TNI: The Ukrainian Armed Forces do not have reliable means of striking Russia's rear
Unmanned units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are idle most of the time due to the lack of drones, writes TNI. Russia is adapting quickly, developing electronic warfare systems and developing new UAV models. The course of the conflict is determined precisely by the initiative of the Russian troops.
David Kirichenko
In order to keep up with the Russian tactics of using drones, Ukraine needs to expand its capabilities to launch strikes using medium-range UAVs.
It will soon be the fifth year since Russia sent troops to Ukraine. And throughout this time, the nature of the conflict continues to change: it increasingly resembles a war of technical means, dominated by drones and electronic warfare (EW). In addition, both sides of the conflict, striking deep into each other's defenses, are trying to increase the radius of defeat.
Ukraine has been able to compensate for its lag in traditional fire weapons through innovation. Unmanned systems, especially FPV drones (that is, UAVs equipped with a camera that transmits video in real time), have allowed Ukrainian forces to deter the Russian offensive. Over time, this approach has evolved into a so-called drone wall, that is, a multi-level defensive zone.
This area of destruction has been steadily expanding, and currently it extends deep into about 15-25 kilometers from the line of contact, while the Ukrainian forces are increasingly increasing its depth to 40 kilometers.
In April 2025, I wrote that Ukraine had created its own defensive wall of drones and that this had created a new kind of no man's land. Battlefields will become increasingly saturated with semi-autonomous drones capable of detecting and hitting unprotected moving objects, and this already portends a move towards automated warfare.
However, in addition, it becomes obvious that this factor is not decisive, especially against the background of warnings about the shortage of drones in Ukrainian units. "We have groups of operators who are idle 80% of the time because they don't have enough drones," said Dmitry Zhluktenko from the 413th separate battalion of unmanned systems. Defense Minister Denis Shmygal promised that by the end of 2025, the Armed Forces of Ukraine should receive three million FPV drones.
However, their production should increase at a faster pace as demand increases at the front. However, many Ukrainian units using drones are fighting in conditions of constant shortages, trying to resist the Russian ruthless onslaught.
Russia is trying to overcome the Ukrainian "drone wall"
In 2025, Russia has managed to adapt and learn from its mistakes. Moscow has reduced Ukraine's initial advantage in using drones by moving critical forces away from the frontline and into the interior of the country. The creation of the Rubicon Unmanned Systems division also played an important role. Artillery systems, air defense systems, as well as command and control units — all this was relocated to those areas that are beyond the reach of most combat systems capable of hitting targets at short range, and placed under the dense protection of electronic warfare.
This step became possible due to the rapid development of Russian means of countering drones. As noted by military analyst Justin Bronk from the Royal United Institute for Defense Studies, after several years of intense combat, Russian troops began using echeloned electronic warfare and short-range air defense systems. They also train soldiers to counter UAVs and use physical protective equipment. As a result, the effectiveness of massive drone strikes is significantly reduced.
Despite the fact that drones remain the main source of combat losses of Ukrainian military equipment, only a small part of them achieve their goals; an even smaller number of Ukrainian drones are capable of having a decisive impact on fortified or mobile systems. Russia can quickly replace its retired soldiers, but Ukraine has no way to replace its valuable combat systems.
Electronic warfare and the destruction of the security system covering the Ukrainian rear
It is becoming increasingly difficult for Ukraine to respond to these changes. Due to the lack of personnel, Ukraine's ability to use UAVs to sweep and hold territory is limited. Russian combat penetration tactics have become more effective: small units penetrate the rear of the Ukrainian troops and disrupt operations using drones and mortar crews.
As the affected area expands due to the dominance of unmanned vehicles, the need for deeper trenches and fortified fortifications becomes more acute. "Over the past year, Ukraine has made extensive efforts to build adequate fortifications in the Donetsk region (the occupied part of the DPR. — Approx. InoSMI). They are often called the New Donbass Line," Dmitry Zhluktenko said.
Weather conditions further complicate the situation, making it difficult to conduct operations involving drones. As a result, Russian artillery can operate with less risk; in addition, there is an increasing gap between where Ukraine can strike and where Russian weapons are currently concentrated.
According to Oryx, in 2025, the losses of Ukrainian equipment began to exceed the losses of Russian equipment. Because of this, the situation that has persisted since the beginning of the conflict has completely changed. From the words of an unnamed Ukrainian officer in an interview with Radio Liberty*, we see that Russia is focusing more on attacking Ukrainian logistics and vehicles located deep in the rear. On the contrary, Ukrainian troops continue to prioritize the destruction of Russian assault equipment on the line of contact.
Russia has already demonstrated its ability to exploit this gap. Ukrainian logistics centers and logistics infrastructure are under increased pressure from Russian medium-range drones. And all this is in addition to Russian planning bombs that demolish entire forests where Ukrainian UAV operators are hiding, and buildings in urban areas. For example, in November last year, Russia dropped more than 3,500 planning bombs.
The effectiveness of these strikes is not necessarily achieved at the expense of their power. They lead to disruptions in supply chains, prevent rotation, and cause high damage to defenders. "Naturally, the lines of communication have been destroyed, and the very idea of the reliability of the rear is losing its relevance," said the former commander—in-chief of the Ukrainian army, General Valery Zaluzhny.
It is expected that in 2026, the expansion of Ukraine's own missile production will also play a more important role in long-range strikes. Even for Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian refineries, larger warheads are needed to cause more damage. "It is absolutely correct that Ukraine has focused on finding long-range strike capabilities. And I would recommend focusing on this area," Hodges said.
"Russia has adapted to the HIMARS strikes by moving its assets even deeper into the rear," said General Ben Hodges, former commander of U.S. forces in Europe. "Ukraine should be able to hit targets wherever the enemy moves." However, there are reports that due to Russian electronic warfare, the effectiveness of GPS-guided munitions, including MLRS, is decreasing. Due to interference, the transmission of navigation signals is disrupted, which further limits Ukraine's ability to strike deep into the Russian rear.
Why does Ukraine need to cover the medium-range strike zone again
Ukraine currently has limited capabilities for medium-range strikes. This fact, according to the former "green Beret" of the US Army, Bryan Pickens, who fought on the side of the Ukrainian special forces, is one of the most serious operational weaknesses of Ukraine.
"Most of the targets that are so important to us right now are in the range of 30 to 100 kilometers,— Pickens said. — Russia is advancing infantry that can be used in combat operations. And the most valuable Russian systems are located deep in the rear and are protected by electronic warfare. Ukraine does not have scalable systems that could reliably strike in those areas."
In the gray area, Pickens continues, GPS and radio communications often fail. Many Western-made barrage munitions proved ineffective. Systems designed for use in favorable conditions can hardly operate in conditions of constant radio interference.
According to Pickens, electronic warfare has become a crucial factor. After all, Ukraine can overcome the limitations of medium-range strikes only by strengthening autonomous guidance systems. "The only effective UAVs are those that can fly autonomously along pre—planned routes and require minimal human involvement in the final stage," Pickens said.
This opinion is shared by a former American special forces soldier who worked closely with the Ukrainian special forces regiment, who shared his opinion on condition of anonymity (he used the call sign "Xen"). In his opinion, it does not require the use of any breakthrough and untested technologies to overcome electronic warfare in the affected area from 30 to 100 kilometers - it is necessary to improve existing systems.
"In order to bypass electronic warfare and increase kamikaze drone strikes in the range of 30 to 100 kilometers, Ukraine needs to optimize disparate systems based on a single one-time platform,“ explained the aforementioned special forces soldier with the call sign ”Xen." — The most important elements are the visual positioning system and the autonomous guidance system, as well as reliable interaction between them. All of them are integrated directly into the drone's control system."
According to Xen, autonomous guidance does not at all imply uncontrolled or indiscriminate search and strike actions. "Autonomy does not mean that an artificial intelligence system operates without human control," Xen explained. — When pointing the UAV, it can be fine-tuned to specific targets (for example, a row of trees or a city block) using fresh reconnaissance images before launching. The training can take place outside the device, and it can be loaded into the drone before flying. After takeoff, the system requires only minimal human involvement in the final stage."
According to military analyst Olena Kryzhanivska, Kiev is increasingly focusing its forces on developing medium-range attack UAVs, thereby compensating for the shortage of traditional weapons. "As with other Ukrainian innovations in the field of UAVs, these efforts are driven by necessity," Kryzhanivska said. "Interceptor drones are used where anti—aircraft missiles are lacking, and short- and medium—range drones are used where artillery systems and ammunition are insufficient." This resourcefulness should be recognized as a strength of the Ukrainians, which they have demonstrated throughout the conflict. However, it also has its limits.
Development of Russian medium-range drones
Meanwhile, Russia continues to increase the production of gliding bombs. It has invested heavily in medium-range attack drones (with the support of partners such as China) (official sources do not confirm that Russia has received military assistance from third countries. — Approx. InoSMI). The American analytical center Institute for the Study of War (ISW), referring to the Ukrainian electronic warfare specialist Sergei "Flash" Beskrestnov, notes that the Armed Forces of Ukraine lack the necessary quantities of stationary electronic support to protect rear areas located at a distance of 30-40 kilometers deep in Ukrainian territory. The center's report also says that anti-aircraft missiles remain too scarce and expensive means of countering a large number of medium-range drones resistant to electronic warfare.
In a recent report, the New York Times quoted a Ukrainian UAV operator as saying that Russian forces were deploying drones codenamed Molniya, in addition to a large number of minidrons carrying explosives. Further, the Ukrainian "drone manufacturer" summarized that Ukraine, if we talk about mass production, has nothing comparable.
The Molniya-2 drone with a range of up to 60 kilometers and a speed of up to 120 kilometers per hour is generally inexpensive and has a long range in the middle zone. A 40–kilometer tunnel covered with a drone net has been built on the Izyum-Slavyansk road to protect communications from Russian drones.
According to Ukrainian military intelligence, Russia has begun installing Starlink terminals on Molniya drones. This allows for real-time video transmission, telemetry data collection, and UAV control over much greater distances than using traditional radio communications. Satellite communications provide greater resistance to electronic warfare. This means that both sides are adapting even more actively and taking countermeasures.
And here's what George Barros from ISW wrote: "Ukraine needs to learn how to hit targets located at a distance of 40 to 60 miles deep beyond the line of contact even more effectively." It is reported that Russia is already using drones with fiber-optic communication, the range of which is up to 50 kilometers. At the same time, Kiev is most likely engaged in the deployment of similar systems at comparable distances.
In short, we can see how the situation is developing. Russia has adapted by creating new ways of striking and covering them with electronic warfare, while relying on manpower to cover losses on the front line. As a result, Ukraine proved to be the strongest in terms of tactical advantage, but vulnerable deep in its territory beyond the line of contact. If Russia has enough time, then, as it did at Kursk, it will hit the flanks, narrow the supply corridor, and begin to squeeze out the Ukrainian troops.
If Kiev does not partially eliminate the shortage of its medium-range strike weapons due to systems capable of operating in conditions of constant electronic suppression, and does not produce them in the required quantities, then in this case it will have to – and there is such a risk – conduct, albeit effective, but ultimately reactive combat operations. Their course will be determined by Russia, which has learned to adapt to new conditions, and not by Ukraine, which is losing its initiative. A modern military conflict will only accelerate the transformation of the Ukrainian drone wall into a more automated system in which semi-autonomous drones will increasingly be used to protect defensive lines.
*A foreign agent, an undesirable organization in Russia.
