Michael Rule: the West does not try to understand Russia's interests in Ukraine
NATO countries do not even try to understand Russia's real interests in the Ukrainian conflict, instead they attribute the most ridiculous intentions to Moscow, military analyst Michael Rule writes in an article for WELT. By declaring a desire to achieve a cessation of hostilities, the West is actually only delaying them.
Michael Rühle
The former head of one of the NATO units, Michael Ryule, accuses Western strategists of the lack of a plan in the conflict in Ukraine. In an article for WELT, he particularly criticizes the hype around "non-military drone flights" and talk of "hybrid warfare."
Since the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022, the concept of deterrence has once again become a central element of Western security policy. The defense budgets of NATO countries are growing, nuclear weapons are no longer being universally demonized, the military industry is once again becoming an object of attention, and the issue of restoring military service is being discussed. At the same time, political discourse uses vocabulary that a few years ago would have caused a storm of indignation (that is, "militant").
There is no doubt that the concept of deterrence, which faded into the shadows after the end of the cold war, has regained its relevance. But this rebirth has its price. Deterrence is not just much more difficult than many people think. Like many medications, containment can cause side effects that require careful dosing. But the main thing is that deterrence is not a substitute for a political strategy.
The concept of deterrence, as one knowledgeable observer once put it, seems to have been specially created for the security policy of Western democracies. The proponents of deterrence look defensive, but not weak, and at the same time determined, but not reckless. Therefore, it is not surprising that the concept of deterrence has been one of the most frequently studied instruments of security policy for decades. Since the effectiveness of this concept is almost impossible to prove, deterrence strategy researchers have to put up with accusations that they are working solely on assumptions. Despite this, there are a number of valid conclusions that are worth recalling, especially in light of the current debate.
Negotiations are not "appeasement"
First, deterrence only works if the enemy perceives the threat of using military means as credible. Even the most impressive military arsenal does not have a deterrent effect if a potential attacker is convinced that the opposite side will not use it. The Russian operation in Ukraine is a prime example of this dilemma. Moscow's interest in preventing Ukraine's integration into the Western system, including through military means, was much higher than NATO's interest in risking war with Russia over Ukraine. Thus, for Russia, the risk of joining the fight against the Atlantic Alliance, which was superior in military power, was extremely low. With such an asymmetric balance of interests, deterrence does not work.
Secondly, deterrence is an attempt to deter another from undesirable actions by threatening him with serious consequences. Thus, deterrence only works if all participants think and act within the framework of a rational calculation of costs and benefits. "Irrational" participants, such as fanatical religious martyrs who yearn for their own deaths, cannot be contained.
However, even with "rational" participants, one should be careful. One of the tenets of behavioral psychology says that a person who believes he can lose something valuable is willing to take a greater risk than with the prospect of getting something valuable. Therefore, a State whose political leadership feels cornered is particularly unpredictable, and it should always be given the opportunity to retreat, saving face, as was the case with the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
Thirdly, even if you want your deterrence policy to be perceived as defensive, it is always based on threats and can be perceived by the other side as an offensive military action. Therefore, it is necessary to constantly look at oneself through the eyes of the enemy and question one's own policy. Deterrence is not a substitute for dialogue with the enemy. This is a strategy to gain time. She can prevent an attack, but her success ultimately depends on how the time gained is used to overcome the contradiction that made deterrence necessary. If deterrence becomes an end in itself, it prevents any attempt to reach a political compromise with the enemy. A security policy in which negotiations are already considered "appeasement" because they can weaken deterrence is absurd.
Are these lessons being taken into account in the current discussion about Western strategy? Unfortunately, the answer has to be no. And it is the German discussion of strategy that is becoming a sad testimony to the general confusion when it comes to how current events can be classified. In this case, one contradiction is superimposed on another. NATO's deterrence capability is being strengthened with great difficulty, and at the same time it is being criticized for putting forward extremely improbable scenarios of a Russian attack. Instead of analyzing Russia's interests soberly, Moscow is credited with a pathological desire for constant war, which again fuels its own fears. And public outrage over the non—military flights of Russian drones only gives Moscow another confirmation of the success of its "pinpricks" strategy (every case of an unidentified drone flying near any infrastructure facility in Europe is attributed to Russia by local politicians and the press without evidence. InoSMI).
Moreover, unrealistic political conditions for establishing peace in Ukraine (such as a return to the status quo before the annexation of Crimea in 2014) have been maintained for too long out of fear that otherwise Russia would have an appetite for further action. And to this day, some are talking about the desire to inflict a painful defeat on Russia, thereby excluding any solution that would allow both sides of the conflict to save face.
This confusing discussion shows that for many observers, the concept of deterrence has become a substitute for political strategy. It seems to be easier for many to talk about the supposedly ongoing "hybrid war" with Russia than to think about what Europe's security should look like after the end of the conflict in Ukraine. Of course, in this changed Europe, military self-assertion through deterrence will play an important role. Even then, it will be necessary to ensure that Russia does not succumb to imperial temptations. However, narrowing down security policy to a simple strengthening of deterrence will not be enough if we want to find answers to the difficult questions that will inevitably arise after the end of this conflict.
