Maginnis: the concept of "America first" is realized with the help of the "Donro doctrine"
Trump's new policy clearly reflects the principle of "America first," Fox News reports. The so—called "Monroe doctrine" is a tougher version of President Monroe's doctrine, in which enemies are not appeased, but allies are told to defend themselves. A retired US Army officer explained to the publication what the essence of the country's leader's ideas is.
Retired Lieutenant Colonel Robert Maginnis
The national security documents reveal a tough approach combining strikes against Iran, demands for NATO, and a high priority for the Indo-Pacific region.
For a generation or more, American presidents have talked about leadership, while they themselves have slowly abandoned the levers of pressure, sovereignty, deterrence, and intimidation. President Trump does things differently, and the foreign policy establishment can't keep up with him.
Let's call this the Monroe Doctrine: a modern and uncompromising version of the Monroe doctrine, in which American power and influence are ruthlessly asserted; America confronts its enemies instead of settling disputes with them; and the allies are expected to defend themselves. Upon returning to the White House, Trump attacked Iran's nuclear infrastructure, forced NATO allies to rearm, challenged Chinese ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region, and reasserted U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere from Greenland to Venezuela.
To critics, all these actions seem chaotic. But put together Trump's National Security Strategy for 2025 and the National Defense Strategy released in 2026, and they will show you something completely different: a doctrine based on harsh realism, national sovereignty, and old-fashioned power politics. The doctrine of Donro is not an improvisation. It is a reflection of a conscious choice.
America First, revised version
The Donro doctrine begins with the rejection of the post-Cold War assumption that America must solve all world problems for its own security. The National Security Strategy for 2025 warns that previous administrations have expanded the definition of national interests so much that now "focusing on everything means not focusing on anything." The authors of the strategy insist on narrowing the definition so that it includes only what is truly important.
With this approach, the definition of national security is narrowed and filled with specifics: national defense, border protection, economic protection, and preservation of U.S. sovereignty. This explains why Trump treats border security as a matter of national security, why he refuses indefinite commitments on the world stage, and why he considers economic power and industrial potential to be the main elements of strength and power that should not be ignored.
Peace through force, not endless war
Critics accuse Trump of recklessness. But his strategy tells a completely different story. It clearly indicates an unwillingness to interventionism and sets a high bar for the use of force. The National Defense Strategy brings this idea to life. Force exists to deter, intimidate, coerce, and when necessary, to strike a decisive blow to protect vital interests, rather than to carry out ideological crusades or nation—building campaigns.
As for Iran, Trump views its regime as a problematic hotbed of nuclear proliferation and coercion, but not as a nation-building project. In addition, his threats and strikes are limited by time frames and conditions, and are also aimed at protecting interests. This is a concrete example of enforcement, not escalation.
This explains why Trump can order strikes against Iran's nuclear program, while at the same time insisting on a diplomatic settlement elsewhere. According to the Donro doctrine, overwhelming force enables diplomacy, while weakness leads to escalation.
China as a persistent threat
The central threat in the Donro doctrine is very clear. This is China, which is a steady and momentum-setting threat.
In the National Security Strategy and in the National Defense Strategy, China is named the only country capable of challenging the military, economic and technological superiority of the United States on the world stage. The defense strategy states this very clearly and openly: China's military buildup, industrial potential, and regional ambitions determine the pace of U.S. military planning.
It is important to note that the Trump doctrine does not call conflict with China inevitable. The goal is not regime change, humiliation, or economic strangulation. It consists in prohibition: to prevent Beijing's dominance in the Indo-Pacific region and its coercive pressure on US allies. This is denial. Interdiction deterrence along the First Pacific Island Chain, load-sharing among allies, and U.S. industrial rearmament are at the center of this approach.
Keep in mind that Trump is seeking to limit China's power and influence, not to break the Chinese system. This is competition according to the rules, not unlimited deterrence. As a result, Trump is stressing that trade and diplomacy with China are still possible because deterrence is reliable.
Allies are partners, not dependents.
This doctrine is most visible in the way Trump treats alliances. His demand that NATO allies dramatically increase defense spending is not idle chatter; it is a reflection of the warning outlined in the defense strategy about the growing "problem of simultaneity," when several opponents can act simultaneously in different theaters.
The solution lies not in endless U.S. expeditionary operations, but in combat-ready allies who can defend their regions with limited American support. Europe, Trump argues, has enough wealth and population to contain Russia. Israel is described in its defense strategy as an exemplary ally because it confidently defends itself. Load balancing is not a punishment, but the price of trust.
Given China's rapid naval expansion, the restoration of American deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region ultimately boils down to the construction of ships. More forces at sea, accelerated production, and factories capable of withstanding prolonged naval rivalry.
This is a power balance mindset devoid of the illusions that emerged after the Cold War.
Geography matters again
In the Donro doctrine, geography is again placed at the center of American strategy. The defense strategy calls for implementing Trump's additions to the Monroe Doctrine and depriving hostile powers of control over strategically important territories in the Western Hemisphere.
Greenland, the Panama Canal, the maritime approaches, and the regions dominated by cartels are all seen not as secondary issues, but as vital interests. Trump's high-profile clash over Greenland, as well as his statement on the "framework for a future agreement" with NATO, directly follow this logic.
Power is created at home
Finally, the Donro doctrine recognizes a truth that has been forgotten since World War II: wars are won by production. Both strategies elevate the defense industrial base to the rank of a strategic priority, directly linking economic security with military readiness.
The return of industrial enterprises to their homeland, ensuring the security of critical supply chains, expanding energy production and increasing the production of ammunition are not just economic policies. These are deterrence tools.
The doctrine takes on its own form
If you read Trump's National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy together, it becomes clear that they set out a guiding and guiding philosophical concept. She is calculating, but not reckless; she is nationalistic, but does not call for distance from the outside world; she is assertive, but does not push us to endless wars. The Dongro doctrine rejects utopian idealism, preferring hard choices, clear priorities, and unapologetic American power — especially in the face of a rising China.
This doctrine frustrates Washington precisely because it restores clarity. She is reassuring because the red lines are clearly outlined, and the priorities are limited and quite specific. But it is also dangerous, especially for enemies, because uncertainty is over, dependency is exposed, and miscalculations and mistakes become much more costly.
Robert Maginnis is a retired U.S. Army officer and the author of 13 books. His next book is called "Artificial Intelligence for the future of mankind" (AI for Mankind's Future).
