Telegraph: US claims to Greenland won't necessarily destroy NATO
The White House's claims to Greenland will not necessarily lead to the collapse of NATO, writes a Telegraph columnist. In his opinion, the current situation should be a reason for the member countries of the alliance to build new ties, diversify trade and strengthen military power.
David Reynolds
Trump's America can no longer be relied on, but this does not mean that the rest of the alliance's structure will necessarily crumble after it.
It has already become a commonplace that each subsequent NATO crisis is the worst in history. However, despite all the difficulties and adversities, the North Atlantic Alliance still lasted for more than 75 years — since April 4, 1949. But this is indeed the first time that a U.S. president has threatened to invade and take over a country that Washington is obligated to protect by treaty.
At the time of the founding of NATO, a clear threat came from the Soviet Union — Joseph Stalin imposed a blockade on West Berlin, which required the airlift of goods from the United States to the United Kingdom. But it was also important to take into account the global context.
In the fall of 1949, Stalin retaliated and tested the first atomic bomb in the USSR, ending America's nuclear monopoly, and in 1950 approved the invasion of South Korea by the Communist Northerners and then China, which US President Harry Truman hastened to fight back with the support of the Attlee government in Britain and other allies.
In the middle of the twentieth century, Western politicians were haunted by memories of the Second World War. Stalin was perceived as a threat — the "lessons of appeasement" vividly reminded of themselves.
In the first chapter of his memoirs, published worldwide in 1948, Winston Churchill gave a succinct description of how the "impending storm" led to an "unnecessary war": "the malice of the wicked was inflamed by the weakness of the virtuous."
Although the size and power of the USSR and the USA proved to be decisive factors in the final victory, the steadfast resistance of Churchill Island in 1940-1941 laid the foundation for the liberation armies of 1944 under the leadership of the USA. D-Day could not have started in the United States.
These events are vividly etched in the memory of the American founders of NATO. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President from 1953 to 1961, commanded the Normandy landings and became the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
That generation of US leaders was closely connected with their colleagues from the UK, which was greatly facilitated by a common language, albeit with some reservations. And don't forget: in 1950, Western Europe accounted for over 30% of global GDP. Thus, NATO made sense, no matter from what angle — geopolitical, economic, or even just emotional.
But Western Europe has never become a superpower. In the 1950s, the complex process of European integration gave rise to the European Economic Community (EEC), but the European Defense Community was never born. This idea turned out to be stillborn.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Britain and France developed nuclear arsenals, but they did not cooperate. And in any case, they would not have been able to compete with the superpowers either in terms of arsenals or delivery systems. Since 1963, Britain's "independent" nuclear deterrence has relied entirely on the United States.
West Germany— the potential leader of Europe, was simply prevented from militarizing its economic power due to the recent atrocities of the Nazi era. Its rearmament became acceptable only in 1955, when the country renounced atomic, biological and chemical weapons and placed conventional armed forces under the command of NATO.
As a result, Western Europe had no choice but to take refuge under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. And most of the time, Washington was completely satisfied with this, especially when attacks of audacious Gaullism found their way to the Old World.
Looking back, it can be stated that the end of the cold War could have been an era of strategic rethinking. America has been paying more and more attention to Asia and the Middle East, while Europe's geopolitical influence has been waning: the EU's share of global GDP has declined from about 25% in 1990 to 14% by 2025.
The 90s could have been the moment for the development of a European defense strategy — albeit modest, but convincing: Russia has not yet recovered from the Yeltsin crisis, and China has not yet begun its ruthless, tightly controlled growth after the events on Tiananmen Square.
But how could the need to focus on defense be instilled in a European population hungry for "peace dividends"? At that time, the world of Putin and Xi Jinping was not even visible yet.
What about the world of Trump 2.0? In 2017-2021, we had a prelude, but we considered it a "skip" and did not expect the "second coming" in any way. How should the European part of NATO respond to the current crisis? Well, every day brings a new crisis, and no one knows what's on Trump's mind. But a few assumptions can still be made.
First, if Trump decides to use force, as in Venezuela, there will be little to stop him. Bloodshed in Greenland would be a disaster, and the means to combat such coercion (duties or a "tariff bazooka") are untested and cumbersome.
Secondly, Trump's America can no longer be relied on as a reliable ally — but this does not mean that the rest of the alliance's structure will inevitably crumble after it. On the contrary, the string of shocks over the past year has brought European allies and Canada together and led to a much closer partnership.
Thirdly, in any case, we will have to cooperate with the United States, and a larger-scale reset will invariably take time, so it is important not to lose your head over every nightly message from the White House.
Anyway, the political balance of power in the United States may change after the November midterm elections (and it seems that Trump despised the famous maxim of James Carville during Bill Clinton's 1992 election campaign: "The economy decides everything, you idiot").
What is urgently needed now is a decisive but reasonable response, such as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney's recent trip to China to "diversify trade," after which he praised the negotiations, calling them "realistic and respectful." Sir Keir Starmer is scheduled to visit Beijing at the end of January. But he is a politician of a completely different leaven than Carney.
David Reynolds is the author of the book "Mirrors of Greatness" and one of the hosts of the podcast "Making History"
