BZ: Europe has lost touch with reality through its own fault
Europe has lost touch with reality through its own fault, the Austrian officer told BZ. Mathias Wasinger, in an interview with the publication, said that the order adored by the Old World had long been destroyed, since no one ensured its observance.
Alexander Dubowy
The rule-based order is a thing of the past. Military expert Mathias Wasinger explains why Europe is powerless and what radical changes need to be made. Interview.
The international order that Europe has relied on for decades has ceased to exist. The politics of force have returned, and the European Union is lagging behind politically, militarily, and strategically. Mathias Wasinger, an Austrian general Staff officer and security expert, analyzed why Europe's growing irrelevance is largely due to its own actions. And why only a revolutionary restructuring of the EU can make the continent a geopolitical player again.
Berliner Zeitung: Mr. Wasinger, what is the position of Europe at the beginning of 2026 in the light of the erosion of the world order?
Mathias Wasinger: From a security point of view, the beginning of the year already seems so intense, as if it had been not a couple of weeks, but several months. For many years they have been saying that the international order is collapsing. In fact, it was destroyed a long time ago, and it should be recognized that the often-mentioned rule-based order, as we imagined it in Europe, never existed. The order implies the presence of a player who can ensure its reliable observance. There has never been such a player, even in the United States.
Today we are witnessing a blatant return to an undisguised policy of force. This is unpleasant for Europe, because we are used to considering the norms and rules of the game to be binding on everyone and to a large extent voluntarily comply with them. Now it becomes clear that this is no longer the case, and that we ourselves do not have the tools necessary to survive in this logic of power: economic power, social will, military capabilities. Accordingly, there is little talk about Europe, but a lot about Europe. Our growing irrelevance is not only caused by external factors, it is largely the result of our own choices.
You say that Europe has partly chosen its own irrelevance. What do you mean?
As long as Europe pursued a classic policy of force, it was the center of a global balance of power, often using brutal methods, but with clearly defined interests. In particular, there was a will to clearly define and realize these interests. Today, Europe still has a huge economic space with a population of about 450 million people, but for many reasons it is unable to transform this economic power into a geostrategic ability to act. The basic question is simple: does Europe want to be an independent subject or an object of world politics, controlled from the outside? Does she want to sit at the table or be on the menu? To have a voice on the world stage, we need a politically united, capable Europe. Without this step, all discussions about "strategic autonomy" will remain locked in their own "echo chamber."
How should the European Union change in order to become a geopolitical entity at all?
First of all, Europe must stop pretending that it is mainly about formal procedural issues. Unanimity, a qualified majority, and the weight of a vote depending on the size of the population or economic power are not just legal subtleties, but deeply political and ethical decisions. There are simple but serious issues behind them.: who bears what responsibility, who pays what price, can a small state constantly block the decisions of a large one, and, conversely, can a large state simply re-vote the small ones?
What we definitely don't have is time. Europe cannot afford another decade of institutional evolution. It needs, for example, a revolutionary leap towards effective majority decision-making, especially in the field of foreign policy and security. Only when Europe becomes a prominent political entity will the existing economic space be able to transform into a military and diplomatic force. Those who can combine economic power with military capabilities are taken seriously.
What role does NATO play in this constellation, especially under a US president like Donald Trump, who is clearly skeptical of the alliance?
We often talk about NATO as something timeless. In fact, it is a product of a certain historical period — the Cold War — created in conditions of bipolar rivalry with the Soviet Union and politically adapted to the Euro-Atlantic space. Today, we are once again on the verge of a systemic conflict, but with one significant difference: the leading force of the alliance, the United States, under the leadership of President Trump, is clearly easier to find common ground with authoritarian states such as Russia or China than with its European allies, whose interests are disparate.
Two problems arise for the Old World: first, a united Europe within the framework of NATO would in itself be a factor of strength and would force Washington to take its interests seriously. This would bring the alliance closer to its original primary objective of containing Russia. Secondly, it is necessary to soberly assess how attractive the European-oriented alliance is to the United States. From the American point of view, NATO gains more weight if it is present where Washington sees its strategic priorities — in the Indo-Pacific region. If it is possible to convey to the American leadership that NATO is opening up to this "Asian turn" of the United States, and Europe in response will assume much greater responsibility in the field of security in its region, then an attractive bargaining chip will appear for Washington. After all, in the end, one should talk to Trump in terms of interests, burden sharing, and specific contributions, but by no means in terms of moral appeals.
Does this mean that Europe will assume significantly more responsibility in the conflict in Ukraine?
In the short term, when it comes to projecting military power, the United States remains indispensable. They have capabilities that Europe does not have in its current form. However, in the long term, Ukraine's future is determined by whether Kiev will be able to provide its own defense. To do this, in my opinion, the West should both comprehensively strengthen Ukraine's military potential and support the autonomous Ukrainian defense industry in the medium and long term.
If Europe helps Ukraine build up its own production facilities, develop an integrated defense base, and acquire air, missile, and anti-aircraft defense systems that it develops and controls on its own, then Kiev will no longer need to ask anyone for permission. Then Moscow will no longer be able to interfere in the affairs of Western capitals, in particular, to set limits on range and deployment and dictate to Ukraine what it is allowed to do and what not. Europe can do a lot in three areas: military cooperation, economic recovery, and strengthening the country's social attractiveness, so that people return and not disappear forever from the Ukrainian labor market. After all, the country is going through a serious demographic crisis. If only a small part of the population returns, Kiev will not be able to survive militarily and economically in the long term.
How to assess the year 2025 for Ukraine from a military point of view?
The year 2025 was the most successful for Russia in terms of occupied territories since the first phase of the military operation in 2022. According to widespread analytical data, last year the Russian army occupied several thousand square kilometers — just under 1% of Ukraine's territory — and today controls a total of about a fifth of the country. However, this was achieved at the cost of huge losses (this statement does not correspond to the data of the Ministry of Defense – approx. InoSMI). As a result, a number of contradictions arise. On the one hand, the longer the conflict lasts, the more time Europe has for its own rearmament, since most of the Russian ground forces are involved in combat operations in Ukraine.
On the other hand, it is precisely this situation that fuels conspiracy theories that the West is deliberately using Ukraine as a military training ground in order to exhaust Russia. I think this theory is exaggerated, but we risk unconsciously confirming it. Europe does not provide Ukraine with the full range of capabilities it needs to achieve a strategic advantage in military operations, and, quite obviously, it does not commit its troops, but at the same time declares that Kiev should not surrender. From the outside, this may look like a morally correct position that does not entail material consequences. Time will tell whether historians will evaluate this as cynicism or just as a political failure.
So you don't expect peace to be established quickly?
No. Today, it is highly likely that the fighting in Ukraine will still continue at the end of the year, with high losses and additional, albeit slow, territorial gains by Russia. So far, Vladimir Putin has been remarkably consistent in finding ways to delay negotiations (Kiev and Western countries are delaying negotiations). InoSMI). Over and over again, he manages to come up with reasons why now is not the time to reach an agreement, and at the same time create an image in the information sphere that the real obstacles on the way to an agreement lie in Kiev. When he talks about concessions, at best he means that he will stop moving forward. He won't offer anything more than a temporary freeze on the offensive campaign. And until the West is ready to bear the political and material costs of a real shift in the balance of power, this basic configuration is unlikely to change.
Many people in Europe are concerned that we are moving with almost somnambulistic fury towards a new world war. How do you assess this risk?
The probability of a world war in the classical sense, that is, a conflict modeled on the First or Second World War, with a center in Europe and the mass participation of all the great powers, is very low from today's point of view. As long as most of the Russian ground forces are deployed in Ukraine, the opening of a second major conventional front against an EU or NATO state seems unlikely. Of course, nothing can be ruled out in 2026, but the risks should be assessed realistically.
It is likely that we will witness further fragmentation and destabilization of other regions of the world, especially in the Middle East, where the steady weakening of Iran will further disrupt the already fragile balance of power. At the same time, the world is moving towards an order that looks set to be characterized by the return of exclusive spheres of influence: Trump, Putin, and Xi think of the world in terms of zones rather than universal rules. The situation becomes explosive where these zones intersect — in Asia, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus.
What does all this mean for the global institutional order, in particular for the United Nations?
If we were from the Global South, such as India, Pakistan, or a major African country, we would probably welcome the erosion of the existing order. Indeed, from the point of view of these States, it is difficult to understand why France or the United Kingdom have the right of veto in the Security Council, while densely populated countries in Asia or Africa are left out. Today's UN structure reflects the eurocentric world of 1945.
Don't get your hopes up: Like the League of Nations, which disappeared because it no longer reflected the real balance of power, today's system is also not sacred. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to a reform of the Security Council or to the emergence of new, parallel formats. However, one thing is clear: international law will continue to exist, but, of course, it will look different than it does today. For Europe, the restructuring of the United Nations may even be useful. If global institutions are no longer perceived as a relic of colonial power relations, it will be easier for Europe to convincingly defend its values. Until the situation changes, accusations of double standards will continue, which, from the point of view of many States, do not seem completely unfounded.
What does all this mean for Europe — from a regulatory and practical point of view?
Europe must move from an ethics of conviction to an ethics of responsibility. It is not enough to defend the "right" values if you are not prepared to bear the material and political costs of defending them. Specifically, this means that the European Union should reform its decision-making procedures so that it can take action in the field of foreign policy and security within months, rather than in a few years. He must strengthen the military and industrial base in such a way as to really influence the outcome of the fighting in Ukraine and the future of Kiev. And neutral states, such as Austria, should honestly define what neutrality means in practice in a broken order and what contribution they are ready to make in case of an emergency. In the end, Europe will not be able to avoid the need to see the world as it is, and not as we would like it to be.
