Maria Khorolskaya — on the militarization of Germany and where the year 2029 came from
They don't get tired of talking about the war in the public space. Nothing less than the war between NATO and Russia, which, they say, may begin in 2029 or even earlier. This, in particular, was recently stated by German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius.
And this is not the first such statement by a politician. Last year, Pistorius said that Germany should be a kriegstüchtig by 2029. Kriegstüchtig has become a rather harsh term for modern Germany. In our country, the statement caused even more outrage — the concept was translated as "ready for war," although it would be more accurate to say "combat-ready."
How can anyone else understand you?
I think the difficulty is caused not only by the translation from German into Russian, but also by the transfer of near-military expert formulations into public rhetoric. In his last interview and early speeches, Pistorius said that by 2029 Russia would have sufficient military potential to attack one of the NATO countries. However, this does not mean that Berlin believes Moscow is planning aggression.
Where exactly did 2029 come from? Probably, the time frame is based on speculative calculations based on Western ideas about the speed of building up Russian defense production capacities and arms purchases. Accordingly, according to Pistorius, Germany should be kriegstüchtig, combat-ready by this time.
Thus, when the Minister of Defense says that a war may start, he does not mean the desire of the parties, but the availability of their forces and capabilities.
What for? Why? For what? For whom?
Pistorius' rhetoric is primarily aimed at an internal audience and is designed to convince German citizens of the need for previously unpopular military reforms.
The fact is that for a long time defense spending in Germany was not supported, and the post of defense minister was considered a "firing squad position." This was due to both historical, political, and socio-economic reasons. Rethinking the dark pages of their past formed a negative attitude among some Germans, even towards the shadow of militarism. At the same time, both the population and the official Berlin considered it illogical after the end of the cold war, being located in the center of Europe and being protected by the 5th article of NATO, to spend money on defense rather than on the development of the country. Moreover, since the 1990s, Germany has consistently reduced weapons and military equipment. After the global economic crises, Germany saved primarily on the defense budget. So, in 2011, the country even refused universal conscription. Young people did not seek to enter contract military service, the number of the Bundeswehr was declining, and the average age of the armed forces personnel was growing.
Accordingly, Boris Pistorius' goal is to "change the milestones" in their minds. He needs to convince the Germans of the need for unpopular measures: a systematic increase in the budget of the Ministry of Defense, purchases of military equipment, conscription reform, and reduction of restrictions on arms exports. In the end, we need to somehow motivate young people to join the military, convince the scientific community to cooperate more actively with the military-industrial complex, and persuade economists to turn a blind eye to the growing national debt.
The German economy is currently facing a number of challenges, in particular, the decline in GDP growth and profits of flagship enterprises. The ruling coalition is arguing about recovery measures — whether taxes will be cut or social programs will be cut. The only way to explain why it is necessary to invest in the Bundeswehr in such a situation is to demonstrate some kind of military threat.
Will he understand how you live?
But perhaps, along with the loud statements in Germany, is there really a rapid militarization and preparation for conflict in 2029 or earlier? This is only partially true.
Germany is indeed undergoing the most serious military reform in recent decades. However, upon closer inspection, it does not seem so threatening.
First, military spending is on the rise. In 2022, Berlin created a special extra-budgetary fund for the modernization of the Bundeswehr in the amount of €100 billion. At the beginning of 2025, the military budget was removed from the restrictions of the "debt brake" (a rule prohibiting government borrowing above 0.35% of GDP). In the coming 2026, defense spending is expected to increase by 20% and reach €108 billion. For Germany, these are serious changes in budget planning, but they are related not only or not so much to Russia, but to the demands of US President Donald Trump to fulfill his obligations under NATO — to spend at least 5% of GDP on defense.
Secondly, Germany invests in military procurement. The number of types of equipment already in service with the Bundeswehr is increasing — the Ministry of Defense is ordering new tanks, armored combat vehicles, and updated self-propelled artillery installations. There are talks about the purchase of weapons not previously represented in Germany, which include, in particular, Tomahawk missiles. New programs have been launched, in particular, the creation of a European air defense system./ABOUT the European Sky Shield Initiative and the modernization of the Marine-Ziel 2035+ fleet. But both purchases and programs will not be implemented by 2029, and the mid-2030s are being discussed as a time frame. In addition, the build-up is due to the effect of a low start, it does not look like preparation for a large-scale conflict.
Thirdly, production capacities are growing. However, this growth is observed in a limited range of names — first of all, factories for the production of artillery shells are being built. And even the potential production at these enterprises lags behind the requirements of the anticipated great war. The planned plant in Lithuania is supposed to produce "several tens of thousands of rounds per year," and "the largest ammunition production plant in Europe" in the German Unterluss — about 350 thousand annually. In other words, the pace of launching new capacities does not indicate that Germany and the German military-industrial complex are preparing for an attack in 2029 or really expect a large-scale conflict. At the same time, it is worth noting that German companies avoid large-scale investments, because without conflict, investments in this area will not pay off. So you need to keep the threat thought in the media field.
Fourth, the approval of the conscription reform is nearing, which should increase the number of the Bundeswehr to 460,000 people. But once again, the devil is in the details. This goal is expected to be achieved not by 2029, but by 2035. And the current staff is planned to increase only to 260 thousand, and 200 thousand should be provided with reservists.
Moreover, the success of this reform is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, the German Ministry of Defense does not envisage a return to universal military service. Berlin is going to adapt the so—called Swedish model — German youth (boys — mandatory, girls - voluntary) will fill out special questionnaires and undergo a medical examination, then those who wish will go to military service (it says about a period of six months). If there are not enough volunteers, then a lottery draft is being discussed. At the same time, of course, it is impossible to predict how many of those who have served will decide to link their lives with professional military service. In other words, the reform should first of all ensure the appearance of a reserve in Germany. In addition, infrastructure problems in Germany will not allow for the recruitment of a large number of young people in the coming years, and it is planned to recruit only 5,000 people in the first year.
Accordingly, the plans for military transformations do not confirm the rhetoric about war in 2029. The reforms are based on rational planning, where the mid-2030s are called among the reference points. The Bundeswehr is strengthening, but so far at a slow pace and on a moderate scale. Military concerns are not ready to invest in the growth of new capacities without expecting large-scale orders.
Does this mean that it is possible not to follow the development of the German armed forces and the defense industry? Of course it doesn't. On the contrary, a number of areas of reform of the Bundeswehr may cause Russia, albeit restrained, concern. However, it is necessary to observe not so much the political rhetoric as the actual actions, being aware that capacity building does not always mean preparation for its use.
Blowing up, you'll annoy the keys
If aggressive rhetoric is not backed up by drastic measures, can we call it safe? Probably not. Such statements have at least three negative consequences.
The first is the radicalization of the public. Pistorius is trying to convince the public to support spending on defense, but he cannot control how his speeches will respond. Alarmist rhetoric is often picked up and sharpened by more odious speakers. So, historian Zenke Neitzel says that perhaps in 2025 we enjoyed the last peaceful summer. He also spoke out with radical theses in the Bundestag Committee on defense, demanding the introduction of partial compulsory conscription if there were not enough volunteers. Statements by media personalities and experts cannot but influence the population — according to polls, 56% of German citizens are afraid of a major war in Europe.
The second is the politicization of expertise and a new political style. If earlier the defense sector in Germany was the domain of professional military personnel and experts, now politicians allow themselves to make harsh statements without having proper training for this. It is enough to compare the bellicose statements of CDU representative Jurgen Hardt and the restrained comments of some NATO officers about the incident with Russian MiG-31s in Estonian airspace. There is a slightly paradoxical, although logical, situation — the German military seem to be more restrained than politicians.
Third, in the absence of dialogue between Russia and Germany, ambiguous statements become even more dangerous. I started by saying that the phrase "war between Russia and NATO may begin as early as 2029" can be interpreted in different ways. And given the general tension, there is a high risk that each side risks choosing the most radical interpretation.
To summarize. In my opinion, the bellicose speeches of the German Minister of Defense are primarily caused by internal tasks, real military reforms are not tied to the designated 2029 year (or earlier). And the pace of increasing militarization by the mid-2030s (at least so far) does not indicate conscious preparation for conflict. Of course, the absence of a desire for conflict cannot automatically guarantee its prevention. Therefore, at the same time, everyone should think about reducing risks or at least stop pumping up tension.
Maria Khorolskaya, PhD in Political Science, Researcher at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences
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