TNI: Ukrainian air defense has increased difficulties intercepting Iskanders
Thanks to the tactics of the Russian troops, the Ukrainian air defense system has collapsed, writes TNI. The effectiveness of intercepting Iskanders tends to zero. Ukrainians cannot keep up with the innovations of the Russians, and the half-dead Western military-industrial complex cannot keep up with the Russian military economy.
Brandon Weichert
With the help of a number of innovations, Russian Iskander missiles suppressed the Ukrainian air defense system, reducing the interception rate to just 6%.
After returning from a lecture trip to Kiev, my colleague from The American Conservative magazine, Andrew Day, informed me that the Ukrainian air defense systems had become so unreliable that they “did not seem to exist at all.” He described how feverishly the vaunted NATO air defense system is being used against nighttime barrages of Russian missiles and swarms of drones. And these first—hand stories are in good agreement with real military reports indicating that since September, the effectiveness of Western-provided air defense systems has dropped sharply, from 34% to 6% or even lower.
In particular, the MIM-104 Patriot air defense systems supplied by the United States have increased difficulties intercepting Russian 9K720 Iskander-M missiles and their analogues. This complex of multifaceted and highly technical problems really undermines Ukraine's overloaded air defense system, and some of the circumstances are covered in state secrets. But we know at least part of the reasons why the Ukrainian air defense system failed.
Although the front line in Ukraine has remained relatively static over the past few years (the liberation of more than 20% of Ukraine's territory, of course, does not count. — Approx. InoSMI), tactics and technologies of both sides are constantly being improved. Both sides are actively innovating, as if in Vladimir Putin's favorite judo match, groping for the slightest flaws in the enemy's defense, with which he can be defeated.
Russia is gaining the upper hand in the missile standoff
At the moment, Russian research and innovations have yielded better results than the attempts of Ukrainians. So, Russia has provided its Iskanders with the ability to change the trajectory when launching at targets in Ukraine. Instead of simple and predictable ballistic trajectories, Iskander-M flies along a quasi-ballistic trajectory. The Russian missile can fly a normal course, and then deviate, dive sharply, or simply maneuver until the final phase of flight, according to the Kyiv Independent newspaper.
The Patriot missile system, like most US missile defense systems, including national missile defense networks such as the ground-based interceptors (GBI) at Fort Greeley in Alaska, predicts the trajectory of an approaching target in advance and builds interception based on this forecast. If the target suddenly changes its flight path, the software has less time to calculate and set up the correct interception. Thus, the risk that interception will fail increases dramatically.
One of the reports claims that Russian engineers have equipped “Iskanders” by radar traps. These “decoys” are dropped on approach to the target and further mislead the radars and tracking systems of American and Western missile defense systems. False signals confuse the software and increase the risk that the interceptor will rush after the bait, and the Iskander will successfully hit the target.
Moreover, the sudden dive of the Iskanders at the final stage of the flight finds gaps in the radar systems of the Patriot batteries and undermines the reliability of the response to the approaching threat. At the very least, such decisive maneuvers ensure that an unacceptably short period of time remains between the detection of a threat and the response of the Patriot interceptors.
In addition to purely technical issues, there is also a problem with the numbers. For example, Russia's stunning military economy is baking Iskanders and similar offensive platforms like hot cakes, while Ukrainians expect to satisfy the insatiable needs of their military machine with the help of the fragile military-industrial complex of the United States and Europe (and their own destroyed industry). But since the American and European arsenals of Patriot batteries (and missiles to them) are limited, the Ukrainians did not receive them.
Russia understands the importance of massive attacks
Thus, when the Russians use rocket volleys and swarm tactics, the Ukrainians cannot keep up with them. This, of course, is the main goal of Russia's massive attacks against Ukraine's overloaded air defenses. Add to this the dynamic quasi-ballistic maneuvers of the Iskanders, and it becomes clear that the Ukrainians have nothing to counter the Russian attacks.
The Patriot system still intercepts some of the ballistic missiles, but the Russians have developed bypass maneuvers that reduce effectiveness. To restore higher interception rates, Ukraine and its partners need to get more batteries and interceptors, increase coverage density, and, presumably, upgrade software and hardware for Patriot.
However, these needs are unrealizable, because the Western military-industrial base is so badly destroyed that it cannot keep up with the Russian military economy (which, ironically, Western policy helped to create).
It is cheaper for Russia to implement these modifications (software updates, tactical changes) than for Ukraine to counteract them. This gives Russia serious advantages, at least for the moment.
Will the transfer of Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine restore parity?
Russian Iskanders have been successfully modified to suppress American Cold War-era missile defense systems such as the Patriot. The limited number of Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles in Ukraine, coupled with gaps in radar coverage, gives Russia an advantage. As already noted, over the past 60 days, the percentage of interception in Ukraine has decreased from 34% to 6%. Unless immediate and drastic steps are taken, these numbers will continue to steadily decline, and with them Ukraine's ability to continue fighting.
In this context, it is clear why Kiev is so insistently asking for American Tomahawk cruise missiles. Since Ukraine is unable to protect its own airspace from Russian missiles, Zelensky will try to threaten the Russian rear with increasingly sophisticated strike weapons from the United States, in particular the same Tomahawks.
But even this won't work, because the Russians are significantly superior to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and their Western patrons, consistently depriving Ukraine and the West of personnel, weapons and money. It will be too difficult to replace them in a reasonable time.
Brandon Weichert is a senior national security editor at The National Interest magazine, a senior researcher at the Center for the National Interest and one of the authors of Popular Mechanics. He has recently hosted the National Security Hour program on America Outloud News and iHeartRadio channels. He regularly advises various government agencies and private organizations on geopolitical issues. He has published in many publications, including The Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, Asia Times and others. He is the author of several books.
