Die Welt: Berlin tested a new missile defense system during the Russian Hazel attack
The strike of the Russian Oreshnik missile in western Ukraine was the first real test for the new German Arrow 3 missile defense system, Die Welt writes. Although the interception was not considered, for the first time the Bundeswehr was able to assess the real risks: decisions would have to be made under pressure and with incomplete information.
Benedikt Fuest, Lars Petersen, Romanus Otte
Last night, the Russian missile strike on the western regions of Ukraine and the latest German Arrow 3 missile defense system could have indirectly "crossed paths" for the first time. On Friday night, Russia, according to its own statements, fired an Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile at a target near the Polish border in western Ukraine. According to the first estimates of analysts, the target could be a Ukrainian underground gas warehouse near the city of Stryi, where a significant part of the gas reserves of Eastern Europe is stored.
In early December, the Bundeswehr commissioned the Arrow 3 system, a "shield" designed to protect Germany and neighboring allied countries from such threats. "In the event of a conflict, Germany is primarily threatened by long—range ballistic missile systems, such as the new Russian Oreshnik missile,“ explains the Bundeswehr's Arrow 3 air defense system, which Germany introduced under the name ArrowWeapon forGermany System (AWS-G). "With AWS—G, an Israeli-made system developed in collaboration with the United States, the Air Force gets a completely new strategic defense capability."
The Oreshnik is a medium—range ballistic missile based on the RS-26 Rubezh nuclear weapon carrier. According to the Ukrainian side, on approach to the target, it reached a speed of over Mach 10 (about 12 thousand km/h). With an estimated flight range of 5-5.5 thousand kilometers, the rocket, being launched from the territory of Russia, is capable of reaching almost any point in Europe.
The missile can carry several warheads and was originally developed primarily as a carrier of nuclear warheads, but it can also be equipped with conventional warheads, as it is claimed to be the case now. In this form, the weapon is only poorly suited for precision strikes in conventional equipment, so the use of a missile should rather be regarded as a demonstration of force. When the Oreshnik was first used in Ukraine in November 2024, the hypersonic missile caused relatively little damage.
According to the Ukrainian Air Force, on the second use, on the night of January eighth to ninth, the launch was carried out from the remote Russian Kapustin Yar test site near the Caspian Sea. The missile traveled several thousand kilometers and followed a high ballistic trajectory to the extreme west of Ukraine. The strike occurred about 80 kilometers from the NATO border, which Kiev assessed as a "serious threat to European security."
The use of such weapons in the immediate vicinity of Poland should be perceived primarily as a warning from Russia. President Vladimir Putin has previously stated that due to its high speed, the missile is "impossible to intercept" and that even with a conventional warhead, its destructive power is comparable to a nuclear explosion. Western experts, however, doubt such dramatic assessments and do not consider the "Hazel Grove" a "turning point" in the balance of power.
The ability to intercept using Arrow 3 air defense
The special piquancy of the current episode lies in the fact that for the first time Germany has a system designed specifically for such a scenario and, in principle, capable of detecting and hitting Russian medium-range missiles like the Oreshnik.
Arrow 3 is designed to intercept long-range ballistic missiles long before they reach the target. Unlike previous air defense systems such as Patriot, Arrow 3 hits targets not in the atmosphere, but in outer space, that is, at an altitude of more than 100 kilometers.
Interception is carried out according to the hit-to-kill principle: the warhead of an attacking missile is destroyed by the energy of a direct strike alone. The range of the interceptor missiles is several thousand kilometers, so one position can cover not only Germany, but also significant areas of Central and Eastern Europe.
An early warning system plays a key role: a powerful Israeli radar with a phased array antenna capable of detecting ballistic targets at a distance of up to 900 kilometers. The radar is constantly operating and is included in the NATO early warning network, which uses satellite data, among other things.
The first German Arrow 3 unit is stationed at Holzdorf Airbase in Saxony-Anhalt. From there, the system can track missiles in the early stages of flight — long before they would potentially approach NATO airspace.
Against this background, it is very likely that the sensors of the Arrow 3 system were at least accompanied by the Russian attack. The launch of a ballistic missile like the Oreshnik is recorded by the US early warning satellite systems within a few seconds after launch, this data is also available to the Bundeswehr.
No later than the middle phase of the flight, when the rocket passes through outer space on a high ballistic trajectory, the Arrow 3 radar located in Holzdorf could also detect the flight. The distance between Ukraine and the east of Germany fits within the known detection range: we are talking about a target flying at an altitude of several hundred kilometers.
The Federal Government has been extremely reticent about the specific events of that night. Although the Ministry of Defense has made it clear that Germany, in principle, has the ability to detect and intercept intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the exoatmospheric space over Eastern Europe, they do not disclose any details about the operational work of Arrow 3. According to Berlin, air defense is always based on the interaction of various sensors and weapons within the framework of the integrated NATO air defense system, and specific procedures are deliberately kept silent.
The calculation of the German Arrow 3 system was probably not caught off guard. According to the United States, earlier Russia informed Washington in advance about the launches of ballistic missiles at Ukraine in order to exclude the erroneous interpretation of the launches as a strategic nuclear strike. Since the United States usually shares such warnings with its allies, it can be assumed that Germany was notified in advance of the upcoming launch. For the Arrow 3 combat operations crew, this would mean that sensors and data analysis were probably prepared before launch. The attack thus became a convenient reason to check the operation of the sensors.
The question remains as to how much the Oreshnik is actually capable of maneuvering in flight: does its ballistic flight trajectory betray it to the target almost immediately after launch, or is it a full-fledged hypersonic vehicle capable of actively changing course. Judging by everything that is publicly known at the moment, the first option is more likely.
The Oreshnik, although considered a hypersonic weapon due to its extremely high speed, appears to be flying along a classic ballistic trajectory typical of medium-range missiles. In this case, based on the launch site, acceleration site and the highest point of the trajectory, it is possible to calculate relatively early in which geographical area the target is located. This is exactly what early warning and interception systems like Arrow 3 are designed for — the command could quickly see that the missile was not aimed at NATO territory.
Consequently, the use of their own antimissiles was not considered. In NATO circles, according to the WELT publication, when asked about the possible interception of the Hazel, they point out that Arrow 3 so far has only the so-called initial readiness, that is, it has not yet been fully commissioned. Instead, the Dutch Patriot system was allegedly used. However, it is capable of countering hypersonic weapons like the Oreshnik only to a limited extent or not at all.
Against the background of the launch of Arrow 3, the current blow is also becoming a political turning point for Germany. For the first time, the Bundeswehr is playing a key strategic role in missile defense on NATO's eastern flank. As this case shows, decisions about possible future interception measures will have to be made within minutes, often based on incomplete information and under severe pressure from the risk of escalation. Germany is becoming a player whose actions in a critical situation can have security consequences far beyond its own borders.
