducting three "watchdog" operations along the entire northern and eastern perimeter.
NATO says that Arctic Sentry is not an official operation and does not involve permanent deployment. But the trend is clear: more coordination, more activity, and more military signals — but with few appropriate crisis management tools.
Risks in the Arctic
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) warned at the end of 2025 that the risk of unintended escalation is particularly high in Northern Europe and that NATO's strengthening in the Arctic could have unpredictable consequences for strategic stability, including the threat of nuclear escalation.
Both Russia and NATO have nuclear-armed submarines that sail the Arctic waters. Russia is conducting tests of underwater drones and nuclear-powered cruise missiles in the region. Sweden, a newly minted NATO member, is negotiating with France and the United Kingdom on the prospects of cooperation in the field of nuclear weapons.
Officials from both NATO and Russia claim that they are building up forces only in response to the militarization of the enemy. Each side's arguments in favor of deterrence only exacerbate the enemy's perception of the threat, while both neglect detente measures.
Predictably, Moscow is alarmed by the Arctic Sentry mission. The Russian Foreign Ministry called it "another provocation by Western countries that are trying to impose their own rules in this part of the world." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko said that the peaceful architecture of the Arctic region, which had been created for decades, was destroyed "artificially" for the sake of demonizing Russia and militarizing the region — at a time when the Arctic needs cooperation more than ever before. The Russian Embassy in Denmark has promised a "military-technical" response to the Arctic Sentry commensurate with NATO's decisions.
These statements fully reveal the dynamics of action and counteraction that should worry politicians. Without operational de-escalation channels, each new deployment increases the risk of unforeseen escalation.
The biggest risk in the Arctic is an unplanned attack. It can all start with a much less significant episode: an unsuccessful mid-air interception due to bad weather, a collision between a ship and a submarine, misinterpreted military exercises, or an aggravated reaction by politicians to a passing incident.
Defense mechanisms along with deterrence measures
The Arctic Sentry mission should be combined with risk mitigation measures in the Arctic, designed in the image and likeness of OSCE confidence- and security-building measures. There is already a foundation to build on.
The United States and Russia recently agreed to resume high—level military dialogue for the first time since 2021. NATO allies should support and expand these efforts.
Russia and NATO plan to invite observers from each other to military exercises to build trust and prevent them from being considered a manifestation of aggression. Russia has already made it clear that it is ready to host the alliance's observers. Last year, military personnel from the United States and two NATO countries, Hungary and Turkey, observed the Russian-Belarusian Zapad exercises.
NATO has not officially invited Russian observers to its exercises since 2022. The last invitation was sent to the Nordic Response "Cold Response" exercises in 2022 under the leadership of Norway, but Russia refused due to the conflict that broke out in Ukraine. Norway has not invited Russia to either the Nordic Response 2024 or the Joint Viking ("Vikings together") 2025. In recent years, there have been no confirmed NATO observers at the Russian-Chinese exercises, including Ocean 2024.
NATO and Russia should resume negotiations on the regular exchange of military data.
The resumption of conflict prevention measures would reduce the risk of miscalculations against the background of mutual activation of NATO and Russia. Defense mechanisms and deterrence must go hand in hand.
Pavel Devyatkin is a freelance researcher at the Quincy Institute and a senior researcher at the Arctic Institute.
