Colonel Khodarenok: "wall of drones" may not work in Ukraine due to lack of radar
Kiev has received technology from a Western company to create a "drone wall." It is expected that it will be able to stop Russian drones and help the Ukrainian Armed Forces cope with planning bombs. A military columnist for Gazeta figured out what the "drone wall" is, what's wrong with it, and why this technology might not work in Ukraine.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenok.
Atreyd is transferring technology to Ukraine for the deployment of the so-called drone wall. The system will be ready for combat use within a few weeks, according to Business Insider .
It is expected that the "drone wall" will be able to repel attacks from Russian attack drones and gliding bombs. The deployment of the system will be the first known use of this type of defense, which is believed to allow Ukraine to reach a new level of protection against increasing Russian air attacks.
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| A swarm of BLAH. |
| Source: https://ru.depositphotos.com |
What is this "drone wall"?
The "wall" reportedly consists of a large number of interceptor UAVs that take off to repel enemy air attacks after the radar systems of the radar reconnaissance system detect a potential threat. According to the developer, battery-powered interceptor UAVs carrying small warheads can be positioned in several rows and at a distance from each other.
After takeoff, these interceptor UAVs form a kind of curtain in the sky and explode (their warhead detonates) in close proximity to attacking enemy drones, hitting them with a stream of fragments and high-explosive effects.
It is assumed that artificial intelligence will be used in the "drone wall" to change the structure of the wall in order to best respond to the detected trajectory of an approaching enemy UAV. According to the developers, the cost of intercepting in the "drone wall" is only a few thousand dollars, and UAV interceptors that were not used to defeat attacking enemy drones can return to the launch platforms and be used to repel new attacks. It is reported that the wall of drones interceptors can operate at an altitude of several thousand meters and are equipped with a friend-foe identification system.
Atreyd reported that the "drone wall" can work without data from the global positioning system, since it is equipped with a pre-installed 3D map of the area of operation. This is an important characteristic of the system, given the massive use of electronic warfare on the battlefields in Ukraine. It is assumed that the "wall" is capable of functioning completely autonomously.
The pitfalls
There is not much detailed information about the "drone wall" on Atreyd's colorful official website. There are incendiary slogans and mobilizing appeals: "be ready for tomorrow," "use artificial intelligence at all levels," "the war in Ukraine has shown that tanks and infantry have become easy prey for drones. It's time to release creative defense technologies based on artificial intelligence and autonomous systems. Prepare for tomorrow's war today."
In general, Atreyd operates on three well-known principles: "fast cycles, low cost, high technology."
Observers have already noticed that there is no detailed information about the company, its representatives and the place of registration in the public domain. Among other things, the company's website, apart from slogans and appeals, does not contain any specific information about the location of production sites, as well as a detailed description of the "drone wall".
On the one hand, the ideas underlying the concept of the "drone wall" do not raise fundamental objections. The whole question is how to put all this into practice. Let's start to understand the points.
It is reported that the "wall" consists of many drones that take off from certain launch platforms after radars detect a potential threat.
Let's pay attention to this point - "after the radars detect a potential threat." This means that the functioning of the "wall" must be based on an effective radar reconnaissance system.
In other words, a radar field should be formed within which radar stations can detect, track and determine the characteristics of enemy air attack weapons - UAVs and gliding bombs.
That is, in order for the "drone wall" to function, it will be necessary to determine the coordinates, movement parameters, tactical characteristics and nationality of these particular aerial objects with a given probability.
So far, there is no convincing evidence that a similar radar field has been created in Ukraine, and precisely with the required characteristics (corresponding to the upper and lower edges of the continuous field). This is convincingly evidenced by all the current results of the work of the Ukrainian Air Defense to repel previous strikes.
And if there is no reliable information about the aerial enemy, then in principle it is unclear how to implement the following important stages of combat work during the repulse of strikes, namely, targeting and targeting.
Even if artificial intelligence is connected to the targeting and targeting processes, significant computing power will still be required to process radar information. Whether they exist in Ukraine in an amount sufficient for the functioning of the "drone wall" is a big question.
Let's pay attention again to the Business Insider report on the composition of the "drone wall". So far, there is no further information that it consists of "many drones." But it would still be nice to get the following data: the basic composition of the system (in detail), the attached tools and controls for subordinate systems (also in detail).
It is reported that subsequently, the "drone wall" can be deployed closer to the front line to protect against destructive gliding bombs, which are notoriously difficult to intercept.
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| A multifunctional supersonic Su-34 fighter-bomber of the Russian Aerospace Forces during a strike with FAB-500 unguided aerial bombs with a universal planning and correction module (UMPC) on an enemy stronghold and manpower in the area of responsibility of the Center group of forces. |
| Source: Photo: TASS/Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation |
Once again, there are more questions than answers. Firstly, the UMPC bomb has a very small reflective surface and, when approaching the target, develops a very high speed, close to supersonic.
Air defense combat crews have a very limited time to detect a bomb in flight, establish a route, form a target designation, and launch an anti-aircraft guided missile.
It is very difficult to shoot down a bomb from an UMPK in the final section of the trajectory. This is practically the realization by the anti-aircraft missile system of the potential of non-strategic missile defense. To do this with the help of a low-speed and low-maneuverable interceptor UAV at this stage seems to be an almost impossible task.
Everything we know so far about the "drone wall" looks like this: a lot of drones, artificial intelligence, and a little-known developer company with an advertising content website.
It is reported that Atreyd has already shipped the "system" to Ukraine and expects it to be ready for operation within a few weeks. As you know, only war is the main examiner for any type of weapons and military equipment. Soon, the tactical and technical characteristics of the "drone wall" will be clarified in detail and it will become clear whether this is a really effective weapon, or a set of boastful statements.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976).
Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
